Waltz

WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

Haas. Dorin & B. of P.

McClosky 281-

Volume VIII, Number 2 January 1956

Price $6.00 per year

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UNDER THE EDITORIAL SPONSORSHIP OF

CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

PUBLISHED BY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

EDITORIAL BOARD

FREDERICK S. DUNN, *Chairman*
WILLIAM W. KAUFMANN, *Managing Editor*
JEAN MACLACHLAN, *Assistant Managing Editor*
KLAUS KNORR, *Review Article Editor*
PERCY E. CORBETT — WILLIAM T. R. FOX
GORDON A. CRAIG — EDGAR S. FURNISS
HAROLD SPROUT

ADVISORY EDITORS

GABRIEL A. ALMOND — GRAYSON L. KIRK
CYRIL E. BLACK — HAROLD D. LASSWELL
BERNARD BRODIE — WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD
JEROME S. BRUNER — EDWARD S. MASON
MCGEORGE BUNDY — MAX F. MILLIKAN
RUPERT EMERSON — PHILIP E. MOSELY
HAJO HOLBORN — RICHARD C. SNYDER
PHILIP C. JESSUP — HANS SPEIER
JOSEPH E. JOHNSON — JACOB VINER
STEPHEN B. JONES — ARNOLD WOLFERS
QUINCY WRIGHT

The editors invite the submission of articles bearing upon problems of international relations. Editorial communications and manuscripts should be addressed to WORLD POLITICS, Woodrow Wilson Hall, Princeton, N.J.

Circulation and Advertising: WORLD POLITICS, Princeton University Press, Box 231, Princeton, N.J.

WORLD POLITICS is indexed by the *International Index to Periodicals*, and abstracts of its articles appear in *International Political Science Abstracts*.

Statements of fact and opinion appearing in WORLD POLITICS are made on the responsibility of the authors alone, and do not imply the endorsement of the editors or publishers.

Copyright, 1956, by Princeton University Press

WORLD POLITICS. Published quarterly by Princeton University Press. January 1956. Vol. VIII, No. 2. Entered as Second Class matter in the Post Office at Princeton, New Jersey, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press. Subscriptions $6.00 per year (two years $10.00); single copies $2.00. Foreign postage 25 cents additional per year.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORLD POLITICS

VOL. VIII • JANUARY 1956 • No. 2

CONTENTS

The Political Attitudes of German Business
Gabriel A. Almond 157

Changing Political Attitudes in Totalitarian Society: A Case Study of the Role of the Family
Kent Geiger 187

Some Thoughts on the Social Structure After a Bombing Disaster
Jack Hirshleifer 206

Massive Retaliation and Graduated Deterrence
Rear Admiral Sir Anthony W. Buzzard, RN (Ret.) 228

Regionalism, Functionalism, and Universal International Organization
Ernst B. Haas 238

The Congress of Vienna: A Reappraisal
Henry A. Kissinger 264

REVIEW ARTICLES

Concerning Strategies for a Science of International Politics
Herbert McClosky 281

The Fall of China
Franz Michael 296

The Contributors ii

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CONTRIBUTORS

GABRIEL A. ALMOND is Professor of Public and International Affairs and Research Associate in the Center of International Studies at Princeton University. The author of *The American People and Foreign Policy* (1950) and *The Appeals of Communism* (1954), he serves as an advisory editor of *World Politics*.

KENT GEIGER is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Tufts University and a member of the Russian Research Center at Harvard. He has written several articles on Soviet society and is now preparing a book of readings on Soviet social institutions.

JACK HIRSHLEIFER, Assistant Professor in the School of Business at the University of Chicago, also acts as a consultant to the RAND Corporation. He has recently published two articles dealing with the problem of war damage insurance.

REAR ADMIRAL SIR ANTHONY W. BUZZARD, Bart., C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E., who retired from the Royal Navy in 1954, was a member of the British strategic joint planning staff during World War II and served as Director of Naval Intelligence in London from 1951 to 1954.

ERNST B. HAAS, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California (Berkeley), is currently engaged in a study of the European Coal and Steel Community under a Social Science Research Council grant. With Allan S. Whiting, he published *Dynamics of International Relations* in 1955.

HENRY A. KISSINGER, the editor of *Confluence*, a quarterly published by Harvard University, is Executive Director of the Harvard International Seminar and Study Director of a study group on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. His book, *Peace, Legitimacy and the Equilibrium: The Nature of Conservative Statesmanship*, will appear in the late spring of this year.

HERBERT MCCLOSKY is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota and author, with John Turner, of the forthcoming *The Soviet Dictatorship*. Currently a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Stanford, he is preparing for publication the findings of several extensive field studies on the social-psychology of political participation.

FRANZ MICHAEL is Professor of Chinese History and Government and Assistant Director of the Far Eastern and Russian Institute at the University of Washington. He is engaged in writing a book on the modern history of the Far East with George Turner, as well as one entitled *Regional Forces and the Decline of China's Last Dynastic Government*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF GERMAN BUSINESS*

By GABRIEL A. ALMOND

THE surface indices of political life in Germany suggest that that nation has embarked upon a moderate pro-European and pro-Western course, and that political extremism and nationalism have no significant appeal at the present time.[1] Thus the elections of 1953 produced an overwhelming majority for the "moderate" parties. Neither the Communist Party nor specifically neo-Nazi formations attained significant votes or representation in the Bundestag in the election of that year. On the whole, the statements made by governmental, political, and interest group leaders have been cautious and responsible. Occasional manifestations of neo-Nazism have been local and limited in character. There is no evidence to suggest that such tendencies have widespread *organized* support either aboveground or underground.

It would, of course, be unsound to infer long-run political tendencies from surface indications in any country. Special caution is necessary in appraising internal German politics and German foreign policy trends in view of the historical record of nationalism, instability, and extremism. In our efforts to arrive at more soundly based judgments about German political potentialities, it may be useful to look beyond the record of current policy, overt positions of political parties, and electoral behavior into the underlying political attitudes of the population and of influential groups within it. The present article deals specifically with the attitudes of German businessmen on foreign policy problems, and is based on interviews conducted in Germany by the writer in the summer of 1954, and on other public opinion materials.[2]

Any effort at characterizing the historic patterns of political orienta-

* This article is based on a study prepared by the author for the RAND Corporation.

[1] See, for example, Otto Kirchheimer, "Notes on the Political Scene in West Germany," *World Politics*, VI, No. 3 (April 1954), pp. 306-21; and Hajo Holborn, "Achievements and Prospects of German Democracy," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXX, No. 3 (September 1955), pp. 421-34.

[2] Some seventy-seven businessmen and other informants were interviewed either in groups or as individuals. The interviews were conducted in the Rhineland-Ruhr, Frankfurt a. M., and Hamburg. This special interviewing of businessmen is one part of a broader study of German attitudes toward foreign policy sponsored by the RAND Corporation of Santa Monica, Calif. Similar studies have been made of the German military elite and bureaucracy and have been published in this journal. See Hans Speier, "German Rearmament and the Old Military Elite," *World Politics*, VI, No. 2 (January 1954), pp. 147-68; and John H. Herz, "German Officialdom Revisited," *ibid.*, VII, No. 1 (October 1954), pp. 63-83.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion of German business is bound to oversimplify and overgeneralize. Nevertheless, even an oversimplified model of earlier patterns may be analytically useful as a base from which to compare present tendencies. Scholars who have written on the historic role of the German middle classes and, more specifically, on the political attitudes of German industrialists ordinarily have included the following ingredients:[3]

(1) In the pre-World War I view of politics common among German industrialists, effective political power was viewed as in large measure beyond the control and responsibility of the individual. The appropriate attitude toward the bureaucratic and authoritarian order was a deferential one, conditioned upon the expectation that the autonomy of industry would be respected. The political parties which heavy industry tended to favor were those which supported the authoritarian bureaucratic regime.

(2) There were two types of favors which businessmen sought to obtain from government and politico-social authority: interest advantages and social recognition. For the first type of favor, a bargaining and "pressure politics" attitude was appropriate; the second called for the various forms of social lobbying: marriage into the legitimate orders of the landed aristocracy, the army, or the higher bureaucracy; purchase of estates; zealous performance of services; and imitation of the style of living of the ruling groups.

(3) A distinction was made between the legitimate, effective institutions of government, which were largely beyond popular control, and parliament and the political parties. For the latter institutions, there were mixed feelings of lack of confidence (even, at certain times and among certain groups, contempt) and fear. The lack of confidence resulted from the ambiguity in the power position of the parliament and its lack of dignity as compared with the traditional authoritarian institutions such as the monarchy, the bureaucracy, and the army. The fear resulted from the rapid emergence of the Social Democratic movement, which represented a threat to property through democracy and

[3] For appraisals of the role of the German middle classes and heavy industry, see Max Weber, "Parlament und Regierung im neugeordneten Deutschland," in *Gesammelte politische Schriften*, Munich, 1921, pp. 164ff. and *passim*; Sigmund Neumann, "Germany," in Taylor Cole, ed., *European Political Systems*, New York, 1953, pp. 292ff.; John H. Herz, "The Government of Germany," in Gwendolyn M. Carter, John C. Ranney, and John H. Herz, *Major Foreign Powers*, New York, 1952, p. 607; Rudolf Olden, *The History of Liberty in Germany*, London, 1946, pp. 121ff.; Guido de Ruggiero, *The History of European Liberalism*, London, 1927, pp. 271ff.; Eugene Anderson, "Freedom and Authoritarianism in German History," in Gabriel A. Almond, ed., *The Struggle for Democracy in Germany*, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1949, pp. 3ff.; Koppel S. Pinson, *Modern Germany*, New York, 1954, pp. 219ff.; and Wilhelm Mommsen, *Grösse und Versagen des deutschen Bürgertums*, Stuttgart, 1949.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

parliamentarianism. The middle classes and heavy industry failed to develop in any adequate sense a tradition of rational political discussion and of political participation, and the organizational and communications structure necessary to support such a tradition.

(4) In this general atmosphere of an authoritarian bureaucratic society, the sense of duty and obligation among the industrialists and businessmen took the form—beyond the requirements of obedience and patriotism—of a narrow concern with the conduct of the business enterprise—a kind of "enterprise fanaticism" (*Betriebsfanatismus*). This involved a specialized intelligence of a high order, but it was an intelligence that did not spill over into the political sphere. In politics, the attitude was one of submissiveness to the authoritarian order, or a sometimes cynical attempt to buy security by making contributions to all the parties to the right of the Socialists. This latter pattern became especially marked in the Weimar period.

(5) As far as attitudes toward international politics were concerned, the Bismarck experience suggested that scrupulousness about means was highly inappropriate in the international sphere. German nationalism was a rather massive and crude ideology, relatively unaffected by Christianity, liberalism, and cosmopolitanism. The bulk of the German middle classes, and particularly heavy industry, was strongly influenced by this nationalist ideology with its rational-ethical primitivism, and it supported the political parties and institutions that advocated it.

That there were significant differences in the business community goes without saying. Perhaps the big industrialists in the Ruhr came closest to conforming to the model sketched above, while the industrialists in southwest Germany, the Hanseatic cities, and the Catholic Rhineland had a more cosmopolitan orientation. Similarly, the political attitudes of the business community changed through time. In the early years after the shock of the defeat in World War I, a substantial part of the middle classes were ready to support the democratic, liberal parties, but, as early as 1921, the middle class began to revert to a nationalist, authoritarian orientation.

Though the defeat in World War II and the disorganizing experiences of the occupation have had an undeniable impact on the mentality of German businessmen, it does not appear that their basic pattern of political irresponsibility has been fundamentally changed. In the analysis which follows, it will be shown that the German business community of today is not nationalist, militaristic, or authoritarian in its political views; but, at the same time, the evidence does not point

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to the emergence of a democratic ideology, or to any widespread readiness to participate in politics and political discussion.

The physical and personal losses of the war and the difficult and painful readjustments of the postwar era have indeed produced a kind of ideological sobriety, but this is essentially a kind of negative learning, a rejection of political romanticism and enthusiasm. No positive ideology has at yet emerged to take the place of the older patterns, although there are a number of efforts in this direction. The striking achievements of German industry in the ten short years since the end of the war—the rebuilding of the German industrial plant and the attainment of a level of productivity higher than that of the prewar years—represent at least up to this point a primarily economic achievement. While some progress has been made in the political sphere, it would be a great exaggeration to speak of a political transformation in the business community.

The evidence examined below deals with the attitudes of German businessmen toward politics and political participation and toward a number of foreign policy issues—in particular, nationalism, reunification, rearmament, European integration, and East-West trade. A final section summarizes the significant findings and suggests admittedly speculative conclusions as to the stability of German foreign policy.

I. Political Involvement and Participation

Shortly after the West German election of 1953, the Evaluation Staff of the Office of Public Affairs of HICOG issued a report analyzing the election results.[4] One of the questions asked in the survey upon which the report was based went as follows: "How do you feel personally about the outcome and result of these elections in West Germany?" The classification of responses according to income and occupation makes it clear that the upper-income groups, businessmen, and the professions were the most enthusiastic about the results. Sixty per cent of those earning 800 DM or more per month described themselves as very pleased with the outcome. The degree of enthusiasm tended to decrease as income decreased. Among those earning under 150 DM per month, only 38 per cent were very pleased. The occupation breakdown showed that 56 per cent of the businessmen respondents and 62 per cent of the professionals described themselves as reacting very favorably to the election outcome.

[4] *A Survey Analysis of the Factors Underlying the Outcome of the 1953 German Federal Elections,* December 11, 1953. See also Erich Peter Neumann and Elisabeth Noelle, *Antworten: Politik im Kraftfeld der öffentlichen Meinung,* Allensbach am Bodensee, 1954, pp. 47ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This favorable attitude appears to have been an aspect of a more general optimistic business mood toward government and politics in West Germany. Responses to a question about the progress of democratization in Germany brought out the same pattern even more strikingly. Seventy-four per cent of the respondents earning 800 DM or over were of the opinion that "democracy in West Germany has become stronger in the course of the past few years."[5] Sixty-four per cent of the professionals and 58 per cent of the businessmen also recorded favorable reactions. A number of other questions of the same type reinforced the pattern of high optimism among the upper-income groups and businessmen.

In the same survey, questions were asked about the degree of interest which respondents had in regard to politics, and about any increase in their interest in the past few years. The higher-income groups, businessmen, and professionals manifested the highest degree of interest, and also claimed most frequently that their interest had increased.

A number of considerations suggest that these findings should be viewed with caution. In the first place, the questions were asked immediately after the 1953 elections and were affected by the unexpectedly powerful trend toward the moderate parties and away from the extremes. In addition, these views were expressed at a time when economic conditions were good, and when Germany seemed on the point of regaining her sovereignty and of being readmitted on an equal basis into the Western political and defense arrangements. Then, too, most of the questions were so worded as to get at "increases" or "decreases" in certain attitudes and feelings, and did not specify what the base was from which this "progress" had been made; nor did they go into the content and structure of these attitudes.

For answers to such questions of base, content, and structure we may examine interviews conducted by the present author, which, while they do not constitute a representative sample, do offer certain other advantages. For example, in these interviews, such topics as political involvement were often discussed in depth with respondents who included many officials of businessmen's organizations and political leaders whose contacts with the business community were constant and intimate and who could, therefore, qualify as experts on business opinion. Also, these interviews were more recent than the HICOG survey, and they took place during a period of difficulties in foreign policy rather than shortly after an election in which the business-supported parties won an overwhelming victory.

[5] HICOG, *Survey of 1953 Elections, op.cit.*, p. 56.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The picture that emerges from an analysis of these interviews suggests that German businessmen continue to take a narrow view of politics, and that their optimism about the political situation is based on the fact that the Adenauer government has been favorably disposed to the business interests and has been successful in both its internal and external policies. Only a small minority of those who were interviewed spoke with any confidence of a trend toward political involvement and responsibility among businessmen. And these were, in the main, men who were themselves politically active, or who were engaged in efforts to raise the level of political discussion and participation.

With only one or two exceptions, the Ruhr industrialists who were interviewed described themselves and their colleagues as *unpolitisch*, nonpolitical. Several commented on the fact that, with the breakup of the old iron and steel combines in the Ruhr, the old corporate feeling among the "Ruhr Barons" had been destroyed, and the new heads of the industrial units that succeeded them had not as yet developed a political style.

These appraisals of the attitudes of the Ruhr industrialists were confirmed and elaborated in interviews with the officers of businessmen's associations, leaders of the coalition parties, trade union leaders, and intellectuals. One official of the main trade union in the iron and steel industry, *I. G. Metall*, said that he did not expect the Ruhr industrialists to join the SPD, but believed that they should have some affiliation and involvement with those political parties which represented their interests. But as a group they still continued to be nonpolitical.

While most observers attributed this pattern of political indifference and narrow interest to the industrialists of the Ruhr, the patterns described in other parts of Germany and in other industrial fields were not strikingly different. The argument was often advanced that, by tradition, the South German industrialist, the Catholic Rhinelander, and the industrialist and merchant of the Hanseatic cities were more liberal and cosmopolitan than their counterparts in other sections of the country. While there is undoubtedly truth in this distinction, businessmen interviewed in these other areas did not claim to be politically involved and active. A Rhineland clothing manufacturer described his associates in the textile industry as being poorly informed and politically apathetic. This was an almost inescapable consequence of the conditions under which they carried on their business, he said. Nearly all of them were capital-poor. Their products had to move fast if they were to keep their enterprises operating. There was little, if any, time

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for reading, or for political interest to develop and be expressed. They looked to their trade associations to protect their interests.

Some stirrings are noticeable, however, especially among the younger industrialists. In a number of German cities there are junior organizations affiliated with the senior chambers of commerce. This movement, which has been encouraged by the Junior Chamber of Commerce of the United States, has as one of its goals encouraging young men in the business world to interest themselves in political and community affairs. It also hopes to change the gerontocratic pattern of German industrial organization, and to encourage the participation of younger executives in policy-making. Similar in purpose to the junior chamber of commerce movement is the organization of "Young Entrepreneurs," an affiliate of the Association of Independent Entrepreneurs. This youth group has about five hundred members, organized in eleven regional associations. It puts out a monthly publication in cooperation with the junior chambers of commerce. The organization stresses political responsibility, training for leadership, Europeanism, and internationalism.

There is a certain ferment among the older generations of German business as well, if the comments of Carl Neumann, Chairman of the Board of the Industry Institute, are accurate. "Democracy can only be successful among intellectually advanced peoples," he said. "The danger of tyranny can only be warded off through the resistance of free personalities. This is of decisive importance, the development from *mass* to *person*. And this is promoted through the free exchange of opinions. In business circles this kind of activity is observable everywhere. 'Discussion evenings' and conferences between employers and employees are no longer a new thing. We must extend and consolidate these tendencies."[6]

There can be little question that such movements among businessmen have a certain impact, and are tending to produce a nucleus of political leaders in the business community. But by the admission of industrialists themselves, this trend has not acquired significant momentum even among the younger age groups. In an interview in Frankfurt a. M., six young businessmen in a variety of fields discussed with great frankness the problem of political activity and interest in their own generation. They all agreed that the typical pattern involved avoidance of political commitment and activity. The reasons advanced differed. One rather hard-bitten son of a famous Ruhr family gave simple economic reasons. Politicians are poorly paid and have no se-

[6] Deutsches Industrieinstitut, *Unternehmerbrief*, October 29, 1953.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

curity of tenure. At the same time, high taxation makes it impossible for the businessman to accumulate a reserve. Hence, to go into a political career means making an economic sacrifice, and no one with good sense would do so. Another participant in the discussion thought the reasons were mainly psychological. German businessmen are traditionally so bound up with their jobs that they cannot turn readily to the insecure arena of politics. Another argued that the risks were too high in German politics. Germans could not forget what happened to liberal political leaders when the Nazis came in, what happened to the Nazis when the Allies came in, and they could not help but be troubled about what might happen to non-Communist political leaders if the Russians came in. They were unable to conceive of politics as a game in which an individual could have fun and still work for good causes. What impulses and energies were available after the end of the day's work they turned to esthetic interests, or to simple family obligations, friends, recreations, and enjoyments.

II. Nationalism

This picture of political indifference and narrow-interest mentality should not lead one to the conclusion that Germans or German businessmen have learned nothing from their experiences. It would be more accurate to say that the learning has been incomplete, the lessons are undigested, and present responses to the political situation are based upon simple power calculations and situational adjustments. The life of the spirit and of the imagination is at a low ebb in Germany, in politics as well as the arts. For politics, this has a positive as well as a negative implication. While there is no significant effort at ideological reconstruction, there are also no significant adventurist and extremist tendencies.

The reasons for this are simple and compelling. The disasters of the Hitler regime and the war are evident in the physical, biological, sociological, political, and military facts of German life. Despite the economic reconstruction of the postwar period, war ruins are inescapable, and they will continue to serve as physical reminders for years to come. The heavy incidence of casualties among the men now in the age group from thirty to forty-five leaves an extraordinarily large proportion of the population without the full protections and satisfactions of family life. And if one considers also the other sociological and psychological consequences of the war—the number of Germans who fled, or were expelled from, their homes, the number who were prisoners of war, the number who were bombed out—it is hard to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

see how any adult German can escape having the most vivid memories of the war and political disaster.

But even if these memories provide energies for fantasies of vindication and revenge, the facts of the German political and strategic situation leave little hope that such fantasies can be fulfilled. The occupation of East Germany by the Russians and the dependence of West Germany on the protection of the Western powers and the United States limit the possible range of German foreign policy; even though they do permit a range of choice, an adventurous nationalism is hardly included within it.

It is in some such framework as this that one must appraise the evidence as to the survival of Nazi and nationalist attitudes among the German public. It may be useful in this connection to examine the findings of recent public opinion surveys dealing with such attitudes.[7] In reporting the results of these surveys, it is important to consider the general limitations of the survey method, as well as the special conditions in Germany at the time these questions were asked. It is, of course, well known that the way in which questions are worded will affect the responses, particularly when the attitudes or opinions reported are unstable and unstructured. Furthermore, as a consequence of the removal of occupation controls, Germans have become increasingly ready to express opinions which previously they suppressed or discussed only among intimates. Hence, the evidence reported below, which suggests trends of opinion change, must be weighed in terms of this development.

One of the questions frequently asked in HICOG surveys runs as follows: "When you consider everything, was there more good in the ideas of National Socialism, or more evil?" In recent surveys, the proportion of those reporting a judgment of "more good" has been increasing, while the proportion of those reporting "more evil" or refusing to commit themselves has been declining. Thus, in May 1951, the businessmen polled included 28 per cent who found more good than evil in National Socialism, 38 per cent who found more evil than good, and 34 per cent who "didn't know." In December 1952, 44 per cent of the businessmen reported more good than evil, 41 per cent more evil than good, and 15 per cent "didn't know." The discrepancies between these two surveys may be explained by the increasing willingness of Germans to speak their minds as occupation controls have been withdrawn.

[7] See HICOG, Reactions Analysis Staff, *A Year End Survey of Rightist and Nationalist Sentiments in West Germany,* January 1953. See also Neumann and Noelle, *op.cit.,* p. 29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It would, of course, be inadmissible to conclude that these percentage figures reflect the proportions of Nazis and non-Nazis in the German population. In the first place, the question asks only for a judgment of the past, and the responses cannot be interpreted as reflecting current or future political preferences. Secondly, the question requires a quantitative estimate of a most complex set of experiences. The same survey suggests that it was the economic and social welfare benefits of National Socialism rather than its political, military, and racist features which bulked largest in the favorable responses.

A survey conducted by the *Institut für Demoskopie* at approximately the same time as the HICOG survey reported a somewhat different distribution of attitudes toward National Socialism. Because of the difference in the wording and structure of the question, the results are not strictly comparable. The question went as follows: "One hears very different opinions about Hitler. Which of the following views comes closest to your opinion?" The question was of the multiple-choice type and provided the respondents with the following four possible choices:[8]

Choices	*Percentage of Responses*
"Hitler had indeed accomplished much that was good, but his disastrous actions and peculiarities far outweighed the good he did."	40
"Hitler was an unscrupulous politician who was responsible for many horrors."	28
"Hitler made a number of mistakes but in any case was a model statesman."	22
"Hitler was the greatest statesman of the century; his real greatness will only be recognized at a later time."	10
Other Answers	3
TOTAL	103*

* Percentages do not total to 100, since there were a few multiple responses.

This survey suggests that the proportion of the German respondents with negative views of National Socialism is far larger than that reported in the HICOG study. Obviously, the different wording of the questions was responsible in large measure for the quantitative differences. If we take the results of the *Institut für Demoskopie* survey as the more conservative, since the questioners were far more specific in the choices with which they confronted the respondents, we come out with a "rock-bottom" 32 per cent as cherishing substantially favorable

[8] Adapted from Neumann and Noelle, *op.cit.*, p. 29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

memories of National Socialism, and 68 per cent as having substantially unfavorable memories.

That the 32 per cent figure may be accurate is reflected in answers to another question asked in the HICOG survey. At the time of the survey, there was a good deal of publicity about a speech of former S.S. General Ramcke, in which he was reported to have said that the ". . . real criminals of the last war were the Allies who bombed German cities, women, and children . . . ," while the so-called German war criminals really constituted an "honor roll." When asked their opinion of this statement, around one-third of the respondents agreed fully with this interpretation of moral responsibility. Another 20 to 25 per cent (varying from group to group) thought that Ramcke was partly right, while only some 25 to 30 per cent thought that he was wrong.

In the same survey, however, a majority of the respondents refused to describe the participants in the July 20 plot against Hitler's life as traitors to their country. The *Institut für Demoskopie* survey reported similar results, with 40 per cent approving of the participants of the July 20 plot, 30 per cent disapproving, and 30 per cent either having "no opinion" or not knowing about the plot.

Taking this survey evidence together, it would appear that some 30 per cent of the German adult population appraise the Nazi experience favorably, roughly another 30 per cent appraise it unfavorably, while the remaining 40 per cent have mixed views. The size of this middle, "uncommitted" group reflects the extent to which there is conflict and ambivalence in the German mind with regard to the Nazi past. As occupation controls have been relaxed, and as the foreign policy situation has changed in the last decade, there has been increasing readiness on the part of Germans to express favorable or mixed attitudes toward the Nazis. These attitudes have come aboveground, so to speak. Along with this process has come the growing demand for the elimination of the last restrictions on former Nazis. Thus, a question asked in the above-mentioned HICOG survey regarding the removal of such restrictions brought a substantially favorable response from most groups. Sixty-eight per cent of the businessmen polled were in favor, as compared with 21 per cent opposed, and 11 per cent who expressed no opinions. On the question of the full rehabilitation of persons who had held high rank in the Third Reich, the majority of the respondents were opposed.

Favorable attitudes toward the Nazi past are not the same thing as advocacy of a Nazi restoration in the current situation. The HICOG survey reported above asked a number of questions concerning atti-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tudes toward future contingencies. One of these questions went as follows: "Supposing a new party—that is similar to the NSDAP—would try to come to power in West Germany, what would be your attitude toward it?" The multiple choices were scaled all the way from "Do everything to prevent it" to "Welcome and support it." Twenty-nine per cent of the business respondents stated they would do everything to prevent the coming into power of such a party. Twenty-five per cent would "not like it, but would do nothing to prevent it"; 26 per cent "wouldn't care"; 8 per cent would welcome such a party but do nothing about it; and 3 per cent would both welcome and support it. This figure of roughly 11 per cent for businessmen who would favor a return to National Socialism was slightly under the figure for the sample as a whole, which was 13 per cent. This would seem to be the approximate size, at the present time, of explicit Nazi or extreme nationalist support. Needless to say, if there should be an economic crisis in Germany, the size of this group might be increased by substantial numbers of those who now say that they would not care, or would do nothing to prevent the recurrence of Nazism. For, as we have already seen, a large number of Germans remember the economic welfare measures of National Socialism favorably, and might be disposed toward something like it again if a serious economic crisis were permitted to exist for a long period of time.

Answers to other questions asked in the HICOG survey suggest certain nationalist trends in German foreign-policy opinion. Thus the German respondents, in the larger number of cases, preferred a national army to one integrated in EDC, and stated that they would prefer a Europe in which West Germany was the strongest power.

Several things may be said about the findings of the HICOG survey, and of the *Institut für Demoskopie* surveys, which report similar tendencies but in smaller proportions. (1) The Nazi past is not integrally rejected by most Germans, but certain of its features are so rejected. (2) It would appear that the extreme neo-Nazi or nationalist point of view is held by some 10 to 15 per cent of the German adult population. Needless to say, this group includes a substantial number of potential activists, and therefore the smallness of the figure should not be viewed with complacency. (3) There is a strong feeling in favor of removing all restrictions on former Nazis, but this stops short of approving the rehabilitation of former high Nazis. (4) Support for a democratic regime is by no means wholehearted among a majority of Germans. (5) The image of a Germany dominant in Europe has widespread popular support. (6) The business respondents did not display patterns

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that were consistently different from those of most of the other occupational groups. Only in the professional occupations were the respondents consistently more critical of the Nazi past, more in favor of democratic institutions, and less nationalistic in their foreign-policy attitudes.

While it would be a serious error to conclude from this survey that Germans are unregenerate and ready to revert to Nazism and extreme nationalism at the first opportunity, its findings do suggest that there are nationalist trends in German public opinion pressing against externally imposed limitations on Germany's political and military behavior. As the limitations are withdrawn, it is only reasonable to expect an increasingly assertive and independent tone in German foreign policy.

At the present time, this trend toward independence and assertiveness is overtly reflected in more or less acute dissatisfaction with a number of specific situations and limitations. Some of these dissatisfactions are distributed generally among the population; others are more specific to particular groups in the population. What is apparent among all groups is a demand, which varies in degree, for more independence in the conduct of foreign policy. In its milder form, this demand is based on the argument that, though Germany is bound to the West, Germans are better exponents of German interests than are the occupation powers. Thus, it is felt that rather than follow the American lead, the German government should take the diplomatic initiative and follow a more direct and aggressive course in pursuit of Germany's own interests. Such a course, according to its proponents, would continue to be within the framework of a basic identity of interest and alliance with the West, and particularly with the United States.

The extreme form of the demand for independence calls for a return to the *Schaukelpolitik* of the Rapallo era. But this extreme point of view, which has been expressed in speeches by former Chancellor Bruening or by the FDP leader Pfleiderer, has the support of only a small minority of German businessmen.

Related to this pressure for independence and full rehabilitation is a general demand for equality of treatment in diplomatic arrangements. This was reflected after the collapse of EDC in the widespread demand among businessmen, as well as other groups, that any alternative defense arrangements be based on the principle of complete equality of treatment for Germany.

Among industrialists and businessmen, this pressure for independence and equality is more specifically directed against economic restrictions. There is a practically universal demand in these circles that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Germany be given the same right to trade with the Communist bloc that all other powers have. Another evidence of this pressure is the dissatisfaction with those features of the European Coal and Steel Community that are alleged to be discriminatory against Germany. Finally, there is increasing pressure among businessmen against certain economic reforms introduced by the occupation powers, in particular the deconcentration and decartelization policies, and the codetermination law. The attack on these policies often stresses the fact that they are of foreign origin and hence not in the interests of Germany.

III. Reunification

Of all the political issues confronting Germany today that of reunification appears to provoke the strongest feelings; and at the same time it is the one that seems to be the least capable of solution by any acceptable means, short of a radical change in the international situation. This is the issue around which latent resentments might, under certain circumstances, combine to shake the internal political balance in Germany, and perhaps provoke foreign-policy adventurism. The public opinion polls suggest that reunification is the most urgent political question confronting the German public. They also suggest that the German public feels that more could and should be done about it. Other survey evidence indicates that Germans are largely convinced that France is opposed to reunification of Germany. Also, they are skeptical of British intentions, and they feel that even the United States could do more toward attaining Germany unity. It is of interest that businessmen and professionals, more frequently than other groups, manifest this attitude.[9]

There were a number of different approaches to the problem of reunification. The largest group favored a policy of building strength in Germany and the West, and then carrying on pressure diplomacy from such a position of strength. One of the respondents argued that the Russians were conservative when it came to a direct threat to their power structure. Once the Western alliance was established and Germany had an army, it was suggested, the Russians might yield to pressure and permit reunification. A Ruhr "baron" known for his nationalist views argued that there were two ways of attaining German unification. First, the West might start a preventive war. He did not oppose the idea, but he thought it unlikely that such a policy would be followed. The second method was to rearm Germany thoroughly with

[9] HICOG, Office of Public Affairs, *Do the West German People Believe the U.S. Is for German Unity?*, May 27, 1952.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American help and then "put the pressure on." He thought the Russians might really react to tough pressure from the outside during the next ten years while they were still weak and unready to accept a war. He was of the opinion that this policy should be carried out on the basis of an American-German alliance. A Western European alliance would, if anything, hamper such a policy, he said.

Another group of businessmen argued that negotiation with Russia regarding reunification ought to be continuous. This was a minority view based upon the criticism that the resources of diplomacy were not being fully exploited, that Germany ought not to wait until the Western alliance was established, but ought always to be probing Russian attitudes and intentions. If the West failed to do this, it was suggested, the initiative on the reunification question would be left to the Social Democrats and the Russians. And if the Social Democrats came into power, they might really be willing to sacrifice the security of the West for the sake of reunification. One respondent took the position that, if Germany were permitted to normalize her relations with the East Zone and with Russia, such normalization might spread, ultimately, from technical and trade questions to the political level, and might produce a diplomatic atmosphere in which reunification would become possible. This emphasis on diplomacy as a means to unification was not generally treated as an alternative to Western integration, but as a line of action that should be carried on simultaneously with it.

A third view pictured trade as a way to reconciliation and reunification. The most extreme exponent of this point of view described Germany as uniquely qualified to serve as "a bridge to the East." There was a terrific ground swell of demand for consumers' goods from the East, he said. The Communists could not escape this pressure, and they were prepared to go far to improve trade relations. With improved trade relations would go increased cultural contact. Thus, consumer demand and cultural contact would gradually transform Communist policy and make possible not only reunification but also a general reconciliation between East and West. In his opinion, German integration in Western security arrangements and German rearmament were fatal mistakes which would postpone reunification indefinitely, and inevitably lead to war.

In its more common and milder form, this argument for renewal of trade with the East, like the argument for renewing diplomatic communication, was not advanced as an alternative to integration with the West, but as a line to be followed simultaneously with the development of Western European integration.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Most of the respondents were quite pessimistic about the prospects of reunification. They could not see how any reasonable measures now being undertaken could lead to it. Perhaps a long build-up of strength in the West, along with a slow process of change in the attitudes and policies of the Communist orbit, might lead to the desired result. One highly placed official of a business organization put it as follows: He did not know what methods would be necessary to attain German reunification, but he felt in his bones that in the long run it would come. He referred to Bismarck who, he said, never made blueprints. Bismarck always believed in taking things as they came; performance of day-to-day tasks eventually added up to a plan. Therefore, there was no point in laying out a grand strategy as to how to reunite Germany. Our respondent thought that if Germany and the West continued to build their unity and strength, Russia might in the end give way, since Russia historically responds only to strength. He did not think that a reunification of Germany was attainable on acceptable terms at the present time, but in the long run, he felt, Russia would give way to pressure.

IV. Rearmament

Evidence provided by public opinion surveys describing German attitudes toward remilitarization and participation in Western European defense arrangements suggests that only a minority of the German people (less than one-fifth) oppose German rearmament in any form.[10] This does not mean that Germans are agreed on the form that such remilitarization should take and on the conditions that might or ought to be attached to it, or that they are ready to accept the personal consequences of such a policy. It does indicate, however, that, even at its height, the *ohne mich* psychology was a limited phenomenon and was in many cases not seriously intended. There were many Germans who could not pass up an opportunity to play hard to get after years of occupation efforts to demilitarize Germany both physically and psychologically.

There has been, however, considerable difference of opinion about the form and timing of rearmament. There was widespread concern during the EDC period, for example, that German military units would be treated inequitably in an integrated army. In view of this expectation, the majority of Germans (48 per cent to 20 per cent), on a free choice, expressed opinions favoring an independent German army

[10] See HICOG, Office of Public Affairs, *West German Public Opinion on Defense Participation Following the Formal Bundestag Debate,* March 31, 1952, p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rather than an integrated one. But when the qualification was added that full equality of treatment in an integrated army would be guaranteed, the proportions were just about the other way around, 40 per cent for an integrated army, and 27 per cent for a national army.[11] These latter findings should not be construed to mean that Germans preferred integration as such, since it is also clear from survey evidence that the great majority of Germans were convinced that rearmament could only be attained in an integrated form.[12]

These findings suggest that both the pro-EDC and the anti-EDC attitudes in Germany were far from homogeneous. Our own interviews with German businessmen were suggestive of the conflicting currents present among both supporters and opponents of EDC. For example, there were those who opposed EDC on the grounds that it would restrict Germany's freedom of action. This point of view was aptly put by a member of a prominent Ruhr industrialist family. "We're the only anti-Communist country the U.S. can rely on in Europe. What kind of allies are France and Italy, with their Communist parties? America needs us. We can afford to wait. We don't have to jump at the first invitation." Then, at the extreme of Europeanism and internationalism were those who opposed EDC on the grounds that German rearmament in any form was a threat to the development of European unity, that it provoked French anxiety, and that military integration should follow rather than precede economic and moral integration. Both of these, however, were minority points of view.

Proponents of EDC were also motivated in different ways. There were those who favored it because they thought it the only way to get Germany rearmed; these constituted a substantial part of the pro-EDC support. The greater part of the internationalists among businessmen favored EDC not so much because it promised to improve German security, as because it was a part of a pattern of integration of Germany into a European community.

The particular complex of attitudes which lay behind the various positions on EDC came out clearly at the moment when it was defeated. The "Europeans" and internationalists were sunk in pessimism. This was particularly true of the Rhineland businessmen who were the closest friends and supporters of Adenauer. Many of these were shattered by the collapse of their hopes. One of Adenauer's business friends sat in his office the morning after the news of the action of the French Assembly, and repeated, more to himself than to the interviewer, "Now we won't have Europe. We will have sovereignty and soldiers in

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 8. [12] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NATO, or somehow, but we won't have Europe." Another businessman, who had devoted himself since the end of the war to efforts at French reconciliation, could not find words strong enough to express his hatred for Mendès-France and his contempt for the French. A journalist spoke of the "icy wind" blowing from the West.

Those who had opposed EDC on nationalist grounds, or who had favored it because they viewed it as the only possible way of getting security for Germany, expressed views either of actual satisfaction or of only mild disappointment. One young Ruhr entrepreneur said that he took no satisfaction from the defeat which Adenauer had experienced. He was genuinely sorry for the "old man."

A similar division of views obtained with regard to alternatives to EDC. The internationalist-minded businessmen tended to favor the inclusion of Germany in the NATO structure as the best alternative. They also urged a policy of understanding and patience vis-à-vis France. The nationalists, on the other hand, either took a skeptical view of the NATO solution and favored it only because they thought it was the best Germany could get, or they opposed such a solution and argued that Germany "ought to sit tight and wait" for rearmament on more favorable terms, perhaps in alliance with the United States and without the disadvantages of being tied to and hampered by the French.

But among the large majority of German businessmen who favored EDC or the NATO alternative—whether from nationalist or "European" motives—there was a significant internal conflict over the question of what consequences the inclusion of Germany in the military arrangements of the West would have for German reunification. Those operating from nationalist premises inclined toward an alternative that would give Germany a maximum of freedom in rearmament, one that would assure that German arms would be used for German interests; in particular, they sought a military arrangement that would enhance the likelihood of reunification, or at least not make it more remote. The internationalists, on the other hand, had their faces turned toward the West; they sought to escape from all the difficulties and the "provisionality" of the West German Republic into a higher European unity. Europeanism tended to be more important to them than reunification.

What was particularly striking among the businessmen interviewed was the fact that so few of them had given any thought to the question of what consequences the development of a German army might have for German foreign policy and for German domestic politics. The collapse of EDC left them up in the air. Only a few of the most thought-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ful informants had speculated about the internal political consequences of re-establishing a German army. One of these argued that the civil political structure in Germany was still so weak and so rootless that the existence of an army would almost unavoidably involve a setback in German democratic development. This articulately pessimistic view was not typical of the disappointed supporters of EDC. The typical reaction was one of anxiety and helplessness. One of the most prominent supporters of Adenauer in the business community, a man known for his good nerves and prudence, reflected the strongest anxiety and self-doubt. He spoke as though EDC had meant a burial, once and for all, of German aggressiveness and of the chance to have Germany harnessed into a European system where those energies might be used for constructive purposes.

But again, the majority point of view regarding the consequences of a German army was one of indifference. Most German businessmen had not thought about it. When they were confronted with a specific question about what the consequences might be for internal political stability and for foreign policy, most of them expressed the opinion that an army would not significantly affect internal politics and would not produce an aggressive foreign policy. The main argument advanced was that the Germans had had their fill of militarism. One young businessman remarked that, in 1914, German troops had fought with enthusiasm; in 1939, they were serious and anxious, but not enthusiastic. In a third war, he thought they would fight for their land, their homes, and their families, but in desperation, not with enthusiasm. It was also argued that a foreign policy of aggression was out of the question, since it was clear to everyone that Germany would be the battlefield of the next war.

There were few businessmen who took the position that German troops would be generally unreliable or would not fight hard in the event of war. It was pointed out that much would depend on how they were used or treated, whether they were used to defend German soil or not, and whether or not they were commanded by German officers. German troops whose status involved discrimination, or who were used to defend the French or other peoples rather than the Germans, might not be reliable. But to permit German troops to be used in such a manner was politically unthinkable, according to these informants. If they were given equal status and used intelligently in relation to German interests, the view was that they would be good troops. One young Frankfurt banker put it this way: "If it's a question of mastering a new weapon, adapting to new tactics or new types of military organiza-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion, the Germans would say to themselves, *'Wir machen es besser'* (We can do it better)."

While only a small number of the businessmen were opposed to rearmament, or were doubtful of the morale of German troops, none of the younger men interviewed were ready to volunteer for service themselves. The opinion was widely shared among these younger businessmen, with regard to both themselves and their peers, that very few of the men in their age range and class would volunteer for service in the first phases of reconstitution of the army. It had taken so long to establish a satisfactory existence after the difficulties of the war and the immediate postwar period that only those who had been unsuccessful in making an adjustment to civilian life would volunteer. One young banker in Düsseldorf, who had served in the air force during World War II, observed that he personally knew the air-force officers of his former unit who had applied to the Blank Ministry to serve in the cadres before the full defense force was formed. He stated that in every case they were the poorer officers who had been unable to make a go of it since the end of the war.

V. European Integration

The most recent available survey evidence indicated that a substantial majority (70 per cent) of Germans favored participation in a Western European Union.[13] Pro-integration sentiment appeared to be more widespread and intense in Germany than in France, Italy, or England.[14] When Germans were asked whether they would favor such a union even if it proved to be disadvantageous at times, the percentage in favor dropped to 63 per cent, a slight decrease as compared with shifts in opinion in France, Italy, and England. This predominantly pro-European attitude in Germany was also reflected in support of the Schuman Plan and of the EDC.[15] Earlier surveys also suggested that a large proportion of Germans felt that Germany had most to gain from the integration of Western Europe.[16] Another survey showed that almost half of the German respondents thought that Germans were entitled to play a leading role in Europe in the future.[17] The opinions of businessmen did not deviate in any striking way from the responses of other occupational groups.

[13] HICOG, Reactions Analysis Staff, *Public Opinion in Western Europe,* January 1953, p. 10.
[14] *Ibid.,* pp. 10, 12.
[15] *Ibid.,* pp. 195, 221.
[16] HICOG, Reactions Analysis Staff, *West German Thinking on a Federation of Europe,* November 28, 1951.
[17] HICOG, *A Year End Survey, op.cit.,* p. 72.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

While these findings show overwhelming overt support for European integration, they also suggest that this is not a homogeneous attitude among Germans in general, or among German businessmen in particular. They also leave open the long-run question of the stability of these pro-European tendencies. Our interviews with German businessmen suggest that pro-European sentiment has been fed from a number of different streams. In the first place, there is a genuine European current based upon some one or a combination of religious, cultural, economic, and political considerations. Secondly, there is a phenomenon which may be aptly characterized as an "escape into Europe."[18] And, finally, there is a kind of "crypto-nationalist" Europeanism, a belief that German economic and political dominance may be attained through European integration. These attitudes occur most typically in combination, but it is possible to distinguish among individuals according to the type of attitude that predominates in the thinking of each.

The genuine Europeans in the business community were attracted to the *mystique* of European unity, the hope that, after more than a millennium of conflict and warfare, the underlying unity of the Christian ethos and of the European cultural tradition would finally express itself in a political form. This European impulse was frequently religious in its content. It was often accompanied by the conviction that, regardless of the costs and sacrifices which they might be called upon to incur for European unification, Germans could gain their redemption only by such action. This attitude was most often found among leading Catholic and Protestant laymen and among the leaders of the various German European movements. The dynamism in this attitude was the impulse for redemption, and it sometimes occurred without any further calculation of economic and political consequences.

More frequently, however, the pro-European businessman had given some thought to the economic and political consequences of European unification. The president of a machine-tool manufacturing company in the Ruhr had for years been tempted with the vision of a Europe which ". . . might become a common market with European industry and 250,000,000 consumers and skilled laborers." If this vision could become a reality, ". . . then it might have been possible to do something, make the workers happy, give them something to work for, and create in Europe a happy and secure land. In an integrated Europe prices might have sunk and one might have been able to do something

[18] Helmut Schelsky, *Wandlungen der deutschen Familie in der Gegenwart*, Stuttgart, 1954, pp. 132ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

about the bitterness and the feelings of injustice that create the basis for communism." He was aware of the fact that it was the French sense of inferiority and anxiety that made it impossible for France to accept such an integrated Europe. Hence everything must be done, he thought, to strengthen France and to remove French anxiety over German power and aggressiveness. One young Catholic textile manufacturer argued that the Ruhr ought to work for France, help her with capital goods, and accept arrangements which discriminated against Germany in the French interest, in order to create a stronger and more confident France.

There were a number of German businessmen who argued that it had been a mistake to press for EDC, that it would have been sounder to proceed gradually with economic measures of integration, instead of frightening the French with the prospect of German rearmament, even in an integrated form. The ground should first have been thoroughly prepared, and the way to prepare it was by economic collaboration and the creation of a European sense of community.

The impulse to escape into Europe, to find in Europe the security and the identity that could not be found in Germany, was typically a shallower, a less structured attitude than the genuine European current described above. And it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that this type of escapist Europeanism was more widespread among businessmen than was the more genuine Europeanism. There has been and continues to be (although perhaps in decreasing measure) a rather widespread impulse to escape from all the liabilities of being German in the postwar era, to escape from the division of Germany, from its moral isolation, from the moral burden of German history, and from the dangers consequent on the presence of Russian military power on German soil. Since this escapism is more of a mood than an attitude based upon intellectual and moral conviction, it is unstable, and it may flow in other directions in response to other opportunities or other conditions. This mood is fed by powerful impulses toward security, stability, and a satisfying identity. If it appears that these needs can be satisfied in a reunited and revalidated Germany, the European trend will be stemmed, and the relatively small number of genuine Europeans may find themselves in isolation. We have already seen how strong the drive toward reunification is, and how strong, also, the drive to revalidate the German past.

It may very well be that the high tide of German Europeanism passed with the collapse of EDC. Certainly, the immediate aftermath of the French decision in the summer of 1954 was a deflation of Euro-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pean hopes. Among German businessmen, the first target in this period was the European Coal and Steel Community. A Hamburg shipbuilder pointed out that his firm can buy sheet steel more cheaply from Japan and the United States than it does from the Ruhr, because of the artificially high prices set by the High Authority. An official of one of the biggest steel concerns in the Ruhr argued that, now that the process of integration had stopped, there would be a gradual deterioration of the CSC; that by itself the Coal and Steel Community would be exposed to increasingly sharp criticism. Another steel manufacturer asked: "Does the *Montan-Union* make sense now?" In his opinion, it had made sense only so long as it was to be a part of a larger union, a currency union, a free market, and a military and political union. By itself, its faults became glaring. He cited his own case. He had to charge the same price for steel whether it was sold in 1,000-ton quantities or in twenty-ton quantities. He said that CSC was becoming a government-controlled cartel, and would come increasingly under attack. The restrictions which it imposed made the iron and steel business uninteresting. Another young Ruhr manager pointed out that CSC gave the French access to cheap Ruhr coal, and made it possible, because of the shorter freight haul, for the French to sell steel more cheaply in the South German market than the Ruhr industries could. He too felt that there would be increasing criticism of the *Montan-Union*, since it was no longer part of a general European integration, but was now vulnerable to attack on straightforward economic grounds.

The Europeanism of the crypto-nationalist variety was a cynical attitude, infrequently expressed, in which the expectation was that, whichever way things went, Germany had a good "card hand." If Europe were integrated, Germany's economic power and energy would be such as to gain her the position of dominance in Europe to which she was entitled. While those holding such an attitude refrained from attacking European institutions and plans, they were in no way committed to these hopes. It was a strictly expediential Europeanism. The individuals who held it were those who, after the collapse of EDC, found it difficult to conceal a certain satisfaction. The prospect of being integrated with France and Italy had not been an attractive one. If there had been any other way of attaining military security, they would have preferred it. Their real preference was for an alliance with the United States, and for the use of German military capacity for German purposes such as reunification and the regaining of the lost territories in the east.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

VI. East-West Trade

Before World War II, German foreign trade with the countries now under Communist domination (including China) averaged some 16 per cent of the total of German imports and exports. At the present time, mainly as a consequence of Communist policy and practice, but also in some small part as a consequence of the embargo on trade with the East instituted after the outbreak of the Korean war, German trade with the Communist areas is under 2 per cent.[19] The dependence of the German economy on foreign trade, and the concern of German industrialists over the present complete dependence on Western markets, have led to increasing pressure on the part of industry for liberalization of the terms of the trade embargo and for an aggressive exploration of trade possibilities with the East.

The widespread conviction among German industrialists that the embargo on trade with the East discriminates against German foreign trade has produced a wave of resentment among businessmen. While the view is universal among industrialists that restrictions on German trade with the East should be removed—with the exception of specifically strategic materials—there are a number of different themes and elements that enter into German thinking about East-West trade which it may be useful to describe.

It is of some interest that the pressure for an aggressive exploration of trade possibilities with the East is not based on immediate economic needs. With only a few exceptions, German industry has a heavy backlog of domestic and foreign orders and would not be in a position to fill orders from the East for some time to come. The resentment among German industrialists appeared to be of two kinds. There was, first, a realistic anxiety over the fragility of the German economic position, because of its heavy dependence on foreign markets, which might at any time be lost to Germany. Many of Germany's trade opportunities appeared to be available only because of the conditions created by the Korean war. Hence it was prudent to seek other opportunities for foreign trade and to have as diversified a foreign trade position as possible.

The second type of resentment was political, and a part of the general trend toward national assertiveness. It was pointed out again and again in interviews with German businessmen that the embargo restrictions

[19] See Gernot Gather, "West-Ost Handel," *Deutsche Initiative,* Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft von 1947, 1950, pp. 45ff.; *Übersicht über die Entwicklung des West-Ost Handels der wichtigsten Weststaaten,* report of the Ost-Ausschuss der Deutschen Industrie, 1954.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were more rigorously applied against Germany than against other countries, and that the Eastern markets were traditional purchasers of the products of German industry. The demand was for equality of treatment, and freedom for Germany to find its own level of foreign trade.

Common to most German businessmen is, on the one hand, a more or less serious overestimation of the trade possibilities with the Communist areas, and, on the other hand, a failure to consider the possible political consequences of substantially heavier trade relations with those areas. There is an interesting nostalgia among many German businessmen which is their own special version of the "Rapallo memories" voiced by former Chancellor Bruening. Just as some former German diplomats recall with longing Germany's diplomatic independence in the Rapallo era, and convince themselves that it is possible to carry on such a policy today, so do German businessmen vividly recall the great contracts and bulk orders coming from the Soviet Union during the 1920's and 1930's. It was sometimes argued that, precisely because the Communist bloc has a planned economy, it is a reliable trade partner, a kind of stabilizing ace-in-the-hole in the event of an economic crisis in the West. Many German businessmen remembered that in the depression it was Russian orders for machine tools and industrial products that mitigated the general economic disaster.

One German leather-goods manufacturer who had recently returned from discussions with Russian and Chinese trade representatives in Moscow spoke with dreamy eyes of the enormous backlog of consumer needs in Russia and China. He said: "Russian women have no handbags, and they are just as vain as women anywhere. Just imagine what an order for a million handbags would do for Offenbach! In China, the peasants have no flashlights to use when returning from the fields after dark, and no bicycles to cover the big distances from the fields to their homes. Just imagine what an order for millions of bicycles and flashlights would do for Bielefeld!" The dreams of this manufacturer were a good deal richer than those of most of his colleagues, and yet they reflect in extreme form the extent to which memory and a kind of apolitical thinking affect judgments and expectations. Little consideration is given to the fact that the economic structure of the Communist-controlled areas is in process of radical change, that consumer demand is repressed in the interests of capital investment. One better-informed businessman pointed out that the kinds of orders now placed by the Eastern bloc are of a pilot variety. They will import foreign

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

machine tools, or industrial products in small number, only to imitate and produce these items themselves.

Similarly, most German businessmen fail to take into account the priority of political over economic calculation in the Communist areas. If the Communist bloc were to open up trade possibilities with Germany, in all likelihood this would be as a result of a political motive based on either domestic or foreign considerations. Very few businessmen interviewed had considered the possibility that Russia might offer attractive trade possibilities to German industry as a means of attaining a certain political leverage in Germany. Once a substantial proportion of German trade was dependent on the Communist areas, it might be possible to create pressure among German business circles—now the most pro-Western of all groupings in Germany—against too complete an involvement in the West. This does not appear to be an immediate possibility, but, in the event of a decline in the level of foreign trade with the areas outside the Communist orbit, it may become a factor of some significance. Just as the Russians have a trump card in offers of reunification which all Germany would find it difficult to resist, so also do they hold a more specialized trump card in offers of attractive trade possibilities particularly directed at the business community.

While, given present circumstances, these are only possibilities, it remains interesting that the business community in Germany is relatively unaware of the priority of political factors in Communist policy-making. Only government officials and some leaders of business pressure groups seem to see this point. Awareness of it was rarely encountered among industrialists themselves, even in the largest establishments. Among the latter, a simple apolitical economic calculation was the predominating logic employed in thinking about the possibilities of the Communist market.

VII. Conclusions

The foregoing analysis suggests the conclusion that, despite the tragedies of her recent history, Germany has not yet begun to exhibit a pattern of political involvement and responsibility. The tragedies are in some part attributable to the historic failure of the German middle classes to develop a liberal spirit and to impose this spirit on their political competitors. Thus the historic failure of German democracy is inseparable from the historic failure of the German middle classes, and the fragility of democratic institutions in contemporary Germany is inseparable from the spiritual poverty of the German business and professional classes.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

When criticism of German politics is put in such massive terms, it may incorrectly suggest by comparison that in such successful democracies as England and the United States there is a pattern of universal political involvement and participation. This is obviously not the case. The crucial differences may be put as follows. In Germany, there is a sharp break between the public and the private spheres. Political and social responsibility is an attribute of office, whether in the parliaments, the ministries, the churches, the trade unions, or the interest groups. What is more, within these various political structures a strong hierarchical spirit dominates, so that political responsibility and communication tend to be confined to the very heights of these institutions.

In England and the United States, on the other hand, there is a gradation from public to private. Private association for public purposes is not confined to political parties and interest groups, but includes a variety of general and special *public*-interest groups concerned with policy issues of all kinds at all levels of the governmental process. Power and communication are more or less decentralized within these organizations. Finally, in England and in the United States there is an attentive public, a discriminating audience, which tends to limit the pressures of special interest, and which subjects the holders of office to regular and frequent accounting.

Thus, English and American political society have what are still lacking in Germany: a broad and relatively decentralized elite which extends beyond governmental office and the specifically political formations of party and pressure groups, and an attentive and involved stratum in the general population.

Both of these political phenomena have grown and are nourished in middle-class soil. They are the products of the professional and business classes. Quantitatively they represent only a small proportion of the total population—a few tens of thousands of people who are active in community associations, in the grass-roots party organizations, church groups, humanitarian organizations, foreign-policy associations. These two political formations—a decentralized elite and an attentive public—small as they are, affect the political tone of the society at large in most significant ways. They provide centers of policy initiative outside the governmental, party, and special-interest systems, and a discriminating audience for public policy discussion. They are sustained by an educational system which at least makes an effort at citizenship training, by a system of communication which feeds information into these groupings, and by a network of civic and public interest organizations which

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

offer part of the population opportunities to assume public responsibilities.

Put in these terms, the shortcomings of democratic society in Germany become more manageable. Despite their lack of a tradition of political responsibility, the professional and business classes in Germany are the best-informed stratum of the population. There are already small elite groups aware of these problems of political communication. A relatively small allocation of resources in the educational system, in the press and communications field, and in support of voluntary civic associations may make some progress toward producing the beginnings of a pattern of broad and continuous political discussion, and may thereby provide more depth and stability in the German political process.

This, of course, is not to argue that the American or British political pattern can be exported into Germany. Political cultures are governed by something like a law of inertia. They change slowly and in terms of the past. And yet there are points in their development when the range of choice is suddenly broadened, when a change of direction becomes possible. The present juncture of German political development appears to offer such a range of choice, and there is evidence—to be sure, on a most limited scale—of a will to take advantage of these opportunities.

But these possibilities are clearly of a long-run order. In the present juncture, Germany will have to rely on a rather shallow political foundation, which includes the governmental structure, the political parties, and the pressure groups. And here it would be a great mistake to overlook a number of positive and stabilizing developments. The structure of government in Germany and the electoral system tend to discourage political irresponsibility and political extremism. The party leaders appear to have assimilated some of the lessons of the Weimar period and seem to be able to operate more effectively in a parliamentary framework. The pressure groups and the trade unions have also assimilated in some measure the lessons of the past, and are now less ready to press special interest to extremes. All of these political elements are at present constrained by a mood of political sobriety.

If we use our findings about the present state of political thinking among the German business classes as clues to their possible political behavior in the kinds of situations which may confront them, a number of speculative conclusions are suggested. In the first place, it is a serious error to describe the changing trend of opinion in Germany today as moving in a neo-Nazi direction. There are few neo-Nazis, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they have little influence among the population. There is, however, an increasing tendency toward national assertiveness, which in most Germans stops short of any form of extremism or adventurism. The destructive past is too much with Germans today, and the risks of adventurism and aggressiveness too compellingly obvious. Perhaps no group inclines more strongly away from adventurism than do the business leaders, who have gained so much in the postwar period, and who have so much to lose in the event of another war.

But among businessmen, as well as among the general population, the strongest and most authentic political impulse is the search for a secure political framework. Until the collapse of EDC, this impulse was largely engaged in the effort at European integration. With the collapse of EDC in the summer of 1954, however, the integration trend began to ebb, and it would appear now to be turning back into the confining and frustrating borders of the West German Republic. It seems inescapable that Germans will now become increasingly concerned and assertive about reunification. They may become more vulnerable to Russian offers, particularly after the Austrian settlement, and they may be more hesitant to take steps which might appear to preclude these possibilities. The crucial question here is whether or not these feelings are so strong that the Germans will accept reunification on terms which would seriously weaken the West and open Germany to Communist pressure and infiltration. The strong anti-Communist feelings among the overwhelming majority of Germans, and the lively fears of Russia and the Russians, seem to argue against any such contingency. While the temptation will be great, these fears and memories will probably lead to the most careful scrutiny of the terms of Russian proposals and of the procedures to be followed. The Germans will have to balance the tempting bait of unity and of trade against their own security. There will be considerable torment in their choices, but, on balance, the fear of Communist infiltration and domination may constrain their eagerness.

The main question raised by the prospect of a German army is whether the introduction of such an institution in Germany will overwhelm a weak civilian society and its moderate foreign policy. The threat arises from the possibility not only that an army may become a contender for political power, but also that the existence of such an army may constitute a temptation for political movements to gain control of it and use it for aggressive purposes. Even excluding these possibilities, the existence of a German army will greatly broaden and complicate the problem of foreign policy-making. If there has

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been a trend toward national assertiveness simply as a consequence of the withdrawal of occupation controls, would it not be an obvious consequence of German rearmament that this trend toward assertiveness would further increase and sharpen? It seems inescapable that, as Germany acquires the powers and means of an independent nation, she will become more independent in foreign policy and more aggressive in the pursuit of her own interests. But it seems unlikely that this single factor of rearmament will produce a pattern of aggressiveness. Whatever may be the strength of the German military establishment, it will be dwarfed by Communist strength; it can be significant only in the over-all Western security structure. Though Germany may be tempted to take the initiative to force the hands of her Western allies, she is likely to be deterred by the knowledge that she would be the first to be overrun in the event of war.

Thus, though the dangers are real, the simple facts of the situation are the best counsels of prudence. There is no turning back from the foreign-policy decisions which have already been made, and there is no way of shielding Germany from the tempting maneuvers of Russia. More and more she will have to participate in the making of risky decisions. It is unfortunate, in the present situation, that the discussion of these issues and the making of these decisions will be confined within such a narrow base. The only answer to the threat of German rearmament and independence in foreign policy is to strengthen the civilian society, to introduce new centers where creative and constructive political ideas may be generated, to break through the monopoly of political communication by functionaries, and to broaden and deepen the processes of political discussion in Germany. Here the German business and professional classes have a special responsibility and opportunity, for such a process would have to begin with them and gradually penetrate into the general society. That such a development might soon occur and create a secularized and active political community in Germany is perhaps too much to hope for. But if such a political breakthrough is improbable in the near future, even a few beginnings in this direction may provide a somewhat greater assurance of sound foreign-policy decisions in Germany than we now have.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CHANGING POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN TOTALITARIAN SOCIETY

A Case Study of the Role of the Family

By KENT GEIGER

I

THERE is general agreement among Western scholars that the modern totalitarian state is distinguished in part by its possession of a unitary and systematically elaborated ideology. While it will be found that expert opinions vary considerably in regard to the importance of the role played by ideology in the origin and continuation of totalitarianism,[1] there is little question but that the ruling power of the totalitarian society is not indifferent to the relationship between national ideology and popular attitudes. Indeed, history shows that the rulers of twentieth-century totalitarian states have devoted considerable effort to the development among their citizenries of attitudes of acceptance toward the social philosophies and goals associated with their regimes.

However, a realistic sense of the limits to which popular psychology can in the short run be reshaped has seemed to direct the totalitarian leadership sooner or later into feeling that the older generation will not respond to the desired extent, and that major emphasis should be placed upon the recruitment of youth. Thus, we find in the writings of the totalitarian ideologues that considerable importance is attached to the increasingly great devotion and loyalty expected of the younger generations.[2] We also find that state-sponsored, closely controlled youth movements have been characteristic of totalitarianism.[3]

[1] Carl J. Friedrich, ed., *Totalitarianism: Proceedings of a Conference Held at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences,* Cambridge, Mass., 1954. See especially the papers and discussion included in Part III—"Totalitarianism and Ideology," pp. 87-137.

[2] "Only by radically remolding the teaching, organization, and training of the youth shall we be able to ensure that the result of the efforts of the younger generation will be the creation of a society that will be unlike the old society, i.e., a Communist society." V. I. Lenin, "The Tasks of the Youth Leagues, Speech Delivered at the Third All-Russian Congress of the Russian Young Communist League," October 2, 1920, in *Lenin: Selected Works,* II, Moscow, 1947, p. 661.

"A few words about the members of the Young Communist League, young men and women, in the collective farms. The youth is our future, our hope, comrades. The youth must take our place, the place of the old people. It must carry our banner to final victory. Among the peasants there are not a few old people, borne down by the burden of the past, burdened with the habits and the recollections of the old life. Naturally, they are not always able to keep pace with the Party, to keep pace with the Soviet

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But here the aim of the totalitarian state collides with an obstacle. In the crucial early years, children are trained and their personalities shaped predominantly within the family, and the family is not a public, but a private, association of individuals. Within the family, interpersonal relations and behavior tend in the main to be governed by the force of tradition, that is, by relatively inflexible norms which frequently are not in accord with those viewed favorably by the totalitarian regime. Therefore, the rapid and radical changes in the orientation of youth fostered by the totalitarian dictatorship are virtually certain to clash with certain of the traditionally sanctioned attitudes of parents.[4] This situation is not infrequently considered prototypical of parent-youth relations in modern totalitarian societies and has become known in popular parlance as the "struggle" between family and state for the minds of the young.

In this struggle (as popularly conceived) it cannot be denied that the totalitarian state disposes of powerful resources for shaping the minds

---

Government. But that cannot be said of our youth. They are free from the burden of the past, and it is easiest for them to assimilate Lenin's behests." Joseph Stalin, "Speech Delivered at the First All-Union Congress of Collective-Farm Shock Workers," February 19, 1933, in J. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism,* Moscow, 1947, p. 451.

"The youth of today is ever the people of tomorrow. For this reason we have set before ourselves the task of inoculating our youth with the spirit of this community of the people at a very early age, at an age when human beings are still unperverted and therefore unspoiled. . . . This Reich stands, and it is building itself up for the future upon its youth. And this new Reich will give its youth to no one, but will itself take youth and give to youth its own education and its own upbringing." Speech given by Adolf Hitler on May 1, 1937, published in the *Frankfurter Zeitung,* May 3, 1937, and cited in Norman H. Baynes, ed., *The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922—August 1939,* London, 1942, p. 549.

"Some other system of government, a system not ours, the demoliberal system, the system of those whom we despise, may think it proper to renounce the education of the younger generations. We not! In this respect we are intractable. Ours must be the teaching! These children must be educated in our religious faith; but we have the duty of integrating this education, we need to give these youngsters the sense of virility, of power, of conquest; and above all we need to inspire them with our faith, and to inflame them with our hopes." Benito Mussolini, "Report to the Chamber of Deputies on the Agreement with the Lateran," 1929, cited in Herman Finer, *Mussolini's Italy,* London, 1935, p. 428.

[3] Accounts in English of various aspects of totalitarian youth movements may be found in the following: Merle Fainsod, "The Komsomols—A Study of Youth Under Dictatorship," *American Political Science Review,* XLV (March 1951), pp. 18-40; Herbert S. Lewin, "Hitler Youth and the Boy Scouts of America: A Comparison of Aims," *Human Relations,* I (1947), pp. 206-27; Robert A. Brady, *The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism,* New York, 1937, especially Chapter V, "Training the Youth to Become Soldiers of Labor," pp. 161-98; Finer, *op.cit.,* especially Chapter XV, "The Fascist Party: Youth Organizations," pp. 426-54.

[4] Compare Kingsley Davis, "The Sociology of Parent-Youth Conflict," *American Sociological Review,* V (August 1940), pp. 523-35. Davis notes that rapid social change, when taken in conjunction with the slower rates of socialization of older persons, results in a general tendency for attitudes of parents to lag behind those of their children in modern industrial society.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the young in the desired direction. These include a carefully controlled school system, the suffusion of the output of the mass media with propaganda themes, and, of course, the closely supervised youth organizations. On the other hand, the resources of the family are frequently seen as equally strong; they include the presumed complete control of parents over children in the earliest years, and influence achieved through mutual ties of loyalty and affection at later ages.

It is the purpose of this article to explore the dimensions of this contest of forces, with special attention to the way in which the situation is viewed and managed by parents in a totalitarian society. The data to be presented enable us to make some estimate of the degree of success attained by one contemporary totalitarian state, the USSR, in modifying and controlling for its own purposes this aspect of the process of socialization of young persons within the family.

II

Ideally, of course, investigation of such a problem would be conducted on the spot, but the Soviet Union, unfortunately, has been exceptionally vigorous in denying Western investigators access to its population. However, owing to circumstances associated with the Second World War, it has become possible in the last few years to make extensive use of political refugees as first-hand sources of information about the Soviet Union. The data to be analyzed below were obtained from former Soviet citizens who were interviewed in Germany and in the New York City area in 1950 and 1951 by members of the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System.[5] There is no doubt that former Soviet citizens who are now refugees in the West constitute a group which in certain respects must be considered unique, and which is far from a random sample of the Soviet population still resident in the USSR. In particular, by their very presence in the West and by virtue of their prolonged exposure to Western influence, we may assume that they are considerably more hostile toward the Soviet regime and its institutions and ideas than the rank and file of the Soviet people. But such a fact does not preclude their effective use as sources of information about the Soviet system if sufficient account is taken of the bias, and if care is exercised in the way the results are interpreted.

[5] This Project has been conducted by the Russian Research Center of Harvard University under the sponsorship of the Officer Education Research Laboratory of Air Research and Development Command, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama, under contract No. AF 33(038)-12909. Reproduction of this article in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of the United States Government. Grateful acknowledgment is here made to the Russian Research Center for the assistance which has facilitated completion of this study.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To investigate the impact of the Soviet system on the transmission of political attitudes within the Soviet parent-child relationship, data were obtained with two different instruments and from two different refugee sub-samples. The first group of materials consists of extended life-history interviews with 141 Soviet young persons who were born in the period 1915-1929. Project interviewers were instructed to cover at some time during the course of the two or three days of the interview the role of the respondent's parents in the development of his attitudes toward the Soviet regime and its works. For the bulk of respondents, this proved to be a topic of considerable meaning and interest, and they freely discussed their relationships with their parents vis-à-vis the Soviet regime.

The first part of the analysis which follows will be devoted to the responses secured in interviews from these young people. They were members of families from all social levels, of both rural and urban residence, and include a few representatives of the Soviet minority nationalities, although 93 per cent of the total were members of the dominant Slavic majority—Great Russian, Ukrainian, and White Russian. Although occasional quotations from persons outside the 1915-1929 age range will be given for illustrative purposes, the percentage figures and tables from the interview materials represent exclusively the responses of the younger persons in the interview sample.

The second body of data was obtained with the use of a check-list questionnaire from persons who were themselves parents in the USSR and whose first child was born in the 1915-1930 period. Thus, in terms of age, these respondents correspond roughly to the parental generation of the young persons in the life-history sample. Their responses, which will be discussed after the results of the interviews are presented, serve in part as a check on the validity of the latter.

III

As a starting point for the analysis of the family-state relationship, let us consider the descriptions of parental attitudes toward the Soviet regime given by the sample of young refugee respondents. Most frequently, as might be expected from this group, the respondents reported that their parents were likely to show hostility, skepticism, or a lack of appropriate enthusiasm in regard to the Soviet regime. For example:

My father always spoke openly. Prior to the war he said that the purges,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> the closing of the churches, the collective farms, and the 1940 labor laws were all slavery. (23-year-old male, father a shop foreman)[6]

In fact, 94 of the 141 cases available, or 67 per cent, said that their parents had had predominantly anti-Soviet attitudes. At the other extreme, only 9, or 6 per cent, reported that their parents had been in the main pro-regime. The remaining 27 per cent gave no information about the attitudes of their parents, gave inconsistent or contradictory information, or did not live in families as they grew up.

Of the 103 young persons who gave adequate responses to the question, then, 91 per cent came from families in which the parents had been at heart anti-Soviet in feeling while living in the USSR. This was a situation which posed a sharp problem for the parents: How, if indeed at all, should they teach their children to understand the real nature of the Soviet regime? How far should they go in transmitting openly their own attitudes and values to their children? As a Soviet mother put it:

> . . . in raising our son we immediately faced the question: Should we raise him in the spirit of the Soviet Union or not? At that time we were changing our views toward the Soviet Union; we were both strongly against the Soviet power. (64-year-old female, doctor)

In the meantime, other forces were at work—forces which served to restrict the parents' freedom of choice. Since school, youth organizations, informal peer groups, cinema, radio, and reading materials of all description strive to make the young person a loyal adherent to the works and symbols of the Soviet order, it is not surprising that children were regularly led in the direction of enthusiastic acceptance of Bolshevik ideology. In fact, within the anti-Soviet family there frequently appeared a young political activist who did not hesitate to display his sentiments:

> The child comes to the conviction that the Communist propaganda tells the truth, and if he hears from his parents the opposite opinion, he feels insulted and tries to explain these things to his parents, who are not politically conscious. In short, he becomes a convinced Communist, a Pioneer, fired by the Pioneer literature, activism, and so on. (57-year-old male, accountant)

Actually, for very young children, the matter of "parental influence" was pretty much a closed issue, since divulgence of suspect interpretations and sentiments to the partly developed consciousness and incomplete sense of responsibility of the child could have serious repercus-

[6] All ages are as of 1950; father's occupation is the last one reported prior to World War II.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sions. One of the most widely cited norms of family conduct under Soviet conditions was the requirement that non-conforming attitudes were not to be expressed in front of small children:

> Everyone was afraid of his children. A small child can betray his parents unwittingly, and therefore my parents were always careful in what they said before me and my brother. (20-year-old female, father a secondary-school teacher)

In the close and continuous interaction within the family, this constituted a problem which could not be lightly dismissed. Gross differences in regard to emotionally significant value orientations between persons in intimate relationships are hard to tolerate. In fact, such differences set forces in motion which in the end serve either to make homogeneous the values of the individuals concerned, or disrupt the relationship because of a distressing increase in interpersonal tension.

The distribution of power in the parent-child relationship is generally thought of as markedly asymmetrical; indeed, a good part of the process of socialization can be seen as the exercise of power and influence by the parent in the interest of transmitting his own attitudes to his children. Under Soviet totalitarianism, however, it is clear that parents could not easily control the views of their young children. Moreover, the problem areas in the parent-child relationship applied not only to matters which a Westerner would consider "political," and in which, it might be argued, children have little interest or involvement, but to matters which had traditionally been of central importance to the parent-child relationship. Two stand out as of particular relevance —the mode in which parental authority was exercised, and the transmission of traditionally hallowed attitudes toward religion and the church. Consider, for example, the following comments:

> . . . they told you you have no right to punish a child. And if a child was punished, he would go and complain to the authorities. (51-year-old male, unskilled worker)

> . . . in the schools they were developing a child of the worst sort. There were denunciations, lack of respect for elders, and denial of God. (51-year-old male, bookkeeper)

The psychological immaturity of children thus constituted a definitely weak link in the family's struggle against the state, and provided in effect a point of entry into the family for elements of the totalitarian ideology. Such a situation must be reckoned as a basic source of tension in the prewar Soviet family. In the Project materials, it was a prominent target for parental complaints. However, as the child grew older, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

situation changed. From the age of 12 to 15 or 16, when an enlarged sense of awareness and personal responsibility had developed, it was possible, if the parent so desired, to open more fully the channels of communication between himself and his child. From the parental point of view, only then could the child be "trusted" with information which clearly showed a gap between family values and the official sponsored ideology:

> (Was your child a member of the Komsomol?) No. Komsomols are young people in their teens—that is to say, children who are already able to reason. Consequently, at that age they may be influenced by their parents. (47-year-old male, office clerk)

To explore the way in which Soviet parents managed their relationships with older children, the reactions of "anti-Soviet" parents were sorted into categories. These fell into three groups. The most numerous, occurring in 67 out of the 94 cases of anti-Soviet parents, or 71 per cent, was that group in which the parents reportedly took the youngsters into their confidence and freely communicated to them their doubts about and antipathies to the regime.[7] The following are typical of the responses in this category:

> The strongest influences in my life were those of my mother, my father, and my grandmother. All of them were always opposed to the Soviet government, and I, of course, was raised in such opposition. (28-year-old male, father an engineer)

> Since my early childhood our family had been anti-Soviet, and very often I heard my parents say that now the situation was no good, and that before it had been better. (29-year-old male, father a store clerk)

The second group consisted of those families in which the parents were reported to be relatively uncommunicative about their attitudes toward the regime. There were 18 of these—19 per cent of the total. An example is:

> . . . my father never told me, "Here is what it says in the paper, but the fact is this." He never talked about political matters. My father was in no way in accord with the Soviet regime, but he was always silent about it. (26-year-old female, father a director of postal-telegraph office)

A reservation about this category must be entered in terms of the inherent difficulty of "hiding" a deeply felt sentiment from one's family intimates. Some of the respondents did in fact indicate that

[7] It was frequently noted that this was done only after the children were old enough to be trusted, or that the children were carefully warned to keep silent about such matters when outside the family.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

although nothing was said, they "knew" what the parental view was. For example:

> The parents avoid direct talk on political questions. They only try to strengthen the child in his general moral position. (Were there any discussions between you and your parents?) What kind of discussions could there be? I was just a kid, but they tried to deflect my attention from Communism by making me read classical literature or other instructive and interesting books rather than the Pioneer literature. (Did you know their political views?) They did not tell me that, but I felt that it did not support the view which was developing in me. (How did you know that?) My feeling was quite definite. I tried to propagandize them and show them they didn't understand. (Did they oppose your ideas?) They did not oppose me directly. They only said, "Wait until you get older and then you will understand more." (And did this influence you?) It did not influence me directly, but it put some doubt in me. These words and remarks became more frequent and they accumulated. (When did they start accumulating? Between the age of 10 and 15 years. . . . (24-year-old male, father a stage director in theater)

Finally, the least numerous group, 9, or 10 per cent, of the total, was composed of the individuals whose parents adapted to this problem by supporting the official doctrines of the regime:

> How were we educated? We were educated in the spirit of Communism, the Soviet Union only, we did not know anything else. . . . My parents were afraid to tell about life under the Tsarist regime. . . . My father was very enclosed within himself in the family. He never told about the past. He always said, "You must do what you are told to do." (23-year-old male, father a trust director)

How may one explain the differences revealed by these patterns? For the open and frankly anti-Soviet response, in the majority of cases little rationale was offered. This can be accounted for in part by the anti-Soviet milieu in which the respondents had been living for some time, that is, the Western world, in the context of which the interviews took place. The reporting of an anti-Soviet atmosphere in the family was a response more likely to be approved by DP groups and also by Western interviewers, and apparently most respondents felt that an overtly expressed anti-regime attitude did not have to be justified in terms of other values or aspects of the family's situation. However, there does seem to have been a prior motivational element in the picture which, although not mentioned by the respondents, helps to account for the predominance of the openly anti-Soviet pattern. This is the trait of impulsiveness, the spontaneous emission of feelings with little regard for their consequences. For instance:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY
WALTHAM, MASSACHUSETTS 02154

Memorandum DATE

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

My mother often cursed the Communists, and said, you should excuse the expression, "It is the Communists who —— over everything." And my brother was a Komsomol and a Party member. My mother would often say, "We have gone through so much, and for what? We have nothing and we never will. During Tsarist times we lived better." Sometimes we got fed up with her raving and told her to keep quiet. (Did she say such things even when your brother was around?) Yes. She would say, "Our comrades! What have they done for us? We have gotten nothing good from them." She would say this every day and she would always cry. My mother felt that she had lived better before. Then she often had arguments with my brother over religion, too. (27-year-old male, mother a waitress separated from husband)

Further evidence of such lack of future-oriented calculation is to be found in the fact that in 29 of the 67 cases in the openly anti-Soviet group, the frank expression of parental views did not win over the child, but led instead to conflict, or enhanced the seriousness of an already existing conflict. According to these respondents, parental opposition to the ideas they learned at school brought them into a position where they rebelled against their parents and rejected their values. For example:

Whenever I stayed with my family, I quarreled with my parents, especially my father. He tried to tell me that the Party line was nothing but a lie, that I should open my eyes and see what's behind it all. But I had faith. I was very young and thus very enthusiastic and I thought my parents were old, clinging to old-fashioned ideas, that they couldn't see the truth, that they couldn't understand our new socialist reforms. (33-year-old female, father a physics teacher)

Here is another sample of parent-child tension over political opinions:

When I started to go to school, the agitation and propaganda began in my life. They used to say we lived better than anybody anywhere. School had a very great influence on me. I did not believe anything my mother said about their having a servant and a cow and everything. Mother often used to tell me about this. She would tell me about her mother and her father, and how satisfied they were with their life. But when I joined the Pioneers I was torn away from my family. I doubted that my mother told me the truth, because they [at school] used to tell me about the exploiters before the Revolution, and that people were not able to live. (30-year-old male, mother a cook, widowed in 1930)

There is no doubt but that with increasing age the intellectual maturation of the child made him both more fully interested in political ideas, and also potentially able to admit and handle the conflict between his parents' views and the outlook broached in extra-familial contexts. On the other hand, another accompaniment of aging is emotional

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

maturation, and in modern industrial societies one of the central problems connected with emotional maturation concerns the "emancipation" of the child from close emotional ties with his parents. Such emotional emancipation is a process which ordinarily accompanies adolescence, and thus occurs concurrently with the young person's greater consciousness of his parents' political views. If the latter are dissonant with those which he has learned to idealize in school and youth group organizations, then they will become the focus for conflict with his parents. Consequently, it is quite plausible and probable that in Soviet society emotional problems of the parent-youth relationship become "politicized" to an exceptional degree or, to put it the other way around, that a great proportion of parent-youth conflicts over differing political viewpoints can be explained as a displacement associated with the struggle to overcome dependency feelings which are no longer culturally approved.

Nonetheless, the central point to be noted in the parent-child relationship in those families in which parents frankly expressed their anti-regime sentiments is the high frequency with which political differences were a sore point, and the widespread tendency of children to reject their parents' views.

Let us turn now to those parents who did not express their views so openly. Although they themselves were in fact opposed to the regime, they adopted either a "neutral" or a "pro-Soviet" position in regard to the ideological development of their children. The predominant explanation given for such parental behavior was expressed in terms of how best to contribute to the present and future welfare of the child:

> My mother never tried to convince me of the rightness of her ideas. She was extremely cultured and knew I had to live my own life, that I had to live in Soviet society, and she did not wish to make it difficult for me. (32-year-old male, mother a typist, widowed in 1928)

In a number of interviews respondents who were themselves parents in the USSR[8] responded in effect in the same way:

> (What kind of character did you try to impart to your child?) I will tell you exactly what my attitude was. Inasmuch as we were living in the Soviet Union, we knew that our children would have to continue to live in the Soviet Union even after we were gone, and so we tried to introduce them to Communist ideas. What can I say about the education of our children? It was of a different sort than I would have preferred, but I didn't object. (59-year-old female, scientific research worker)

[8] Responses from this group are not included in the textual or tabular numerical totals.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In a few cases, a different explanation was offered—namely, that the frank transmission of their own feelings to their children would have jeopardized the physical or economic welfare of the parents themselves:

> In the majority of instances, the influence of parents on their children was insignificant in the Soviet Union. Many questions of ethics are absorbed by the children in school from their classmates and the school's environment, and the parents are forced to accept it. Otherwise there can be very serious consequences. For instance, one can be reported for "political discussions." (54-year-old male, university professor)

> (What was your attitude toward religion?) We did not have any icons in our house. All depended on my father. In the position he was in we could not have done it. My father's sister was a very religious woman and she always laughed at us because we were godless. (What was his internal attitude toward religion?) Since my father occupied a good position, he could not display any religious feelings. Maybe they [the parents of the respondent] talked somewhat differently between themselves. I couldn't know it, but it was not in our presence. We, the young people, were educated in an anti-religious spirit. (23-year-old male, father a trust director)

Finally, there is some indication that still another explanatory condition deserves mention. The modal type of family in the USSR is a small, structurally isolated[9] group in which emotional intimacy is highly valued. In such circumstances it becomes especially important to maintain expected levels of mutual acceptance and stability in interpersonal relations. For this reason, it may be supposed that Soviet parents were not infrequently moved to avoid serious conflict with their children simply in order to maintain peace and harmony within the family. Moreover, the burden of adaptation or adjustment could be seen as rightfully belonging more to them than to their children, since by virtue of their age and experience they were better able to "understand" the reasons for the attitudinal patterns of their children than were their children able to appreciate the parental point of view. Moreover, in the adolescent period during which the child is engaging in the struggle to become emotionally independent from his parents, he may be notably unwilling to compromise those principles he calls his own. For these reasons, it is perhaps not too surprising that some Soviet parents

[9] Isolated, that is, in the sense that members of the larger kin group are in the typical case not particularly close in either a residential or emotional sense to the members of the immediate individual family. In this respect the Soviet family, at least in its urban Slavic variety, does not differ from the predominant family type in the United States. See Talcott Parsons, "The Kinship System of the Contemporary United States," *American Anthropologist*, XLV (January 1943), pp. 22-38.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were likely to engage in a measure of adaptation to the views of the younger generation, and were willing to pay the price of suppressing their dissatisfaction with the Soviet system.[10] The most popular private rationalization for this seems to have been something on the order of: "Someday they'll find out the true state of affairs for themselves."

The result obtained from analysis of reported parental attitudes in the families of these 94 young respondents appears to be an important datum for appraisal of the role of the family in Soviet totalitarian society, for it indicates that in a majority of cases anti-Soviet parents were unwilling or unable by their own efforts to raise anti-Soviet children. Twenty-seven, or 29 per cent of the 94, seem to have made little attempt to do so, and either did not contradict what their children learned in school, or in fact reiterated and reinforced what they had learned there. As a justification of this attitude, the predominant view in this group was that the children should be raised for their own good, or for the good of the family as a whole, in the spirit of the social system in which they had to live. And of the 67 parents who were reported as attempting to influence their children in an anti-Soviet direction, 29 of the 67 cases, or 43 per cent—a not inconsiderable proportion—were relatively unsuccessful. If these 29 are added to the two groups of families in which the parents, in effect, cooperated with the regime, 27 in all, the resulting 56 families constitute 60 per cent of the total number of 94 respondents with anti-Soviet parents. Now, if the 9 respondents who came from predominantly pro-Soviet families are also added to this number, the proportion of families represented by young respondents in the interview sample which were relatively powerless to oppose effectively the pressures of the Soviet system is even greater—65 out of 103, or 63 per cent. Considering the circumstances under which the interviews were conducted, and the disaffected, political-refugee status of the respondents, this is indeed a remarkable finding, and testifies in sinister fashion to the ability of the Soviet regime to destroy ideological opposition even within the private family group.

It is not necessary that the above result stand alone, for rough corroboration was obtained from a different group of refugees and with the use of a different instrument. Sixty-six respondents who had themselves been parents in the USSR were administered paper-and-pencil

[10] The advantage to the individual parent of peace within the family is clearly expressed in the following exchange:

(How did you explain to your children those events in the USSR whose negative side was clear to you?) On this question, the children had much instruction in school, and in order not to become upset, I kept silent. (56-year-old female, bookkeeper)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

questionnaires concerned primarily with their experiences in family life. The first child of these respondents was born in the 1915-1930 period; thus they comprise a group which corresponds in age quite closely to that of the parents of the young respondents whose experiences were examined above. These former Soviet parents were confronted with the following check-list question:

> How did you explain to your child(ren) those events in the USSR whose negative side was clear to you, such as purges, repressions, the Terror, etc.?
>
> a——I explained to them as best I could in such a fashion that they would see no contradictions between what I told them and what they heard in school.
> b——I told them the complete truth although it contradicted the things they were taught in school.
> c——I tried as best I could to avoid such topics and remained silent.
> d——Something else. (Please explain)

Results were as follows: the most frequently chosen responses were "c," indicated by 36 per cent of the group, and "b," also chosen by 36 per cent. Five per cent chose alternative "a," and nine persons, or 14 per cent, answered in their own terms ("d") or checked more than one response. Five, or 9 per cent, did not answer.

In Table I, these results are compared with the parental attitudes toward the regime reported by the respondents who were themselves children in Soviet families.

TABLE I. MODE OF INTERPRETING SOVIET REGIME TO CHILDREN OF ANTI-REGIME PARENTS* AS REPORTED BY CHILDREN IN INTERVIEWS AND BY PARENTS ON A CHECK-LIST QUESTIONNAIRE**

	MODE OF INTERPRETING REGIME			
Position of Respondent in Family	*Overtly Anti-regime*	*Non-committal*	*Favorable to Regime*	*Total Answering* (N = 100%)
Child (%)	71	19	10	(94)
Parent (%)	47	47	6	(51)

* Parents best described as holding genuinely pro-Soviet attitudes while in the Soviet Union (N = 9 in the interview sample, and N = 1 in the questionnaire group) are excluded.

** There is a distinct social class difference in the parental mode of interpreting the regime to children, a pattern which is discussed further below. There are also somewhat different proportions of social class representation in the two sample groups being compared. This does not, however, change the tendency for children to report parental behavior differently from the way it is reported by parents themselves. Essentially the same pattern of differences between the parental version of events and the child's version continue to appear when each social class group is analyzed separately.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This table merits several comments. In the first place, it indicates that not only when the situation is reported from the point of view of the child, but also from the point of view of the parents themselves, a sizable proportion of Soviet parents were not able or not willing to express their views to their children with complete frankness. Indeed, the table suggests that parents are quite a bit less willing than are children to signify the presence of overt opposition to the Soviet regime within the home.

The table also indicates that parental attitudes as characterized by young people tend to be concentrated at the extremes of the three major response patterns, while parental attitudes as characterized by parents themselves are bunched more on the middle, or non-committal, alternative. This difference may be in part a function of the way in which the information was gathered. In the interview situation, because of the use of probes by the interviewer, the respondent may have felt more pressure to characterize the attitudes of his parents as either actively "for" or "against" than was felt by the questionnaire respondents. However, another interpretation is possible: the table may reflect the fact that the same process is being viewed, and interpreted, from two different points of view within the family—points of view which are in themselves different. Parental silence on vital topics may be seen *by the parent* as a compromise solution to the conflict between his own negative attitude and the more positive interpretation of the Soviet scene which he feels is expected of him by his children. But such behavior may be seen *by a young person* as behavior corresponding to the old Russian proverb, "Silence gives consent," or, more likely, as failure to respond in the prescribed way and thus as opposition to the regime.

The first major conclusion suggested by both sources of data is that the regime was quite successful in opposing the anti-Soviet views of parents and thus in molding the attitudes of young people. Clearly, the first step in the process consisted in gaining the loyalty of children at an early age. The predominant reaction to this on the part of parents was a feeling of fear and helplessness. Little could be done to prevent their indoctrination. As their children grew older, however, and developed a sense of responsibility for the welfare of their parents, it was possible to introduce them to non-conformist ideas. But as might be expected, and as these data indicate, by this time it was in many cases too late, and if the parents persisted in contradicting what the children had learned in school, conflict was likely to develop. Parent-youth conflict, actual and potential, then served as a social pressure within the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

family which often led to greater parental conformity with the attitudes and values of the new Soviet culture. It therefore actually served the purposes of the regime by helping to weaken the family as a source of opposition to Bolshevik ideology.[11]

It is perhaps of greater import, however—particularly in view of the anti-Soviet bias of the respondents in this case—to emphasize that such a substantial number of parents made no attempt to pit their strength against the tide of events while they were in the USSR, and failed to oppose the new Soviet *Weltanschauung* even within the privacy of their homes. They thus collaborated with the regime in spite of themselves in the task of developing their children into loyal young Soviet citizens. It is in fact quite probable that political conformity in this sense has been for some time the modal response among the population still resident in the Soviet Union.

Still and all, the fact remains that in some cases Soviet parents failed to surrender to the course of events, and within the home actively resisted the new ideas propagated by the Soviet regime. This raises the question: Which were the families more likely to become "Sovietized," and which were those internally more resistant to the new ideas? To some degree, of course, the answer to this question depends upon the pattern of specific experiences undergone by the members of the family under consideration. For instance, the arrest and sentencing for political reasons of a member of a family made it difficult for the rest of the family to maintain any semblance of a neutral or pro-Soviet orientation.[12] However, consideration of certain more general aspects of Soviet social conditions and social structure leads one to expect significant differences in this regard among the various Soviet socio-economic groups.

Comparisons for the three major socio-economic groups of Soviet society are made in Table II. In both samples dealt with, the young life-history respondents and the questionnaire respondents of the parental generation, the variation by socio-economic group was in the

[11] Compare with the role of children in the first-generation immigrant family in the United States. For example: "In the face of this whole development [i.e., the pressures and attractions of American life] the immigrants were helpless. They had neither the will nor the ability to turn their offspring into other directions. The nominal authority of the fathers was often halfheartedly used; they were cruelly torn by the conflicting wishes that their sons be like themselves and yet lead better lives than they. Sensing that the school and street would tear the next generation away, the parents knew not how to counteract those forces without injuring their own flesh and blood." From Oscar Handlin, *The Uprooted,* Boston, 1951, pp. 252-53. See also W. Lloyd Warner and Leo Srole, *The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups,* New Haven, Conn., 1945, especially Chapter VI, "The Family," pp. 103-55.

[12] Changes in family relationships subsequent to regime-induced deprivations are discussed at length in Kent Geiger, "Deprivation and Solidarity in the Soviet Urban Family," *American Sociological Review,* XX (January 1955), pp. 57-68.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

same direction, and the two samples were therefore combined. Also, the questionnaire respondents who checked more than one category or answered in their own words were assigned to a single, most appropriate category. The difference quite conclusively favors the Soviet peasant family as furnishing the most active anti-regime family environment. On the other hand, the least actively anti-regime family is the white-collar level family of intelligentsia and employees.

TABLE II. OVERT ATTITUDE EXPRESSED IN FAMILY BY ANTI-SOVIET PARENTS* TOWARD SOVIET REGIME FOR PARENTS FROM DIFFERENT SOCIO-ECONOMIC LEVELS

Socio-economic Level	OVERT ATTITUDE TOWARD SOVIET REGIME		
	Not Overtly Anti-regime	*Overtly Anti-regime*	*Totals* (N = 100%)
Non-manual (%)	47	53	(81)
Worker (%)	35	65	(34)
Peasant (%)	23	77	(39)

* This table includes respondents from both the life-history interview and the questionnaire on family life and only those cases in which the parents were reported as "anti-Soviet." Respondents from the interview sample group were born in the 1915-1929 period, while respondents from the questionnaire sample had children of which the first was born within the same time period. The distributions over these periods of precise years of birth of the children as among the three socio-economic groups in the samples are approximately equivalent.

How may these differences be explained? In the first place, area of residence is an important factor. The school system, the youth-group organizations, and the mass communications media through which the regime's agitation and propaganda are mediated are much more effectively developed in urban areas than in the Soviet countryside.[13] Therefore, the young people in the cities, and probably to some degree the entire urban population, tend to be much more influenced by current ideology than do their country peers. It is of course not only in totalitarian societies that social change occurs more rapidly in the city than in the country. Insofar as such pressures are effective, we would expect to find a stronger trend toward conformity among urban parents than among rural parents.

Closely connected is the strength of the traditional peasant orientation toward religion, and the relative weakness of religious attitudes

[13] Consult Fainsod, *op.cit.*, especially p. 36, for information on the weaknesses of youth organizations in rural areas. The differential exposure of various population groups to the mass media is discussed in Peter H. Rossi and Raymond A. Bauer, "Some Patterns of Soviet Communications Behavior," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XVI (Winter 1952-1953), pp. 653-70. Rossi and Bauer characterize the Soviet collective farmer as a person who is "almost isolated from the communications network" (p. 658).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

among the urban population.[14] Essential contradictions between Bolshevism and traditional religious views quite effectively precluded the adoption of other than an anti-Soviet frame of reference within a strongly religious household.

The latter consideration also applies in some measure to social group differentiation among the urban population. Owing to the rapid rate of urbanization characterizing recent Soviet history[15] and the fact that newly urbanized peasants generally become workers, a positive attitude toward religion and other attitudinal and behavioral patterns of the peasantry tend to be found more frequently in the urban working class than among the urban non-manual population.

It is also widely recognized that Soviet society since the mid-1930's has become highly stratified,[16] and that the material lot of the Soviet peasant and worker has been a hard one. Hence one might expect parents in these categories to manifest genuine hostility toward the Soviet regime purely on the basis of neglected "class interests."[17]

One additional factor deserves mention. It concerns the close connection in Soviet society between access to and retention of responsible, well-paid jobs and attitudes of political orthodoxy. Soviet parents who were highly placed in the Soviet system usually felt they could ill afford to take any chances in jeopardizing their position.[18] Thus part of the price paid by the Soviet upper class for their material advantages was a greater degree of ideological conformity, genuine or simulated, whereas the lower classes seemed to have the compensatory advantage of being allowed more liberty to blow off steam. In their case, politically deviant beliefs and attitudes could be shrugged off by Soviet authorities as a case of the "backwardness of the masses."

The implications of this class difference in family patterns extend in several directions. In the first place, Table II makes it apparent that

[14] In 1937 Y. Yaroslavsky, head of the League of Militant Atheists, estimated that about two-thirds of the urban adult population over 16 called themselves atheists, whereas in the country from one-half to two-thirds were believers. Cited in N. S. Timasheff, *Religion in Soviet Russia, 1917-1942,* New York, 1942, p. 65. Harvard Project data on refugee attitudes toward religion also indicate that religious belief increases in strength as one descends in the social class hierarchy.

[15] Lorimer concludes that the net migration from rural areas to cities must have been at least 23 million persons in the inter-census period, 1926 to 1939. Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects,* Geneva, 1946, pp. 145-50.

[16] Alex Inkeles, "Social Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union: 1940-1950," *American Sociological Review,* XV (August 1950), pp. 465-79.

[17] There is, however, some evidence to the contrary. It is likely that a considerable portion of the frustration engendered by difficult material living conditions is expressed and dissipated within the context of the family itself. See Geiger, *op.cit.*

[18] Note, for example, the case of the trust director's son (p. 197 above) who felt that a man "in his father's position" had to use more than the usual amount of care.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it is in some measure misleading to make general and unqualified statements about the role of "the family" in changing political attitudes. The role of the family evidently varies considerably from class level to class level. Second, since overtly expressed opposition to the regime on the part of parents varies inversely with class level, we would expect parent-youth solidarity in terms of political conflict also to vary inversely with social class level. The best data available indicate that at least for the urban population such is actually the case. Solidarity in Soviet "intelligentsia" families apparently is greater than in families of lower ranking non-manual categories (bookkeeper, schoolteacher, clerk, etc.) and in these latter greater than in worker level families.[19] Finally, it is quite likely that considerable variegation as well as a high incidence of underlying ambivalence characterize the political attitudes of young people in the peasant and working class groups. Particularly in the case of the peasant youth, ambivalent feelings about the Soviet regime seem to have given rise to the typical reaction of political apathy, a trend which is related in mutually supporting fashion to the weakness of rural Komsomol and Party organizations.

IV

The broad problem with which this paper has been concerned has been the struggle between totalitarian state and family for the control of the mind of youth. The prewar Soviet Union has served as a test case, and the data have been furnished by Soviet political refugees. If the experiences reported by such persons differ from those of the rank and file of the Soviet population, it may be assumed that they incline in the direction of more parental hostility toward the Soviet Government. Thus any conclusion reached which seems to be favorable to the aims of the Soviet regime would probably be even more strongly substantiated if it were possible to investigate the problem within the contemporary USSR itself.

A basic conclusion is warranted. The family has on the whole not been a significant force in resisting the ideological indoctrination of Soviet young persons. While there is some evidence that politically tinged parent-youth conflict was a prominent feature in the prewar Soviet family, of equal or greater importance is the fact that Soviet parents so frequently minimized such conflict by their adaptive-conforming responses to the regime's ideology. Although a number of considerations must enter into a full explanation, two deserve special prominence since they underline essential differences between the

[19] Geiger, *op.cit.*, pp. 65-66.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

totalitarian and the democratic way of organizing society. The first is the systematic use of coercion and terrorism as a means of inducing conformity. In substantial measure, Soviet parents went along with the Soviet regime because they feared to act otherwise. Secondly, the family, like an army, travels on its stomach—and the Soviet regime holds the key to the larder. Under Soviet conditions, in which all opportunities are government opportunities, attitudes of political conformity have come to be seen as a basic prerequisite for the obtaining of the good things of life—education, good jobs and, ultimately, decent food, clothing, and shelter.

It is also of some interest to note that the connection between a semblance of political loyalty and personal welfare is most relevant for parents in the upper class family, and that it plays a less prominent role in the worker and peasant family. This reflects a general feature of social structure in contemporary urban industrial society. Adaptation and close conformity to the needs of the existing order are part of the cost involved in the attainment and preservation of high status and its privileges.

A final commentary on the findings reported above takes us back to the general question of evaluating the role of the family in resisting the creation of those homogeneous political attitudes associated with totalitarianism. To what extent can the present results be generalized to other totalitarian societies? It is probable that the Soviet regime in the years preceding World War II enjoyed less mass support than any other totalitarian system of modern times. If the family was of so little importance in blocking the influence of externally induced sources of attitudinal change in this extreme case, one might conclude that it can be reckoned as even less significant a conservative force in other totalitarian societies. But popular support is only one factor. The realities of the Soviet scene differ in a number of additional respects from those obtaining in other systems of the totalitarian type. In the extent to which basic social changes[20] have been carried through, in the isolation of the population from outside influences, and in the very longevity and manifest stability of the system itself, the Soviet experience has as yet not been matched by other regimes. The implications of such contrasts as these suggest that the Soviet pattern cannot easily be generalized to other totalitarian systems. For they emphasize the fact, which has been a consistent interpretive motif in this case study, that parental action within the family is partly determined by factors over and above traditionally grounded personal predispositions.

[20] Forms of property ownership, relations between church and state, etc.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE AFTER A BOMBING DISASTER

By JACK HIRSHLEIFER

WHILE much is known about the impact of bombing on an economy's material ability to produce—in terms of the physical survival of resources—comparatively little thought has been devoted to the broader social consequences of truly major bombing. The social and political consequences, however, may well dominate the material or more narrowly economic ones; resources potentially of value may either remain unutilized or may be improperly or anti-socially employed, as a result of the impairment or collapse of our accepted processes of social decision. Our purpose here is to attempt to explore the social consequences of a major bombing disaster by an examination of the effects of bombing upon the organization of society, upon the distribution of political and economic power, and upon institutions relevant to the effective functioning of society. Needless to say, we can only make preliminary or tentative conjectures (or, rather, speculations), in view of the complexity of the subject and the limited degree of historical knowledge of the functioning of human societies under conditions of extreme stress. Nevertheless, it seems desirable to explore these questions—since the answers may have important implications for prewar planning designed to promote the ability of our society to cope with such disasters.

As an economist, the author is all too aware that much of the subject matter here discussed lies outside the field of his professional competence. The excuse for writing anyway is the hope of directing the attention of those more competent than he to this vital, though unpleasant, subject.

There has been some analysis of the psychological effects of bombing on the individual level,[1] as well as extensive discussion, in the Strategic Bombing Survey and elsewhere, of the effect of bombing on morale in World War II. Little or nothing, however, has been written of the possible effect of bombing or other major disaster upon the structure of society or popular attitudes toward this structure. One rather good reason for this neglect has been that bombing in World

[1] See I. L. Janis, *Air War and Emotional Stress,* New York, 1951, *passim.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

War II did not seem to produce any substantial immediate effect in these directions. Nevertheless, for a truly major disaster—one, for example, involving hydrogen bombs dropped in a short period of time on our hundred largest cities[2]—it does seem reasonable to believe that the structure of the national society may be most seriously affected.[3] The bombs will tear great gaps in all existing mechanisms of production, distribution, and finance; they will create hordes of propertyless refugees desperately seeking food and shelter; and at the same time they will gravely weaken our civilian systems of police, administration, and law. In the event of destruction of single cities or of a sharply limited number (as occurred in World War II, where destruction was truly city-wide only in a small number of cases, including Tokyo, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Hamburg), the fabric of the national economy and society can support the sectors put out of action; there is serious doubt whether this will remain the case for the 100-thermonuclear disaster considered here.

The leading historical instances in which the entire pattern of a national society was disrupted by a disaster have been military conquests and occupations and true social revolutions. The behavior of the various strata of population in such extreme crises (and especially in interregnum situations after the collapse of one authority and before the firm installation of another) is one promising source for information on which to predict behavior after massive thermonuclear bombing. The other main source, of course, is the bombing experience in World War II.

I. The Immediate Post-Bombing Period

In popular writings on the subject of future bombing catastrophes, a picture of a near-complete collapse of civilized society is often painted. The survivors of such bombing, it might be argued, as a result of losses

[2] This, of course, is not the worst conceivable disaster. We may anticipate that a potential enemy might some day, perhaps comparatively soon, be able to deliver on the order of thousands of such bombs. It appears that, in the absence of radical preparatory measures on our part, survival from such a disaster will be so low that analysis of the post-bombing era may be of little interest.

[3] Our hundred largest cities contained, in 1950, 29 per cent of the nation's population. The hundred largest Census metropolitan areas contained 51 per cent of the total population. Very roughly, we may think of the former as the population vulnerable to the physical effects of the bombing, and the latter as inclusive of those directly linked economically with the vulnerable area. These statements should be interpreted only as a broad indication of magnitude; for example, some of the population outside the cities will be physically vulnerable, while some of those inside may not. We shall also generally assume that a substantial fraction of the vulnerable population escapes or survives the disaster.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and destruction owing to enemy action or to looting and panic, are torn out of the context which normally governs and restrains their actions. Having been wrenched from their ties to neighborhood, job, property, and even possibly family, they will no longer be subject to the network of influences which internalize social control of behavior. Simultaneously, the external controls (the police force and administrative mechanism generally) will also be gravely damaged by the bombing. In these circumstances we can perhaps conceive of sheer social chaos resulting: a Hobbesian war of each individually against all.

A more sober look at the possibilities, however, should serve to dispel this lurid image. While there is reason to anticipate increases in certain types of anti-social behavior on the part of refugees and evacuees,[4] all the evidence of historical disasters indicates that man's urge to be part of an organized society is so overwhelming that it cannot be seriously shaken. Even the Black Death, which, because of the fear of contagion, was particularly destructive of social cohesion, did not splinter society to its component atomic individuals.[5]

If we know anything, we know that men will follow leaders. The more interesting threat to social life as we know it, therefore, is not atomistic chaos but, rather, extreme lawlessness—in the form, perhaps, of a society consisting largely of robber bands engaged in mutual struggle for surviving economic resources. It is conceivable that the emergent leaders thrown up by the disaster, who may have no connection with the official authorities, might in many cases desire to maintain their position for the purpose of engaging in predatory activities. However, since in the nature of the case these leaders will have neither ideology nor organization to win them support outside their own group, it is difficult to see how they could stand out against authorities who will have the advantage of legitimacy and of at least a partially effective nation-wide organization.

Perhaps the most interesting example in recent history of anything approaching extreme lawlessness in this sense occurred during some of the more confused periods of the Russian Civil War when (among others) Bolsheviks, Whites, independent peasant movements, minority

[4] While this might seem to be a fairly obvious development among uprooted populations fleeing into areas which have suffered relatively less or not at all, there is no evidence of any serious criminal problem in the evacuations associated with actual or threatened World War II bombings. Janis mentions increases in looting, thefts, and juvenile delinquency in the bombed areas after a raid (*op.cit.*, pp. 147-49), but crime in reception areas is not even mentioned in any of the standard reports. By way of contrast, a high rate of criminal activity was encountered among displaced persons and other refugees in occupied Germany shortly after the war ended.

[5] *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, II, pp. 574-76.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

separatist movements, and foreign interventionists struggled against one another in a shifting pattern of alliances. This instance is sufficient to demonstrate that such a scramble is possible in a disaster context. Even under the worst interpretation, however, the experience was one of civil war (that is, of competing authorities), rather than sheer lawlessness. The possibility of revolutionary as opposed to anarchic conflict is discussed in the next section. We still must conclude that there is no evidence that a disaster context has ever produced in modern times anything approximating a collapse of organized society, except possibly as a transitory local phenomenon.

Turning from the limited evidence in the historical record of past disasters to our present problem, it may be helpful to project ourselves imaginatively into the situation created by the hypothetical bombing disaster. On our assumptions, our hundred largest cities (i.e., cities down to the size of Montgomery, Alabama—population 107,000) have been struck by bombs large enough to kill the bulk of their inhabitants if no protective measures were undertaken. In taking stock of the population after the initial attack,[6] it is necessary to consider the joint effects of the long-appreciated initial hazards and the newly revealed radiation threat. The recent AEC release on fallout[7] reports that the area of serious-to-lethal radioactivity for the Bikini detonation of March 1, 1954, covered about 7,000 square miles. The seriousness of the hazard may be appreciated when we note that one hundred bombs could cover with such radioactivity almost one-fourth of the nation's aggregate land area of 3,000,000 square miles.[8] The heavily urbanized Northeast, in particular, may possibly be almost blanketed. On the other hand, the AEC report emphasizes the possible value of protective measures—in particular, taking shelter in basements or solid structures—and implies that the decay of the radiation is so rapid that the period of serious danger may be over within forty-eight hours. This last view has been challenged by Ralph Lapp,[9] and it does seem likely that even after this length of time the degree of survival will depend upon the success with

[6] It is believed that the mutual attrition of strategic forces will preclude the mounting of additional attacks of anywhere like the magnitude of the original blow.

[7] AEC release of February 15, 1955. Full text available in *U.S. News and World Report* (February 25, 1955), pp. 128-34.

[8] The Bikini explosion has been widely reported to have the force of about 15 million tons of TNT (compared with 20,000 tons for the nominal atomic bomb). If so, this might be a rather large average bomb-size for a 100-city attack. There will, however, be additional fallout hazard from bombs aimed at non-city targets (e.g., air bases). In addition, the cumulative fallout of many bombs may lead to serious-to-lethal radioactivity in large areas not so heavily affected by any single weapon.

[9] See his "Radioactive Fallout III," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* XI (June 1955), p. 207.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which evacuation from "hot" areas, together with decontamination and shielding measures against residual radioactivity, can be carried out.

With all this in mind, the survivors of the initial attack may, after a period like forty-eight hours, be divided into several categories:

(1) In regions sufficiently remote from attack (if any), the entire population structure will survive.

(2) In areas affected only by fallout, only a minor fraction of the population are likely to be casualties if it is assumed that all have behaved properly—i.e., moved quickly to the best available fallout cover. Presumably this will apply to residents of rural areas and small towns, provided that they are not so unlucky as to have a bomb go off nearby.

(3) Cities provide generally excellent protection against fallout, but unfortunately they will presumably be the target areas and so will be vulnerable to the still more terrible immediate effects. In the absence of an effective shelter program, our assumptions provide for little survival of urban populations if they remain in the attacked cities. On the other hand, should the city-dwellers follow FCDA policy and evacuate, they will with high probability be exposed in the process of movement to the fallout hazard in places where good cover is hard to come by (depending upon wind patterns, the fallout from any single bomb on a city will tend to extend along a relatively narrow sector, but the cumulative effect of many bombs in heavily populated areas may leave only a few safe areas).

Summing up, it appears that even after consideration of fallout effects, the major weight of attack will be borne by the urban population (for our purposes "urban" refers to the population of the hundred largest cities), comprising about 30 per cent of the nation's total. While there will be some losses among the non-urban 70 per cent, by and large it seems safe to conclude that casualties and material damage for them will be light enough so that they will still have a way of life to preserve after the bombing.

The threat to this way of life will come from the dispossessed urban survivors who may have lost all they held dear, and who will be in desperate need of food and shelter. The *survivors* of this vulnerable 30 per cent, however, may be a class relatively small in numbers. The urban survivors essentially will have the choice of placing themselves in a position of dependence upon the population and authorities of the small towns and rural areas in order to obtain food, shelter, and other necessities of life—or some or all of them may attempt to take what they need or want by force. Only the latter alternative is really

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

consistent with the picture of chaos described above, but there are many reasons to believe that it will be by far the less prevalent development. For one thing, the survivors will include sick and injured who will have to accept dependence; still others may be in a shocked or a passive mental state, incapable of aggressive action; the law-abiding lifetime habits of the majority may not be easily broken; and finally, few will have the opportunity to secure firearms.

The receiving communities, on the other hand, will be strongly motivated to provide relief to those in need,[10] but also to preserve their way of life against the threat of force. There will be local and state police forces, and frequently military forces in the general area who can be called on to preserve order. It is true that the national and even most of the state administrative mechanisms may be paralyzed by the destruction of Washington and state capitals, and the disruption of essential links of the communication networks located in the target cities. Nevertheless, local authorities can generally be expected to act on their own initiative with the forces at their disposal—especially as the interests of these surviving authorities will be closely tied with those of the local populations which placed them in office. To the extent that administrative centers or even whole states and regions are not bombed, or that alternative headquarters provided with functioning communication channels are operating,[11] considerable administrative and police resources will be available to the authorities in any area where they may be hard-pressed. The disproportion of force and of organization would seem on the whole to be sufficient to coerce even the aggressive elements among the refugees to accept a dependent status, although there would perhaps be temporary lawlessness in some local areas.

Looking at the matter from the point of view of the receiving communities, it would seem that providing the food and shelter required by the refugees would probably prevent a host of troubles, and so would constitute the wiser as well as the more generous course of action. The food resources in the countryside and small towns are probably adequate, although the distribution would be spotty at first.[12] Housing

[10] A recent study of disaster situations has concluded that generosity and self-sacrifice in the period immediately after the crisis are an almost universal pattern of reaction. See F. C. Ikle and H. V. Kincaid, "Social Aspects of Wartime Evacuation in the United States," Committee on Disaster Studies, National Academy of Sciences, September 1954.

[11] Recent news reports have indicated that the national government has begun to undertake appropriate precautions to this end. See *New York Times,* November 21, 1954, p. 1, "President in Bomb Shelter Leads Drill for Atom Raid." The story describes the manning of alternative command posts outside Washington, with functioning communication channels, under a plan designed to cope with the bombing emergency.

[12] Our huge farm price-support stockpiles may come in handy here.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

space is much tighter, but refugees will generally accept makeshift quarters for a period of time.

II. The Basic Organization of Society

If we may grant that society will not collapse in the emergency period into a state of anarchy, the next question to which we may turn is whether the basic principles of our existing social organization may be expected to survive in the longer run, or whether the delayed or cumulative consequences of bombing may overwhelm the way of life we know. These principles are generally summarized by the slogan-words "democracy" and "private enterprise" in the political and economic spheres respectively; it is assumed that the reader will have a general awareness of the actual (rather than ideal) phenomena and relationships covered by these words, and so we shall not go into their meaning here. One comment which should be made is that we assume that the possibly changed social structure after bombing will still be determined primarily by ourselves—we do not consider the case where the social structure may be reorganized by a victorious enemy or by other foreign nations after an unsuccessful war. The possible world contexts in which the reorganization may take place include continued war with a greater or lesser continuing threat of bombing, or a cessation of war by a defeated enemy, by mutual agreement, or possibly as a result of mutual inability to continue.

How might the bombing catastrophe affect these basic principles? In this section we shall discuss possible political effects, and in the next the economic. From the political point of view, there are several potentially dangerous factors, to which we now turn.

(1) Resentment against government: The evidence concerning bombing in World War II shows a universal tendency to blame the home government for bomb damage almost more than the enemy, apparently because the bombing stimulates aggressive feelings which cannot be entirely channeled to a faraway target. These feelings are exacerbated whenever real inadequacies of defense exist.[13] In view of the gross disproportion between the threat we are postulating and any defensive measures likely to be undertaken, an argument might be made that a total repudiation of the pre-existing, and therefore demonstrably incompetent, government is in prospect.[14] While the military

[13] This phenomenon is described in Janis, *op.cit.*, pp. 124-52.

[14] The Strategic Bombing Survey reported a positive association between degree of bombing and opposition to the regime in Germany, as evidenced by subversive incidents as well as various measures of morale. The effect, however, was neither large nor clear, being partially confounded with other phenomena such as the growth of general war-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

leaders provide the most probable substitute for the rejected government, more "constitutional" possibilities (e.g., the opposition party) may exist. In any case, this is a conjecture and, as we have said before, there is no substantial indication of this type of resentment being carried to the stage of radical social action. In addition, there are the counterbalancing phenomena of apathy[15] and of heightened dependence upon government (e.g., for food rations), both of which tend to lead to docility rather than revolt. Even where actual deprivation (of food, utilities, transportation, etc.) occurred in World War II, little or no overt opposition seems to have resulted.[16]

(2) Incapacity of legitimate government: Because of the enormous concentration of government on the federal level in Washington, the executive, legislative, and judicial arms may all be at least temporarily incapacitated. While the succession to the Presidency seems formally quite adequate,[17] it may for some time be unclear who the chief officers of government legitimately are. In addition, the threat of anarchy may conceivably lead to the institution of martial law on state, regional, or national levels. In any case, civilian government powers will be gravely weakened at the same time that possibly unpopular measures may have to be taken in the process of restoring order. The exigencies of the situation, plus the absence of any authority universally regarded as legitimate, might conceivably lead to dangerous conflicts between contending authorities.

In comparison with this, the threat from definitely subversive or anarchic sources seems minor. It is not as if the effect of bombing is to impair the efficiency of the apparatus of government while leaving oppositional groups intact. On the contrary, oppositionists also are bombed out, have their communications interrupted, and become preoccupied with the sheer mechanics of personal survival. Having nothing like the variety and depth of material resources available to the

weariness and the tendency of the heavily bombed large cities to contain more oppositional elements even without any bombing. See USSBS, "The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale," I, especially pp. 22-23, 94-103. Rather similar results are reported for Japan in "The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale."

[15] USSBS, "German Morale," I, p. 1. [16] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

[17] The succession presently provided by law is as follows: Vice-President, Speaker of the House, President *pro tem* of the Senate, following whom are the Cabinet officers in order of rank: State, Treasury, Defense, Attorney-General, Postmaster-General, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, and Health, Education and Welfare. There remains a certain probability, perhaps small but not negligible, that all of these officers may be killed. While Congress may elect a new Speaker of the House or President *pro tem* of the Senate, this may be a slow process if the session is out—and if Congress is in session, there are likely to be quorum difficulties. Legislation is now being prepared to strengthen the continuity of government under bombing conditions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

legitimate authorities, they would be unlikely to pose a really serious national threat even if they did have the potentiality for winning a considerable measure of popular support.[18]

(3) Sectional conflict: It is conceivable that local, state, or regional loyalties might, under stress, override the national ones. Areas not seriously hurt by bombing might, for example, decline to assist those which were hurt. Or else, regions might differ so violently on such issues as continuation of the war, the basic structure of society, or redistribution of the surviving wealth as to bring about a dissolution of our national union.[19] While this possibility must be mentioned, it seems unlikely that national loyalties can be overturned in this way. Throughout history, wars have generally been associated with at least a temporary increase in national loyalties; this development would seem all the more probable if war begins by an enemy attack on the nation's homeland.

(4) Alterations of status: Perhaps the most explosive phenomenon of all consequent upon the bombing will be the alterations of status, which will be both radical and fortuitous. The stage is set for potentially violent conflict between the dispossessed class, who may have lost home, property, job, and possibly family, and the retaining class, who will be trying to preserve its own standard of life.[20] Conflict seems the more likely in that the former will constitute a mass of refugees quartered in the undestroyed regions and even in homes normally inhabited by the latter, and so awareness of the unjust disparities of fortune will be high. It may be expected that the newly dispossessed class would demand adequate and speedy compensation for injury to person and property, in real as well as monetary terms. While this demand is not fundamentally out of harmony with our existing socio-economic order (our economic "constitution"), we shall see that the indications are that it cannot be reasonably satisfied under post-bombing conditions. Failing compensation, demands will very probably be generated for radical equalitarian redistributions, and these may be fundamentally disruptive of the social order. In this connection, it should be pointed out that the more powerful position will be held by the comparatively undamaged social groupings resident in the areas

[18] See USSBS, "German Morale," I, p. 103.

[19] The separatist movements which flourished for a time during the Russian Civil War were motivated in large part by political and social opposition to the Bolsheviks in control of Russia proper.

[20] If there is very great destruction of life relative to destruction of material resources, this conflict may be somewhat mitigated. It is even conceivable that all the survivors might be made "richer" in terms of property than before. Despite this possibility, it seems more likely that a substantial dispossessed class will exist.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which have escaped bombing; it will be the officials in these areas who will be providing food, shelter, and clothing to a dependent class of refugees. These relatively more powerful groups will be strongly impelled toward conservatism and the preservation of law and order.

(5) Martial law: This weapon for the defense of society is evidently a most dangerous one. The urgent requirements of the emergency period might set the stage for dictatorial rule, in the guise of martial law, which would sweep away the democratic heritage we value. Nevertheless, it is sometimes justified to suspend constitutional safeguards temporarily, and the threat to life and property posed by lawlessness and anarchy after such a bombing disaster, while probably manageable by resolute and timely control measures, far exceeds in magnitude some of the emergencies which have led to martial law in the past.[21]

The wisdom of the adoption of martial law over the nation as a whole or over the attacked regions is a subject of controversy at the moment. Before June 16, 1955, plans of the mobilization and civil defense authorities did not seem to contemplate either martial law or the use of military forces after bombing.[22] But in Operation Alert, held on the above date, the President—apparently without thorough briefing on the arguments pro and con—declared a hypothetical nation-wide state of martial law. As a result, the official view of the administration now is that martial law will be adopted, although detailed plans for its execution have not been worked out.[23] On the other hand, a recent report prepared by the National Planning Association and signed by several prominent legal figures (including Dean D. F. Cavers of Harvard and Professor Charles Fairman of Washington University) comes out unequivocally against martial law.[24] Professor Fairman's

[21] For a useful discussion of martial law, see Charles Fairman, "The Law of Martial Rule and the National Emergency," *Harvard Law Review*, LV (June 1942), pp. 1253-302. The discussion of Lincoln's use of martial law in the Civil War (pp. 1278-89) is particularly interesting.

[22] "United States Civil Defense," which represents a civil defense plan issued by the National Security Resources Board in 1950 before formation of the Federal Civil Defense Administration, does discuss martial law as a last-resort measure (p. 16). Since its formation, however, the FCDA appears to have ignored and, by implication, frowned on planning for the use of military force to support the laws or to prevent anarchy in the emergency period. "This Is Civil Defense" (1951) outlines the responsibilities of the armed forces bearing on atomic attack (pp. 11-12) without reference to this problem. "Police Services" (1951) nowhere mentions the use of military force or the problems posed by the probable inability of the courts to dispense justice.

[23] On these points, see *New York Times*, June 17, 1955, p. 10, col. 4, and June 18, 1955, p. 1, col. 3.

[24] "A Program for the Nonmilitary Defense of the United States," A Statement on National Policy by The Special Policy Committee on Nonmilitary Defense Planning of the National Planning Association. Press release of May 9, 1955, pp. 23-25.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

views have been given wide circulation in columns by Arthur Krock in the *New York Times.*[25]

Despite this weight of opinion, it does appear that there is a valid role for martial law in such a disaster. While we have minimized the probability of sheer anarchy consequent upon the bombing, this was on the presumption that the force remaining at the disposal of society would be used resolutely to put down or to cow lawless elements. Where the structure or the personnel of civilian police forces has been so damaged as to be unable to preserve law and order, there would seem to be no alternative to martial law. The declaration of martial law on a nation-wide basis by the President serves notice on all concerned that the resources available to society will be used to put down disorder, and the announcement itself may suffice to deter the development of such situations—doubtless this is why martial law is sometimes proclaimed even in ordinary peacetime disasters. The opponents of martial law are on stronger ground when they point out how ill-suited this form of government is to the longer-range problems of recuperation from the disaster and prosecution of the war effort. Even here, however, it should not be forgotten that the administration of war-ravaged areas under emergency conditions, in which the military have considerable experience, does provide some points of similarity with the post-bombing situation. All in all, it seems that the more reasonable view would hold that it would be wiser to accept the possibility that the post-bombing emergency might require martial rule. It would be far better to prepare in advance for this possibility by specifying the conditions which might warrant martial law, by training military officers so that they would know what lies within their allowable field of discretion and what does not, and by determining in advance the conditions under which martial law is to be dissolved. Surely it would be better to do this than to risk the possibility that martial law would be required anyway, but would be executed by officers without a proper knowledge of their powers and of the problems with which they must deal.

The possible unconstitutional and revolutionary consequences of these tensions are, on the political level, a non-legitimate, possibly military regime or contending sectional regimes, and on the economic level a radical change in the forms or distribution of property ownership. On the political level (the economic will be discussed in detail in the next section), it seems likely that the legitimate authorities will prevail, the argument being much the same as that used before in minimizing the

[25] See *New York Times,* June 28, 1955, p. 26, col. 5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

possibility of a collapse of government authority. That is to say, the legitimate government will have material and moral resources which outclass those available to any possible competitor. It seems safe to say, for example, that American military officers will in general be strongly motivated to support the constitutional government rather than institute a military regime. Formation of a "national" government in the British sense is a likely development which would broaden political support for the legitimate authorities.

Perhaps the leading qualification which must be made of this conclusion is the possibility of exceptionally poor or weak legitimate leadership, which might voluntarily surrender power to some more self-confident group. Another more remote possibility is that the existing government might be somehow discredited by the bombing itself, which might occur if the ruling group had gained or retained power on the promise of making the nation (or the claim of having already made it) invulnerable to attack (e.g., Goering in Germany), or else on the promise or claim of being in some sense a "peace party." Almost certainly, a military regime is the dominating alternative in all these cases.

III. Status, Incentives, and Wealth

The distribution of economic as well as of political power, and attitudes in regard to that distribution, will be severely affected by the bombing. We may speculate that disaster would have two opposite effects with respect to such attitudes: on the one hand, inertial resistance to change is greatly weakened, opening the way for radical modifications previously beyond the bounds of possibility; on the other hand, the urgency of day-to-day requirements for human survival tends to impose pragmatic solutions for fundamental questions like the distribution of power, making it difficult for consistent schemes of social reform to gain acceptance. However strong the rationalistic arguments in favor of such schemes may be, neither the public nor the decision-makers will have time to listen to much rational argument, nor will they be very willing to accept temporary losses in the hope of a larger long-run gain. As an example, the imposition of socialism in a disaster context is conceivable as a practical device to enable decision-makers in effective political control to strengthen their hold on the society, or merely to ensure that appropriate decisions are made in the economic sphere; it is not too plausible, however, to expect the disaster experience to bring about a socialist system by somehow convincing people or rulers of the rightness of that system.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The basic questions about the economic order concern the distribution of economic power among (non-government) individuals, and between government on the one hand and individuals on the other. Economic power is wielded by individuals in their own name and for their own benefit, although of course social benefits generally accrue from such decisions (the "hidden hand"); economic power is wielded by government in the name of and presumably for the benefit of society as a whole, although it does not necessarily follow that social ends will be better achieved by this apparently more direct mechanism.

Turning first to the role of government in the economy, it is of course a common development in wartime for the government to expand its sphere of intervention and control. The major reason for this has been the desire or need on the part of the governing authorities (in democratic countries, with popular consent) to divert the resources of the community away from employments designed to satisfy private demands for current consumption or for investment for future production, and toward war or war-connected ends. This alone makes the government a far bigger customer for the products of the economy than before, and so enhances the economic influence of those holding political power. A second reason for the expansion of government controls has been the desire to achieve this diversion of resources in ways which are not consistent with the normal working of the private enterprise system. For example, a possibly efficient way of diverting resources is to offer high profits in war industries, but such high profits may be thought to have adverse effects on morale; the diversion of resources without the use of the profit incentive, on the other hand, will generally require direct government intervention.

In the post-bombing situation, we may expect that initially economic relationships will be in a chaotic state. Aside from the direct physical losses and their indirect ramifications through the economic network of suppliers and customers, the ownership of both the surviving and the destroyed properties will be confused because of the destruction of records; the financial mechanism may be wrecked; and the legal status of existing contracts of all kinds will be in doubt. Furthermore, it may for some time be unclear what the social priorities should be as among the production of consumer goods, investment goods for rebuilding, and war goods. Almost certainly, some radical government interventions will be required to settle on a rough basis (subject to post-emergency redetermination) the major legal questions of contracts and ownership, to provide for emergency credit, and to determine the main directions of effort for the surviving productive capacity.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This is the context, therefore, in which we may discuss the prospects for radical changes in our economic system. Among the basic principles of that system are private property, free choice of occupation, and freedom of contract, with consequent direction of economic effort under the profit incentive and through the price mechanism. None of these is absolute, of course, but we cannot devote further time here to an exploration of the qualifications and interpretations necessary for an adequate discussion of the fundamental economic principles of our society.

In the post-bombing situation, there are several main possibilities as to the type of government in effective power: the previously existing Federal government, an administration operating under martial law and perhaps military in nature, or possibly local or regional regimes out of effective control of a central authority. Under none of these circumstances does it seem reasonable to believe that the political authority will attempt a radical social reform to displace private ownership of enterprise. The first need will clearly be to get production and exchange going again, and this can best be done by the owners or managers previously in control.[26] In fact, the weakened administrative structure after bombing would indicate the desirability of maximum reliance upon permissive controls (i.e., inducements) as opposed to restrictive ones (prohibitions). Radical interference with the accepted system of inducements (the profit motive) may, therefore, have more adverse consequences than in a war without bombing. Of course, the administrative problem of reconciling economic inducements with social objectives remains—and might, in fact, prove impossible of solution.

We should not, however, limit ourselves to the surface question of demands or attitudes. Conceivably, even in the absence of direct demands for radical social change, steps might be taken in response to other demands which would lead inevitably to a modification of the socio-economic system. For example, the extension of government controls over the employment (rather than the ownership) of property is a normal wartime development (limited here by the weakness of damaged administrative mechanisms after bombing) which might, if

[26] The experience of the Bolsheviks after their seizure of power in Russia is interesting in this connection. According to Dobb, their immediate aim was not socialization, but the conquest of key positions to consolidate the political power they had already won. Lenin's first priority was to keep industry running, largely under private ownership, but with Bolshevik central direction. The transition to "war communism" was due primarily to political and military developments. See M. Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development Since 1917,* London, 1948, pp. 82-124. Similarly, the Chinese Communists have moved rather slowly in extending total state control over economic activity.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

long continued, tend to create vested interests opposed to a return to "free enterprise" or in favor of socialization. It would appear, however, that the most dangerous aspect of the situation from this point of view is not the mere extension of government controls, which is normal in wartime, but rather the steps which might be taken to resolve the conflicts of interest certain to arise over the critical question of the distribution of wealth—or, more generally, of status—after the bombing disaster. The major conflicting groups here will not be economic classes in the usual Marxist sense (proletariat vs. bourgeoisie), but rather the great classes of those who have suffered heavily from bombing, and those who have not.

In our society, status is determined in large part by wealth and income, and the desire to achieve or retain status in both of these forms is the dominant incentive of economic life. These foundations of status are affected in different ways by bombing. Income may be considered to have its sources in ownership of property (i.e., wealth) and labor (i.e., the exploitation of one's natural and cultivated human capacities). While the pattern of employment of labor will be greatly changed by the bombing, it is perhaps reasonable to expect that the human capacities involved (for example, the ability to organize and administer men and machines, or scientific ability and knowledge, or native shrewdness and energy) will still command much the same returns, relatively speaking, as before the bombing. The major qualification here is the loss of capacity on the part of those who have suffered permanent injuries. Income from property, on the other hand, will obviously be affected in the same way as wealth itself.

The pre-bombing distribution of wealth will be grossly distorted by bombing. We shall discuss here the consequences of a number of possible resolutions of the conflicting claims arising from this situation: (1) Proportionate compensation for the war damage (i.e., shifting the incidence of the loss from those suffering immediately to the nation's property-owners in the aggregate); (2) acceptance and stabilization of the post-bombing distribution of wealth; (3) an entirely "new deal" of wealth, presumably on more or less equalitarian lines; and (4) abolition of private wealth (i.e., socialization) in greater or lesser degree.[27]

[27] The first three of these relate to the distribution of economic power within the accepted process of economic decision-making, while the fourth implies a radical change in the process itself. Actually, of course, the existing "free enterprise" process is already "socialized" to a substantial degree by government regulation and intervention in economic decisions governing the use of and returns from property, and in wartime there is normally some further accentuation of this development.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Proportionate compensation is in its aims the most conservative of the solutions above, since it attempts to preserve the wealth and status relationships of the pre-bombing situation. Unfortunately, the magnitude of the *de facto* change will have been so great that methods for achieving this aim will have to be rather radical—and, even then, only highly imperfect compensation could be achieved. In the first place, we have the direct, almost unimaginable destruction. Even with the most perfect information—that is to say, with the survival of perfect evidence as to title to the destroyed and undestroyed wealth—a provision of compensation in the amounts of the order of tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars[28] would be fantastically difficult at any time, and would, for a sufficiently large-scale attack, probably have to be postponed until after the duration of the emergency.[29] Pending such compensation, the *de facto* distribution of wealth would obviously be completely altered and the final settlement, if and when it comes about, may be extremely unsatisfactory to those suffering the losses.

All this has assumed perfect information. When we consider that titles to wealth are in almost every case evidenced by ink scratches on paper, we begin to have good cause for concern as to the ability of many property-owners to prove title to their claims. The relevant bits of paper include deeds, stock certificates, and bonds in the personal possession of property-owners; bank accounts, as evidenced by passbooks and duplicated on the records of banks; currency, notes due, and accounts receivable; and various balances, such as brokerage accounts, in their favor. While there usually will be some duplicate record as evidence of holdings (though this is not the case for currency, for example), this duplicate may be even more vulnerable than the property-holders' own records. Thus, banks are more concentrated in cities than residents, and records of stock ownership are concentrated to an extreme degree in New York City.[30] Furthermore, in some cases the duplicate records will be in the control of adverse parties, as in the case of accounts receivable. We must add the further consideration that even if the true owners could be determined, they would in a very large fraction of cases have died—in many cases intestate, and in other cases having left wills which cannot now be found. In all of these

[28] Our hundred largest metropolitan areas probably contain over 50 per cent of the total national wealth, worth about $500 billion at current price levels.

[29] The discussion which follows emphasizes the difficulties of equitable compensation even after the emergency. For the duration of the emergency period, the only compensation it seems feasible to pay will be largely in the form of relief.

[30] To some extent, financial institutions and corporations have begun to store copies of essential records in locations presumably safe from bombing destruction.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cases, the attempt to straighten out the tangled claims would completely overburden the courts and the accounting and legal professions, which are in fact so extremely concentrated in cities as to be among the most severely damaged sectors themselves.[31]

Nor is it the case, as might first be thought, that this shattering of existing patterns of property relationships can be confined to areas in close proximity to the actual bomb drops. Many firms in undamaged areas will be bankrupted by the inability of firms in damaged areas to pay their accounts receivable. Checks on banks in damaged areas will be uncollectible. Insurance companies will have a large part of their assets destroyed, and of course they will be snowed under by death claims; in a great number of cases, probably the great majority, the equity of policyholders or stockholders would be completely wiped out in the absence of government intervention. In fact, a wave of bankruptcies similar to, but far more serious than, that characteristic of business crises would sweep over the entire economy in the absence of special measures to arrest this development. While this crisis effect could be stopped by appropriate government interventions (these might include moratoria on debts[32] and the granting of emergency government loans), a large fraction of the undamaged firms and individuals will still be legally bankrupt, and most of the remainder will also have their net wealth position affected in varying degrees. The reason for this is that, legally speaking, destruction extinguishes assets but not liabilities. While many debts will be wiped out or at least will not lead to insolvency if creditors do not appear and press their claims, the legal asymmetry in the treatment of assets and liabilities is certain on balance to affect adversely property rights in the undamaged areas.[33]

The effect of these considerations is not that *no one* will be able to prove title to his lost property, but rather that the distribution of surviving evidence will be largely fortuitous. *Some* firms in undestroyed areas will be relatively insulated from the effects of the destruction, while others will suffer greatly from the interruption of economic rela-

[31] On these points, see D. F. Cavers, "Legal Measures to Mitigate the Economic Impact of Atomic Attack," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, IX (September 1953), pp. 269-72.

[32] A debt moratorium, combined with the probable inflation which is to be anticipated in the period following the bombing, might eventually have the effect of extinguishing the real value of prewar debts.

[33] Imagine, for example, a totally destroyed area. Firms or individuals outside the destroyed area who have title to the destroyed property will suffer a complete loss of their assets (assuming no immediate compensation). If debts are owed to persons or firms in the destroyed area, however, and even if the creditor individuals or firms are completely wiped out, there will still in general be legal heirs outside the bombed areas who can make claims good against the debtor firms.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tionships of various types. We may therefore conclude from this discussion that the *de facto* pattern of wealth distribution as among both individuals and firms would be everywhere severely disturbed by the bombings; that any serious attempt to restore the prewar pattern would be almost hopeless to undertake during the duration of emergency; and that even after the end of the emergency such restoration could be only partial and might never be attempted at all.

The difficulties facing a policy of compensation or "equitable" distribution of the loss have been emphasized because such a policy is naturally the first one thought of. If it could be substantially carried out, it would have the advantage of minimizing the status effect of the bombing, thereby supporting or restoring a sense of security in property ownership. If, however, compensation is largely infeasible for the duration of the emergency, we must look into the alternatives available. Those alternatives still based on private ownership of property may be thought of as falling into two categories: (1) the *de facto* distribution of wealth emerging from the bombing may be accepted as a new starting-point for the socio-economic process, or (2) it may be swept away and replaced by a "new deal," perhaps intended only for the duration. From the point of view of power relations, it might appear that post-bombing conditions strongly favor the former of these, since the social classes losing property might also be expected to lose power, and therefore their ability to enforce some kind of new deal. Those who have lost property will be largely evacuees and survivors from the urban areas and will probably be highly dependent upon the surviving forces of government, which will naturally be in the rural areas and small towns and therefore elected by and responsive to the interests of the local populations.

Since the ability to put property to beneficial use depends on law and order, however, and since this requires a fairly high degree of social consent to the status quo or else an effectively repressive police system, it would probably be expedient for the more fortunate classes to permit some compromise here. Humanitarian and equitable considerations would operate in the same direction; historical experience is rather mixed, however, in indicating the possible effectiveness of these motives under disaster conditions.[34]

From the point of view of feasibility, the policy of accepting the

[34] That is to say, instances of cooperation, self-sacrifice, and heroism in the history of disaster have been matched by instances of exploitation and selfishness. In general, it appears that the former tend to predominate in the immediate post-crisis era, gradually giving way to the latter. Ikle and Kincaid (*op.cit.*) conclude that this is a universal pattern in disasters, both natural and man-made.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

redistribution of wealth created by bombing raises the least problems. If one's property is in real form and undestroyed, he still has it; if it is destroyed, he is out of luck. Similarly, evidences of debt or other titles, and contracts as well, may or may not retain value.[35] Some property whose ownership is quite unclear (commodities held in warehouses on speculators' accounts, shares of stock where records of ownership have been destroyed and no claimant comes forward, etc.) may be held in trust, or taken over either by the government or by parties in actual possession. The need to conserve the strained policing and administrative resources of society constitutes an extremely powerful argument in favor of this policy.

The "new deal" policy involves rather considerable difficulties, both on the collection and the paying ends. In peacetime the collection might be done by a capital levy, with the government accepting payments in cash or in kind and making the distribution either in a lump sum or in periodic payments of cash. Such a policy would involve legal, accounting, and administrative problems perhaps comparable to those under a compensation scheme. It would seem, therefore, that rather more radical measures might be required for such a redistribution during an emergency of the type we are describing. The most obvious method, of course, would be to declare as the initial step all surviving property as held in trust by the state. This is not quite the same as the imposition of communism, since the idea is to redistribute this property as rapidly as possible among individuals and, even before this may be carried out, to permit private acquisitions of property out of the unconsumed portion of the incomes of individuals. Nevertheless, such a policy would concentrate so much economic power in government hands as to justify very real concern over its totalitarian implications. In the case of publicly held corporations, it is conceivable that stock interests could be rapidly distributed among the surviving individuals, but it is difficult to see how other property could reasonably be distributed. There are theoretical possibilities, but they all seem impracticable in such an emergency.

A "new deal" in status relationships might more easily be brought about, not by such an actual confiscation of property titles, but rather by controls limiting the power to spend one's nominal income. A thoroughgoing rationing scheme would tend to have this effect. Such a compromise outcome for the disaster situation might well command

[35] It is possible, however, that debts may be placed under moratorium even where the debtors are still in a position to pay, in order to control the financial crisis arising out of bombing.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a wide degree of support; since property-owners would still retain some power of decision over the use of their holdings as well as a promise of augmented consumption opportunities at some future date, this solution might not be too unpalatable for them. We cannot comment here on the system of controls necessary to put this compromise into effect.[36] It should be mentioned, however, that the equalizing of consumption opportunities would be expected to have some adverse effect on incentives.

A policy of compensation, we may conclude, while attractive from the point of view of equitably redistributing the loss, involves probably insuperable difficulties for the duration of the emergency, and even afterward could only be very partially effected. On the other hand, accepting the post-bombing status quo with respect to the distribution of wealth is unattractive from the equitable point of view, but of course the most feasible policy administratively—failure to attempt a remedy of such gross inequities would be socially highly dangerous, but so are all the other possible policies. Finally, a radical, presumably equalitarian, redistribution of wealth seems extremely difficult to institute in any way not involving the almost total socialization of property. An equalitarian solution in terms of income or consumption possibilities and understood to be temporary seems more feasible than permanent redistribution of ownership.

As indicated above, World War II bombing was not associated with radical changes in social attitudes. The experience of the various nations subject to war damage in World War II seems to indicate a very widespread acceptance of the compensation principle.[37] In Britain, France, Japan, and Germany compensation was promised and paid for the major categories of damage. The British plan was basically one of compulsory insurance, but for personal chattels a certain amount of insurance was provided free, while any surplus over the minimum could be covered by voluntary insurance. In the United States a scheme of voluntary insurance against war damage was offered by the government, but compensation for damage in the Philippines which occurred prior to the passage of this legislation was granted gratuitously by the U.S. government. While details varied among countries, in each case

[36] See, for example, the expenditure rationing proposal made by E. Shaw, T. Scitovsky, and L. Tarshis in *Mobilizing Resources for War,* New York, 1951. Such proposals require, however, an effectively functioning financial system, as well as sufficient enforcement power to ensure proper segregation of consumption and non-consumption incomes.

[37] Most of the following details are from Chamber of Commerce of the United States, "War Damage Indemnity," September 1950. The working of the Japanese program is described in great detail in USSBS, Civilian Defense Division, "Final Report Covering Air-raid Protection and Allied Subjects in Japan," pp. 177-91.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

compensation tended to fall considerably short of 100 per cent (frequently because of use of prewar prices in calculating property values); in addition, there was an equalitarian tendency in that losses up to a certain figure typically received more favorable treatment than higher brackets of damage.[38]

In World War II, then, it appeared that a compromise was struck as among compensation, accepting the post-bombing distribution, and equalitarianism—the last entering in the form of differential compensation rather than outright redistribution. This outcome is perhaps rather interesting, suggesting as it does the absence of pressure for a completely new deal of wealth. In the case of postwar Britain, however, it appears that there was in fact intense and widespread demand for a new deal along equalitarian lines, although it tended to operate through the tax system and such devices as dividend limitation rather than through the war damage compensation program.

The author's conjecture, and it is only that, is that after a disaster of the magnitude postulated here, but assuming survival of a functioning and constitutional government, the compromise struck would be along the following lines: (1) Acceptance for the duration of the post-bombing structure of wealth, subject to compensation only in the form of a minimum of maintenance for survivors to carry the displaced individuals over until they can be reintegrated into the productive mechanism. (2) A promise of "equitable" postwar reapportionment, primarily compensatory but subject to equalitarian modifications. (3) "Normal" wartime controls over the use of property and over consumption, limited by the weakness of the administrative mechanism. (4) Social priorities weighted very heavily in the direction of maximum restoration of production, with questions of social reform and distributive justice deferred to the post-emergency period.

Our discussion has not, unfortunately, been able to take adequate account of the long-run consequences, for a social pattern already weakened by bombing, of possible government policies like debt moratoria, capital levies, or measures taken to repress the inflation likely to follow the bombing. It is possible that mistaken or unsuccessful policies here may have extreme effects on the social structure. As for

[38] In the Philippines, for example, losses were compensated "in full" (but only in terms of prewar values, replacement costs being approximately triple original costs) up to $500, and in the proportion of 52.5 per cent over this amount. See U.S. Philippine War Damage Commission, "Final and Ninth Semi-Annual Report," March 31, 1951.

Apparently the working of the Japanese scheme was considered generally fair and adequate by the public despite the inflation which reduced the real value of the payments. USSBS, Civilian Defense Division, "Final Report," p. 182.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the consequences of the bombing itself, however, so long as the damage remains somewhere short of or in the neighborhood of the level we have been considering, the present analysis seems to indicate that the force of custom and the necessity to get things done in ways which people will find familiar and comprehensible combine to reduce the probability of radical social change.

This conclusion, which is presented with considerable diffidence, may well represent merely a failure of imagination—it is conceivable that the victory of Nazism in Germany or of Bolshevism in Russia would have been similarly discounted by the type of analysis conducted here.[39] Furthermore, the element of chance may also be importantly involved. A social scientist predicting in 1914 that Lenin would not ultimately succeed might have been "right" in a probabilistic sense; events which are truly improbable will still occur from time to time, and Lenin's victory may have been one of them. Unfortunately for predictive social science, there seems good reason to believe that the element of chance is very large in human affairs, by which we mean that even relatively minor fluctuations in particular events (e.g., the course of a few bullets in Munich in 1923) may lead to radically different outcomes of historical processes. Let us hope, however, that our present conclusion may never be subjected to historical test.

[39] This should not be taken as admitting that the situations are in fact comparable. For one thing, both Hitler and Lenin were leading movements with sufficient resources and mass support to pose a threat to the governments in power for years before they actually seized control. In addition, each movement was in part the product of an ideological preparation which had gone on for decades. In these circumstances, analysis would very likely have given considerable weight to the possibility of victory for the radical group, given a sufficiently desperate social situation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MASSIVE RETALIATION AND GRADUATED DETERRENCE

By REAR ADMIRAL SIR ANTHONY W. BUZZARD,
ROYAL NAVY (RETIRED)

RELIABLE disarmament, particularly of nuclear weapons, requires inspection and control, which in turn require much mutual trust. None of this is yet in sight. Disarmament of nuclear weapons is therefore still a long way off, although a measure of conventional disarmament may be nearer.

Meanwhile, as we try to nourish the necessary mutual trust and negotiate the many issues between East and West, the main menace to peace surely is Communist subversion. But that is not all. Behind the forces of subversion stand strong local armies, designed to support the subversive elements, to negotiate from strength further Communist advances, and to engage in local aggression, if opportunity offers, on a minor or even quite large scale, probably with conventional weapons.

Still another menace is that of minor wars arising from local nationalistic quarrels, and caused more by third parties than by the main rivals in the East-West struggle. Deliberate, premeditated aggression on a world-wide, or even a continental, scale by the Communists is seemingly out of the question. World war is therefore likely to result only from these local Communist or nationalist menaces, aggravated by pride and miscalculation. If these conflicts should lead to a deadlock between East and West, a world war might then ensue, and might well be started by a surprise Communist attack on the style of Pearl Harbor.

The foreign policy of the West seems therefore to require a defense policy which, while continuing to maintain the deterrent against deliberate world war, can also provide the local tactical strength necessary to negotiate from local strength, to deter limited Communist aggression, and to deal with the local nationalistic quarrels of third parties. Yet our present policy of massive retaliation hardly seems to meet these requirements, for, in effect, it threatens to destroy civilization as a result of any aggression too powerful for our small conventional forces to handle. Thus, NATO states that it intends to use nuclear weapons in the event of an attack from the East; and at the same time we are told that there is no distinction between the tactical and strategic use of such weapons.

That we should, in fact, try to establish distinctions between the stra-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tegic and tactical use of nuclear weapons is the proposition which this article attempts to develop. The suggestion is that we work out and declare, without waiting for Communist agreement, distinctions of the following order. The *tactical* use of nuclear weapons, we might say, is to be confined to atomic weapons, and is to exclude even these from use against towns and cities. Their *strategic* use, we might further declare, is to include hydrogen weapons and the mass destruction of targets in towns and cities. We might also state generally that, in order to pursue the moral principle of never using more force than necessary, we would not resort to the strategic use of nuclear weapons unless their employment proved absolutely essential. Thus, without committing ourselves unalterably in advance, or showing our hand too clearly, we would have the option, when threatened with a limited aggression too great for our conventional forces to cope with, of saying to the prospective aggressor: "If you do attack, we will, if necessary, use atomic and perhaps chemical weapons against your armed forces. But we will not, on this issue, use hydrogen or bacteriological weapons at all, unless you do, and we will not use any mass destruction weapons against centers of population, unless you do deliberately." To this statement we might append certain exceptions, such as cities in the front line of the land fighting and those with airfields alongside.

By an announcement of this character we would be modifying our present policy of massive retaliation to one aptly named "graduated deterrence." The obvious practical difficulties of such a policy may be dealt with later. Assuming practicability for the moment, let us consider the moral, political, military, and economic merits of graduated deterrence.

I

MORAL CONSIDERATIONS

Morally the issue is, surely, quite clear. We should not cause, or threaten to cause, more destruction than is necessary. By this criterion, all our fighting should be limited (in weapons, targets, area, and time) to the minimum force necessary to deter and repel aggression, prevent any unnecessary extension of the conflict, and permit a return to negotiation at the earliest opportunity—without seeking total victory or unconditional surrender. The moral standards which we profess to defend, demand not only this action in the event of aggression, but the pursuance of long-term policies directed toward this end.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

So far, massive retaliation, despite its shortcomings and failure to halt aggression in Korea and Indo-China, has been a fairly effective deterrent because the Russians have been incapable of striking back massively, particularly at the United States. With this situation changing, massive retaliation, although still an effective deterrent against an all-out attack by the Communists, is no longer effective against the much more likely threat of local aggression by Soviet and satellite armies, because the Communists might well expect the United States to refrain from action which is becoming akin to suicide. Increasingly, therefore, our present policy is in danger of being interpreted as bluff —if indeed it does not prove to be one—for any aggression between an all-out war and a very minor one; and it leaves much room for misunderstanding and Communist exploitation.

Graduated deterrence, by providing an intermediate deterrent, guards against these dangers, and gives more latitude for our diplomacy, without reducing our deterrent against all-out attack. This option of intermediate action, together with the removal of the element of bluff, would not only improve our capacity to deter; it would also enhance our ability to negotiate from local tactical strength, an ability which becomes increasingly important as the strategic hydrogen stalemate approaches.

Graduated deterrence, by being at the same time less drastic than massive retaliation, would also help to reduce tension and build up trust. For example, in the disarmament discussions, an announcement of this new policy would constitute an assurance of our sincerity, since it would show that we genuinely wish to limit all possible use of nuclear weapons until their disarmament can be arranged. Conversely, such an announcement would be a test of the Communists' sincerity in these negotiations, for their denunciation of it would demonstrate the intention to continue exploiting our present tactical weakness.

Further, by blocking Communist pressure politics and every form of aggression, we might get the Soviets to see that their vast armaments are useless. Indeed, experience in the limited *use* of armaments would also nourish the trust essential for limiting their *possession*. Finally, by relying more on tactical strength with which to match Communist tactical strength, we would convert our security requirements into terms more comparable to those of the Communists, and therefore more easily balanced and reduced, stage by stage. Thus, the surest road to ultimate disarmament probably leads through graduated deterrence.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

Graduated deterrence certainly complies with the basic military principle of first concentrating on the enemy's armed forces, as opposed to his people. But would the proposal to bar hydrogen weapons and the mass destruction of cities pay the West or the Communists more? On the one hand, if we decided to adhere to such a policy, we should be unable to attack with any mass destruction weapons key points like headquarter cities, Russian industries, submarine bases, and communication centers. On the other hand, the Russians would be unable to use these weapons against similar targets, including the many ports on which the development and supply of so much of the Allied potential depend.

Thus, both sides would gain enormously on an *absolute* basis, and this would heavily outweigh the *relative* considerations. But, insofar as the relative considerations counted, the Western allies would surely gain in view of their great dependence on ports, which form such bottlenecks and such ideal targets for nuclear and chemical weapons. This advantage would be particularly important in the crucial early stages of a war, because the mobilization and deployment of the Allied forces are always likely to be much less advanced at the start than those of the Communists. Moreover, since targets in towns and cities could still be attacked with high-explosive weapons, the Allied superiority in technique and precision attack would represent an added advantage for the West. Submarine bases could still be effectively mined, and key industrial targets and bridges attacked efficiently with high-explosive guided missiles.

We would also gain in three other respects. First, the advantage to our morale of not having to initiate the strategic use of nuclear weapons would be great. Secondly, by making possible the limited employment of these weapons against local aggression, we could if necessary exploit our great atomic superiority, not only directly against the Communist armies, but also against their supporting airfields and ships. Thirdly, in trying to halt the Communist armies, we could also exploit the great defensive properties of atomic and chemical weapons (both of which are so much more effective in defense than on the attack) without provoking their use against our vulnerable ports.

Thus it seems that, militarily, the ability to impose the suggested limitations would be to our advantage *relative* to the Communists, as well as of tremendous *absolute* advantage to both sides. Such a policy would help particularly to redress the tactical balance of power and improve our ability to hold territory.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

At first sight, massive retaliation might seem to be the cheapest way of keeping the peace. But now that the Russians, too, are becoming able to retaliate massively, this policy by itself will not be an effective deterrent to limited aggression. Strong tactical land, sea, and air forces are therefore necessary in any case for deterring and repelling limited aggression. In providing this kind of strength, within the framework of a policy of graduated deterrence, the economies that we achieve by using tactical atomic weapons to help match the vast Communist conventional forces will be of real value. With our present policy, according to which an attack of any magnitude immediately provokes all-out hydrogen war, many of our tactical atomic preparations are a waste of money.

Moreover, with massive retaliation, a full scale of air and civil defense for our cities against every possible form of mass destruction is essential if our deterrent is to be convincing to the Communists. But this is becoming increasingly impracticable economically (except perhaps for the United States), and it is already quite beyond the means of the more exposed and less prosperous NATO countries. The meager air and civil defense measures which these countries can afford for their cities would be much more justifiable as part of a policy of graduated deterrence, both as an insurance against our deterrents failing to stop the Communists from initiating city destruction and as a reasonable defense against conventional weapons. Thus, although there would be no relief from our present defense expenditures, graduated deterrence would give us better security for our money. In sum, then, these moral, political, military, and economic considerations make graduated deterrence seem in principle far preferable to massive retaliation.

II

Objections to the practicability of such a policy seem formidable at first. But, when scrutinized, are they any worse than the many dangers and shortcomings of massive retaliation? Let us look at the three main objections to graduated deterrence.

(1) *That it would reduce our deterrent and thus increase the chances of war.* This, as we have seen, is becoming a fallacy now that Russia, too, is increasingly capable of retaliating massively. Indeed, graduated deterrence will decrease the chances of war, provided that we pay reasonable attention to our tactical strength, and do not renounce generally, and in advance, the initiation of strategic bombing with nuclear

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

weapons, regardless of the scale or theater of aggression. In other words, against the unlikely eventuality of deliberate all-out aggression, our deterrent would be unchanged. Against the eventuality of a deadlock arising on some crucial issue, city destruction no longer being inevitable, we would have reduced the temptation for the Communists to attempt a "Pearl Harbor" against us.

Against major aggression by the Red armies, the Communists would know that our deterrent—not necessarily being suicidal—would be less likely to be bluff, and that we would be more united in our determination to retaliate. They would know that if we imposed the limitations of graduated deterrence, conditions would favor our great tactical atomic superiority, our atomic and chemical weapons used in defense, and our precision with high explosives. They would know, too, that there would still be a risk of hydrogen bombs being used, and of the mass destruction of cities.

Against minor aggression, our deterrent would be increased by the possibility of our using atomic and chemical weapons. We would be less likely to shrink from the prompt action required to prevent small wars from spreading; thus, we would be less likely to get into a position where a series of Communist nibbles forced us to take action leading to a major war. Finally, against the danger of war by mistake, or one brought on by a third party, there would be less scope for such misunderstandings as an intended minor aggression being taken for, and treated as, a major aggression.

(2) *That the Communists would not agree to our limitations in peace, or conform to them in war, if we elected to try and impose them.* It is true that, in peace, they probably would refuse to agree to our distinctions at first, arguing, as they do now, that the use of nuclear weapons must be abolished altogether, and knowing that this would leave the Red armies supreme. But, in war, it seems almost certain that the Communists would do their utmost to conform. They must appreciate the vast superiority of the United States in nuclear weapons, her skill in delivering them, and her advantage in having air bases, on land and sea, so much closer to Russia and China than the Communist bases are to America.

In weighing the *relative* advantages, the Communists might well conclude, as we have, that the limitations would often favor us in our efforts to hold territory. But the *absolute* disadvantage of having their cities pounded by hydrogen weapons would far outweigh such relative considerations. As hydrogen weapons become more plentiful, this

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

absolute consideration will surely weigh more heavily with the Communists.

But even if this estimate should prove wrong in war, we would have gained immeasurably in the unity and morale of the Allied nations by having placed the onus for initiating the mass slaughter of people on the enemy. Moreover, we would risk little, since to be a few hours after the enemy in the destruction of cities would not matter. It is true that the enemy could, if he dared to disregard our limitations, forestall us by a short time with hydrogen bombs against, say, our airfields while we were still attacking his with atomic weapons. But, if he did, we would probably be no worse off than with a policy of massive retaliation, where the enemy would have every incentive thus to forestall us with hydrogen weapons.

(3) *That distinctions in the use of nuclear weapons are impracticable, that the tactical use of them would spread to unlimited use, and that any such distinctions would therefore prove illusory.* The problems of making useful distinctions between hydrogen and atomic weapons, and of defining centers of population and their geographic limits, are certainly difficult ones. But provided they are thoroughly studied beforehand, there is no reason to suppose that they are insuperable. The weapons to be classed as strategic, instead of being defined as hydrogen, might be more appropriately characterized as those with major fall-out effects, or those exceeding in power a certain number of kilotons. Similarly, centers of population could be defined in a number of ways; but there is much to be said, where tactical operations are concerned, for excluding mass destruction of all towns and cities over a certain size, except those actually in the front line of the land fighting not declared and proved "open." The front line, in turn, might be defined as extending so many miles beyond the most advanced land units of each side. Such a definition could then be adhered to regardless of the targets that the towns and cities contained, unless perhaps offensive missiles were launched from them, or offensive aircraft took off from airfields close alongside.

With some such distinctions established well in advance, the problem of limitations seems far from hopeless. For the difference between a bombing policy intentionally designed to strike the middle of cities with hydrogen bombs, and one designed to strike other targets with atomic bombs, but occasionally near-missing a city by mistake, would be obvious. Moreover, the Communists, like us, would be desperately anxious for cities to be spared from mass destruction. Thus, both sides would be eager—not reluctant—to overlook an occasional accidental

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

breach of the rules; and both sides would want to avoid doing anything that would give the other an opportunity to put the worst interpretation on its actions.

In sum, it is far from certain that we would not succeed in maintaining these limitations during at least the early stages of any nuclear war, which is really what matters. Moreover, once our distinctions were established, and thus could grow in the minds and plans of both sides, the risks of the limitations breaking down in war would gradually diminish as the years went by. Finally, even if our limitations should break down in war, would anything have been lost by making the attempt to uphold them? Little or nothing, surely, provided only that we never lose sight of the risk of this happening, and avoid becoming "trigger happy" with our tactical atomic weapons.

This risk, if not sufficiently clear for both sides to see, could easily be advertised, and if any atomic weapons ever were used tactically, the spectacle would serve as a potent reminder of the consequences of employing them against cities, or of using hydrogen weapons thousands of times more powerful. Thus, the argument that it would be a dangerous illusion to toy with limitations cannot be sustained; and to deny ourselves a policy based on sound principles all around, because we fear we shall be blind to its shortcomings, would be defeatist in the extreme.

III

The conclusion surely is that graduated deterrence, providing us with the option of imposing limitations on the use of nuclear weapons, is in *principle* fundamentally right from the moral point of view, and advantageous politically, militarily, and economically. In *practice* there is a major difficulty, that of establishing and imposing distinctions in nuclear weapons, and the targets attacked by them, which stand a good enough chance of being maintained in war.

Before coming to a final decision about the merits of graduated deterrence, one may wonder whether it is better to introduce such distinctions immediately, or withhold an announcement until the eleventh hour before the outbreak of certain forms of war. Surely the latter would be most unwise, for the Communists might become so committed in their plans and weapons to fighting us on the basis of massive retaliation that they would be incapable of conforming to the limitations that we attempted to impose. A delay, in fact, would increase the general risk of the limitation breaking down in war; it would

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

also increase the chances of an all-out war resulting from some misunderstanding. Indeed, by foregoing a peacetime declaration of our distinctions, we would also be denying ourselves the contribution that such a declaration would make toward redressing the tactical balance of power, helping our negotiations on disarmament and other issues, and strengthening the Western moral position both in our own eyes and in those of the uncommitted countries. What is more, an issue of this magnitude must surely be treated in the democracies as a national matter if it is to be properly prepared for in peace and acted upon with unity and restraint in war. In particular, it is only by showing the need for tactical strength that the effort will be made to provide it.

If the distinctions of graduated deterrence are not to be made at the eleventh hour, when then should they be established? Clearly, our tactical strength cannot at least for some time be such that we can afford to promise in advance never to initiate the strategic use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances. But there is every reason for establishing the necessary distinctions as soon as they can be worked out and agreed upon by the Western allies. For it will take some time thereafter for both sides to adjust to the idea of limited nuclear war. Indeed, the longer the delay, the more difficult these adjustments will become, and the longer we shall have to suffer from the shortcomings and dangers of our present policy.

The present circumstances seem particularly appropriate for introducing graduated deterrence on other grounds as well. It is becoming increasingly difficult to convince the peoples of the Allied nations that there is any point in continuing to build NATO and other forces with real tactical strength when our policy is to blow the world up in retaliation for any substantial aggression. Moreover, Western opinion seems to be under the delusion that a *general* stalemate is the military factor responsible for bringing the Russians hurrying to Geneva, and that we can therefore now afford to relax our defense preparations. In fact, only a *strategic* stalemate is about to be reached, and that thanks more to recent Russian progress than to ours. The *tactical* situation still remains substantially in the Communists' favor.

The establishment of the distinctions of graduated deterrence would both help to dispel these two doubts and, at the same time, indicate the need to enhance greatly our present tactical strength. In particular, it would convince the Germans, who are becoming increasingly impatient for reunification, of the need to press on with their contribution to NATO of twelve divisions, wherein lies the best hope of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Russians agreeing to withdraw from East Germany. It might also encourage the United States, who alone can afford substantially increased defense expenditures, to continue building tactical strength.

In our dealings with the Communists, this juncture also seems appropriate, because they (unlike our public) labor under no delusions. Quickly, while we are still only able to negotiate from strategic strength, they hurry to Geneva to try and prevent us from gaining the tactical prizes in Germany which could redress our tactical inferiority, knowing that these become decisive once the impending strategic stalemate arrives. Graduated deterrence, by showing our determination to produce a tactical balance of power, might help to convince them that there will be no alternative but to negotiate settlements with us on Germany, disarmament, and other outstanding issues.

Finally, graduated deterrence would provide a complementary corollary to our recent proposals for ground and air inspection, which in themselves are also measures for limiting the use of armaments rather than for disarmament. If we should get the Communists to agree to these measures, the moment would then be ripe for exploiting such success with graduated deterrence. If they should refuse, or procrastinate, graduated deterrence would enable us to retain the initiative with further positive action in our continuing efforts to face the Communists with the "necessity for virtue."

Surely, then, there is much to be said on the side of graduated deterrence. Let us therefore fully investigate this proposal, and weigh it carefully against the shortcomings of our present policy. For if, in the years to come, the help of German forces, a measure of conventional disarmament, and improved relations with the Communists should ever enable us to feel we could keep the peace without the strategic use of nuclear weapons, we might even renounce in advance initiation of their use. Thus might graduated deterrence gradually lead toward the elimination of the hydrogen bomb's threat to civilization.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REGIONALISM, FUNCTIONALISM, AND UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION*

By ERNST B. HAAS

I

NOTHING compels the reexamination of basic constitutional postulates so much as the possibility of their peaceful revision. Hence the much-advertised United Nations Review Conference underscores the need for contrasting the theoretical structure of the Charter with the reality of the practices which have evolved within its framework. Such an effort, while it might give support to those who strive for severe alterations of the structure, may also lead to the conclusion that even though the operational practices of international organization fail to meet the specifications of the Charter, peace might be more secure in the Cold War era if it is permitted to depend on operational vagaries rather than on legal precision. What, then, is the basic theory of the Charter and what the actual practice?

It is a commonplace that the preservation of peace and security is the fundamental aim of the United Nations. Collective security—rather than the myriad of functional tasks also entrusted to contemporary international organizations, including in particular the advancement of economic development and the emancipation of colonial peoples—was the basic purpose. Economic well-being and the achievement of national self-determination were considered in 1945 as means toward the end of security, not as basic aims in their own right. Further, security was conceived as the resultant of a firm concert of power of the Big Five, as institutionalized in the Security Council and its voting rules. Finally, in the theory of the Charter, regional organizations were to be firmly linked to the United Nations and subordinate to the direction of the Security Council. As Senator Vandenberg argued, "We have found a sound and practical formula for putting regional organizations into effective gear with global institutions. . . . We do not thus subtract from global unity of the world's peace and security; on the contrary, we weld these regional king-links into a

* I am greatly indebted to Paul Seabury for critical comments and advice and to Fred von der Mehden for much research assistance.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

global chain."[1] Only Article 51 foreshadowed the possibility of the regional tails wagging the global dog, rather than acknowledging the directing superiority of the universal organ.

Each of these postulates has in fact been upset by the patterns of behavior manifested in international organizations since 1947. If the term "regional organization" is understood as connoting any kind of basic political tie, bilateral or multilateral, based on a treaty or merely on traditional understandings, with the sole proviso that participation is by definition limited to certain states selected according to some principle of mutual political-military need, the non-universal pattern would seem to be growing by leaps and bounds. Of our eighty sovereign states, only fifteen lack membership in such systems; of the sixty current United Nations members, only seven remain unaffiliated, and if we count the Afro-Asian bloc as a "system," the number shrinks to four. True, in terms of their qualitative cohesion, these systems vary from the looseness of the Commonwealth to the military and political rigor of NATO; but in almost all, the scope of cooperation and even of centralized decision-making goes considerably beyond the role given to the United Nations.

The advent of regionalism reflects the disintegration of the concert of power as the guarantor of security. Collective security within the universal organization has become the function, not of a concert, but of a pair of new operational maxims: permissive enforcement and balancing.[2] Permissive enforcement implies the delegation of enforcing power to a member state or a group of such states, or even to regional systems. As manifested in the Uniting for Peace Resolution and in the Korean situation, the principle makes possible the enlisting of United Nations symbols and values on behalf of any policy which succeeds in obtaining the support of two-thirds of the membership. Put in regional terms—as, indeed, has been clearly done by American, British, Canadian, and Australian statesmen—permissive enforcement implies the delegation of enforcing power to a NATO or a SEATO as the only focus of strength which could be expected to undertake large-scale military operations. Balancing, by contrast, comes about as the result of the efforts of a neutral or mediating bloc's seeking to prevent permissive enforcement operations. Through offers of compromise and conciliatory formulas—as in the Indian scheme for the repatriation of Korean

[1] As cited in Norman J. Padelford, "Regional Organizations and the United Nations," *International Organization*, VIII, No. 2 (May 1954), p. 216.

[2] For elaboration of these concepts, see my "Types of Collective Security: An Examination of Operational Concepts," *American Political Science Review*, XLIX, No. 1 (March 1955).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prisoners—such a bloc seeks to prevent the utilization of regional strength under United Nations symbols. Collective security then becomes a function of a delicate negotiating process, with the world organization the forum, not of a community conscience or a concert of power, but of counterbalancing forces unwilling to seek a showdown, fearful of alienating friends or neutrals, and therefore willing to make concessions.

Finally, the theory of the Charter has in fact been upset by the intrusion of functional interests clamoring for recognition in their own right rather than as adjuncts to the preservation of peace. No longer is the security issue the dominating one in all relations between regional blocs. There is an evident practice of bartering concessions on economic, social, and colonial questions for support on security issues. Indeed, it has been suggested that there are two Cold Wars: the conflict between the West and the Soviets, and the struggle of the Afro-Asian bloc against the West in the effort to eradicate "colonialism."[3] Thus, the functional and security claims of regional systems have emerged as the source of the actual functioning of universal international organizations.[4]

It is the effort of this article to suggest a number of propositions permitting the elaboration of a limited "Cold War" theory of the relationships between international organization and world politics, restricted in validity to the era of an active tripolarization of regional cohesion, if not of power. The first task of such an effort is to go beyond the theory of the Charter as expounded in 1945 and to explain the advent of regionalism, the displacement of the concert of power as the instrument of security, and the intrusion of functional aspirations into the political intercourse of the United Nations. Furthermore, such an interpretive attempt must put conduct in the United Nations and regional organizations into the over-all context of foreign policy aims and clashes. The interpretation, therefore, assumes basically that par-

[3] Coral Bell, "The United Nations and the West," *International Affairs,* XXIX, No. 4 (October 1953). This point is worked out in the form of an equilibrium theory of international organization, labeled "multiple equilibrium" because of its extension into a non-power dimension, by Jiri Liska, in "The Multiple Equilibrium and the American National Interest in International Organization," *Harvard Studies in International Affairs,* IV, No. 1 (February 1954).

[4] Critics of the advent of regionalism and related factors in the United Nations are legion. Neutralists, despite their espousal of "third forces," number significantly among them, but so do firm supporters of Western policy. See, e.g., Byron Dexter, "Locarno Again," *Foreign Affairs,* XXXII, No. 1 (October 1953); Paul H. Douglas, "United to Enforce Peace," *ibid.,* XXX, No. 1 (October 1951); Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, *Regional Arrangements for Security and the United Nations,* New York, 1953.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ticipation in international organizations is regarded by policy-makers as a means for the achievement of national policy aims.

While the national policy aims provide the initial point of departure in the effort, the primary concern in these suggestions is to abstract the *pattern* of interlocking policies which result from these aims when they are actively pursued within the organizational framework of the United Nations, NATO, or the Commonwealth. Our argument holds that a general process of *balancing* prevails at the level of regional as well as global international organizations, of which security issues, colonial aspirations, and economic demands form the prime constituents. Each of these concerns figures within the context of regional systems; relations between regional systems—expressed as voting blocs in the General Assembly—define the nature of United Nations activity. So long as the conditions now determining the policies of states continue to dominate, it is contended that the range of alternative goals open in the United Nations is roughly limited by the operation of the balancing pattern.

"Balancing" here implies no more than the tendency of one set of national or regional aims to be met by a countering set of aspirations, with a measure of compromise likely to be worked out so long as the participants prove unwilling to ignore or override completely the countervailing pressures created by their policies. No notion of *equal* countervailing forces is being entertained; yet the scheme here suggested is sufficiently reminiscent of the classical balance of power pattern to require an examination of whether the balance of power, considered as a tool of political analysis, is applicable to the discussion of international organization.[5]

II

The first step in the development of such a scheme, therefore, must be an analysis of the major regional systems. Attention will be focused on the nature of the community of interests which ties the members to one another, on the factors of cohesion and conflict which characterize each system internally, and on the process of adjustment—or "balancing"—through which each retains whatever viability it possesses.

Without doubt, the Soviet regional system is the most solid of the

[5] This definition of balancing differs from Edward H. Buehrig's kindred suggestion. His conception seems to me to be synonymous with what is generally called "power politics." See his "The United States, the United Nations and Bi-polar Politics," *International Organization,* IV, No. 4 (November 1950). For a treatment of the balance of power as a tool of political analysis, see my "The Balance of Power: Concept, Prescription or Propaganda?" *World Politics,* V, No. 4 (July 1953).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

entire array. A high degree of ideological, institutional, and policy congruence, if not identity, is evident in the relations between Eastern Europe and Moscow. A combination of concessions and purges suffices to reestablish unity when tension does develop. Whether through coercion or voluntary agreement, then, on the intergovernmental and interparty levels the Soviet bloc acts as one.

Whether the same sweeping generalizations can be made about the Soviet-Chinese relationship is another matter. While the diplomatic record shows that full agreement between Moscow and Peiping is always displayed to the West in the last analysis, certain evidence also suggests that the two have not always marched in step before the last stages of a joint thrust. Thus, during the Korean prisoner negotiations, Peiping seemed prepared to accept the Indian-sponsored compromise resolution before Moscow was ready to do so.[6] Again, during the Indo-Chinese talks at Geneva, differences of degree seemed indicated by the less intransigent position taken by Molotov with respect to Laos and Cambodia, as compared with the initial argument of Chou. Other negotiations suggest that the amount and kind of economic aid given to China and the security issue in the Far East generally make for friction between the Communist partners. If there are differences in outlook and aim between the two, it follows that some degree of adjustment is called for if they expect to maintain a common front toward their enemies.

The Western camp, composed of NATO, the SEATO-ANZUS combination, and the Organization of American States (OAS), exhibits no such unity. Conflicts between the partners arise constantly, calling for adjustment and redefinition of collective aims, within each system as well as among them. Before examining the combined behavior of the three systems, as reflected in the policy of the United States as the leading member of each, the bases of internal agreement and division must be outlined.

NATO exhibits a high degree of consensus with respect to the need for integrated military and political activity for the defense of Europe. Every crisis—including that over German rearmament, the most divisive issue so far confronting NATO—has been resolved on the basis of a larger delegation of power to the system's central institutions. It is because of this bedrock of agreement that a pervasive community of interests could take shape, giving rise to international institutions

[6] See "Indian Proposals for a Korean Truce," *Indian Press Digest*, II, No. 3 (March 1954), for a study of diplomatic exchanges between New Delhi and Peiping, as revealed from Indian government and press sources.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

possessing a *de facto* decision-making power surpassing any other contemporary example. The annual allocation of the financial burden of rearmament by the NATO Council and the drafting by the NATO Secretariat of the agreement to share nuclear information provide perhaps the most telling examples of this trend.

While economic issues have provided some ammunition for internal NATO disagreement, especially in relation to the foreign trade policy of the United States, on global issues of economic development harmony prevails in the system. All the members make common front in opposing the demands of underdeveloped nations for ambitious international investment schemes, stressing instead the primacy of private investment and of development plans carried on within imperial systems or the Commonwealth.

It is the colonial issue which most consistently seems to call for intra-NATO adjustments. European opposition to the aspirations of the Afro-Asian bloc meets with pronounced American ambivalence on the question of national self-determination. While economics and global strategy indicate a policy of support for European colonial plans, relations with the Afro-Asian bloc suggest the opposite course. That the NATO members succeed in displaying unity on this issue in United Nations discussion is due, in part, to a process of internal adjustment in which the United States so far has paid a high price in terms of concessions.

The process of intra-NATO balancing becomes crucial to the functioning of the United Nations machinery in relation to the global scope of anti-Communist policy. Whenever American leadership in NATO appears to be pushing in the direction of the geographical extension of the system to extra-European areas or to the intensification of anti-Communist measures, resistance comes to the fore. British demands for an Asian or German "Locarno" have clashed sharply with American insistence on "united action" or EDC. Thus it happens that an American government anxious to mobilize the geographically restricted NATO community of interests on behalf of global containment measures must make significant adjustments.

The Canadian position is a case in point. Unlike Americans, Canadians tend to see in NATO an approximation to a quasi-federal Atlantic Union, while they see in United Nations collective security a device "to make peace rather than wage war . . . to prolong our efforts to reach a settlement."[7] British sentiments are similar. One leading Laborite

[7] Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Canada and the United Nations, 1950*, Ottawa, 1951, p. ix.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

notes that "the official British point of view about the United Nations is that it is now really a forum," that it should be universal and continue the special position of the great powers through the veto, but that it should *not* be regarded as "an effective instrument of collective security." Regional pacts serve this purpose instead. But, in contrast to American predilections, Britons "often favor bringing the so-called neutral states into the picture, since precisely because of their neutrality they bring back the idea of detached judgment in place of the clash of world forces."[8]

These differences are symbolized by the position taken in European "independent neutralist" circles. While supporting NATO in Europe (although usually opposing German rearmament), praising the United States for its leadership against Communism, and appreciative of economic as well as military aid programs, these "neutralists" nevertheless demand "that the free nations of Europe should not be led into playing the role of satellites to any Power; that they should be free to conduct their domestic affairs according to their own design; and that in the foreign field they should use their influence in whatever way they consider most conducive to the preservation and organization of peace."[9]

In terms of global collective security, this implies the intercession of a neutral "third force" to facilitate negotiations and compromise, even though this force might be allied to the United States in NATO. Such neutralist demands may be expected to grow in popularity and effectiveness when institutionalized through the Western European Union structure. In terms of NATO solidarity in United Nations councils, these sentiments carry with them the need for constant internal adjustment in order to preserve harmony, an issue of particular relevance to the solidarity of the West with respect to Asian security.

SEATO, despite French and British membership, thus by no means represents the extension of Atlantic regional solidarity to the Far East. Even ANZUS, its modest predecessor, was kept from being fully effective by disagreement over whether Japan or China was the main target of the Alliance. Australia and New Zealand argued the former position, the United States the latter. These difficulties are compounded by the heterogeneous membership of SEATO. As made plain at the Bangkok Conference, the United States regards Formosan, Korean, Japanese, and Southeast Asian security as mere local aspects of a

[8] Hugh Gaitskell, "The Search for Anglo-American Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXII, No. 4 (July 1954), p. 566.

[9] Guy Mollet, "France and the Defense of Europe," *ibid.*, XXXII, No. 3 (April 1954), pp. 365, 372-73.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

regional "front." The Philippines and Thailand are concerned primarily with Formosa and Indo-China. New Zealand and Australia advocate immediate integrated military planning for the treaty area proper—which the United States opposes—while Britain and France are concerned with Malaya and Indo-China, and Pakistan with India. The community of security interests is at best a tenuous one.

The picture is made more complex with the introduction of economic and colonial issues. Large-scale economic development is demanded by the Asian members and supported by Britain, with the American role and contribution left in doubt. Pakistan and the Philippines stand for the emancipation of the remaining colonies in Asia; France, Britain, and Australia show no particular haste in departing.

It is therefore hardly surprising that the institutional structure of SEATO so far is unimpressive. The supra-national NATO Secretariat has its counterpart in Bangkok only in the form of a permanent council of the diplomatic representatives of the member states. Continuous balancing of contradictory security aims will be required to maintain a harmony of interests. And pronounced intra-SEATO adjustments on economic and colonial questions will become necessary to cement the agreement on security. This task will not be made easier by the conflicting commitments and forces which prevail within NATO. The Atlantic reluctance for extensive Pacific security arrangements can hardly be overcome by economic and colonial concessions, since NATO opposes Asian SEATO opinion in these spheres as well.

On balance, the impact of Afro-Asian neutralism may well be strengthened because of the curious mediating role exercised by the Commonwealth. With two of its members committed to the neutralist bloc—and sharply critical of SEATO—and four others participating in the Southeast Asian system, Commonwealth statesmen anxious to preserve their own community of interests must steer a course between full Western commitment and encouragement of neutral intercession between the Soviets and the West. Instead of unifying the two major anti-Communist regional systems, then, the Commonwealth is likely to enhance the necessity for constant interregional adjustments implying a dilution of commitments.

Balancing within the OAS hinges on the same basic issues: security, economics, and colonial emancipation. As in NATO and SEATO, American aims in the Western Hemisphere regional system are dominated by security considerations. The Rio Pact and the Bogota Charter have fashioned a hemispheric system which not only stabilizes political relations among the members but which also is intended to create a solid

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

front among them against extra-hemisphere dangers. Hence American policy has emphasized the arming and standardization of forces in South America, the collective discouragement of Communist-tinged movements, and the undertaking of cooperative programs for internal security. And to the extent that Latin American governments share Washington's determination to keep the hemisphere free from Old World influences of any kind, there is certainly in the OAS a minimum community of interests with respect to security.

More than this, however, hardly exists. For years, Latin American insistence on OAS-sponsored economic development programs has fallen on unsympathetic ears in Washington. More American investment, more technical assistance, and especially OAS-administered hemispheric commodity agreements are demanded by Latin American governments. The essence of Pan-Americanism, says Ezequiel Padilla, is economic solidarity: "The objective would be to treat the whole hemisphere as one economic unit, and thus to rescue Latin American economy from the grip of blind economic forces."[10] The desire for industrialization and the fear of retaining single-crop economies are constant themes in these demands and they add up to a much more clamorous chorus than Washington's concern for armed strength. An equally marked divergence of interests exists in the colonial sphere. In United Nations as well as in OAS meetings, the termination of colonialism in the Western Hemisphere has been demanded, with an invitation to Britain, France, and Holland to leave their remaining American possessions, an aim to which the United States is at best indifferent.

Cohesion in the OAS, therefore, is far from striking. A judicious process of balancing keeps the organization effective, as demonstrated at the Caracas and Rio Conferences of 1954: the United States acceded to the Latin demand for commodity regulation to the extent of sponsoring a conference to that end, while the South Americans endorsed Washington's preoccupation with hemisphere security by passing resolutions against communism in member states and by tacitly approving intervention in Guatemala. Further, United States policy had to give way in the realm of economic development and colonial emancipation, as set forth below, in the continuing effort to retain the almost solid OAS-bloc vote in favor of American interpretations and conceptions of global collective security, i.e., permissive enforcement.

The Afro-Asian bloc differs from the regional systems so far ex-

[10] Ezequiel Padilla, "The Meaning of Pan-Americanism," *Foreign Affairs,* XXXII, No. 2 (January 1954), p. 274.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

amined in that it does not possess one organization of its own. Apart from the almost defunct Arab League, irregular Islamic and Asian conferences have been the only modes of organization, with the Afro-Asian Conference of 1955 the most ambitious of such efforts. Two themes are common to the states of the region and make up their community of interests: a vital concern with economic development, and the determination to end colonialism everywhere.

The economic issue manifests itself in demands for large-scale United Nations investment outlays and technical assistance, coupled with the assertion of the right to nationalize and regulate foreign property. Yet these countries reject economic aid as a substitute for "freedom," as they see it. "The Arab world," wrote a Lebanese diplomat, "antagonized and isolated and thrown into despair, can no more be restored into a 'situation of strength' by such short-cuts as Point Four than it can be intimidated into love of and loyalty to the American cause by a show of force."[11]

Consensus in the Afro-Asian bloc, however, is demonstrated uniformly in the attack on all colonial vestiges. "We are here to challenge the basic assumptions of nineteenth-century imperialism," the Egyptian delegate declared to the Security Council during the Suez Canal dispute. "If the whole of Asia and Africa combined cannot get a subject discussed because of two or three great powers objecting, then the time may come when the Asian and African countries will feel that they are happier in their own countries and not in the UN," Prime Minister Nehru told the Indian Parliament.[12] Tunis, Morocco, New Guinea, Cyprus, Iranian oil, Palestine refugees, and the former Italian colonies are all issues which, to the Afro-Asians, symbolize their struggle against all vestiges of Western domination.

Agreement disappears, however, as soon as the issue of collective security is raised. No doubt, most of the states in the region are "neutralist" in the sense of preferring conciliation to enforcement, negotiation between the super-powers to indefinite bipolarization of might and influence. Yet three of them have joined SEATO and two are moving toward NATO. "Neutralism" in the sense of rigorous non-alignment with any regional alliance system characterizes only the Colombo Powers (excluding Pakistan) and those members of the Arab League which disapprove of Iraq's Western orientation: Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. It is their doctrine of neutralism which calls for further

[11] Fayez A. Sayegh, "The Arab Reaction to American Policy," *Social Science*, XXVII, No. 4 (October 1952), pp. 190-93.
[12] Bell, *op.cit.*, pp. 466-67.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

examination in terms of the dynamics of regional and universal international organization.

Rigorous neutralism implies distrust for all Western ideologies, but a toleration for their dissident strains, especially in the simultaneous acceptance of both Marxism and liberal democracy by the same groups. This detachment, in turn, facilitates an indifference to the merits of the ideological issue between the super-powers. Universal collective security is the key to peace, and not the rivalry between "power blocs," which Nehru never tires of castigating and with which he identifies regional organizations. Mohammed Hatta described abstention from these blocs as designed "to work energetically for the preservation of peace and the relaxation of tension generated by the two blocs, through endeavors supported if possible by the majority of the members of the United Nations. As an illustration of this policy may be cited the efforts made by Indonesia in concert with the Arab and Asian countries, to put an end to the war in Korea."[13] Conciliation and mediation in the Cold War are the obvious policy derivatives from the principle of neutralism, as consistently preached by Nehru and endorsed even by Israel, Iran, and Yugoslavia.

The maximum of agreement achieved by the inner core of neutralist Asian states was revealed in the 1954 Colombo Conference: United Nations supervision over the establishment of peace in Indochina, continued disarmament talks and a cessation of hydrogen-bomb tests in the Pacific, admission of Peiping to the United Nations, denunciation of colonialism, especially in North Africa, and the desirability of calling the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference to consider these issues further. Balancing among the five, however, was manifested in this declaration of solidarity directed equally against East and West: "The Prime Ministers affirmed their faith in democracy . . . and . . . declared their unshakable determination to resist interference in the affairs of their countries by external Communist, anti-Communist and other agencies."[14] It is surmised that this truly "neutral" statement represents India's concession to Burma's and Pakistan's concern over Sino-Soviet expansion.

[13] Mohammed Hatta, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs,* XXXI, No. 3 (April 1953), pp. 444-45. Contrast this position with the even more relativistic conception of neutralism offered by "P," "Middle Ground Between America and Russia: An Indian View," *ibid.*, XXXII, No. 2 (January 1954). See also Robert A. Scalapino, "'Neutralism' in Asia," *American Political Science Review,* XLVIII, No. 1 (March 1954).

[14] Article 8 of the Final Communiqué of the Conference of South-East Asian Prime Ministers; Indian Council of World Affairs, *Foreign Affairs Reports,* III, No. 7 (July 1954).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Such are the internal harmonies and disharmonies of regional systems. Regional cohesion is maintained, or at least sought, by mutual adjustments and concessions in the realm of security. But, in addition, aid in the realms of economic development and colonial emancipation is bartered for support on security issues. Even so, intra-regional balancing frequently fails to establish a solid front on all issues and unity of performance in the United Nations is imperfect. Hence it is at the global institutional level that additional concessions are made within and among regional systems in order to enable key blocs to marshal that two-thirds majority which is essential to gaining United Nations endorsement for any set of national policies. The continuing impact of functionalism on security must now be demonstrated as it manifests itself through regional tensions in the United Nations.

III

Aspirations for economic well-being and demands for colonial freedom are certainly factors which would play an ever more important role in international relations even if there were no Cold War. Still, in terms of an over-all pattern of foreign relations, questions of security —collective or otherwise—are dominant. While it is no doubt true that to India the matter of economic development and to Egypt the expulsion of the British from Suez are of far greater concern than the rivalry between the democratic West and the Communist Soviet bloc, the fact remains that these Indian and Egyptian aspirations gain most of their international cogency from being tied somehow to Cold War strategy. Hence the crucial factor in a theory of international organization remains the question of collective security, since it tends to condition the amount of impact enjoyed by the functional realms. How does balancing in the collective security field manifest itself in the closely related areas of economic development and colonial emancipation?

Balancing implies the preservation of security through a process of negotiation, conciliation, and mediation. The conciliator is an uncommitted party, or a member of a major power bloc not fully in agreement with the leader of the group—in short, the Afro-Asian and dissident NATO or SEATO powers. Because of his crucial importance to both super-powers and their allies, the position of the conciliator must be respected to some extent, leading to concessions, easing of tensions, and even *détentes*. A cumulative pattern of compromises, in turn, sets up expectations of peace, stability, and coexistence which the super-powers can violate only at great peril to their reputation and leadership in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

world. Both economic development and the cry for colonial freedom can and do contribute further impetus to the balancing pattern, because they create more and more expectations detracting from the overwhelmingly security-oriented approach which the West seeks to give to the United Nations, thereby strengthening the total bargaining position of the conciliating bloc or blocs. It must be stressed, however, that only issues which arouse controversy fulfill this particular role; for such matters as the status of women or the standardization of statistics, although "functional" in the usual sense of that term, do not give rise to a pattern of compromise and adjustment.

How, then, does economic development affect the functioning and impact of the United Nations as a totality? Regional and national aspirations in the realm of international investment are singled out as the key index in the analysis, especially as they revolve around proposals to create an International Finance Corporation (IFC) and a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED).

For the underdeveloped member states, the proposition is fairly simple. The Afro-Asian and most of the Latin American countries feel that the dearth of private international venture capital and the conservative lending policy of the International Bank call for more United Nations efforts. They prefer an international institution under collective control to bilateral assistance or global agencies dominated by the industrialized nations. They stress the importance of non-self-liquidating projects and the need for grants; they object to the high interest rates and stringent amortization terms attached to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development loans.

A bartering of economic for security considerations is frankly advocated by one of the leaders in the fight for IFC and SUNFED, Chile's Hernan Santa Cruz: "The United Nations has taken up arms to repel aggression and to vindicate collective security. The main burden was being carried by Western countries. . . . If they did not receive raw materials from the [underdeveloped] countries, they could not physically resist, and without their moral support the collective struggle against aggression in the name of peace would degenerate into a mere fight in defense of political and economic interests. . . . And the common man in the underdeveloped areas would only support the United Nations and its great work of collective security if he were convinced that its action was part of a universal undertaking, the object of which was to secure peace, individual freedom and the self-determination of peoples, and also to provide him with a decent standard of living and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

material and social progress."[15] Whether or not the NATO and Soviet blocs take seriously the ringing Charter phrases advocating the aims set forth by Santa Cruz, concern for mobilizing or hamstringing United Nations security operations compels attention to this juxtaposition of issues.

Initially at least, the West opposed both IFC and SUNFED. With the exception of Holland, the NATO and ANZUS countries have pointed to the need for making overseas investments attractive to private enterprise and have stressed the scarcity of public and private capital for large-scale international investment. Domestic needs, the burden of rearmament, and the measures of regional organizations have all figured in the argument of the opposition to IFC and SUNFED.

A bartering of security for economic concessions, however, has been featured by the West as well. Apparently hoping to outmaneuver the argument of the SUNFED supporters, American delegates explicitly in 1952 and 1953 made participation in the development schemes contingent on savings obtained from a successful program of global multilateral disarmament. Despite the outcry of opposition, this proposal was to lay the groundwork for the extensive balancing operation in the Eighth General Assembly.

The position of the Soviet bloc, finally, was the most clear-cut. Like their Western antagonists, the Soviets have opposed the projects. But they argue that IFC and SUNFED must certainly lead to ever-growing domination over the world economy by American imperialists. Without any qualification, the Communist delegates assert that all international financing must lead to a growth of Western monopolies.

These being the positions taken, how are we to account for the fact that resolutions approving both projects were passed in 1953 by unanimous votes, with the Soviet bloc abstaining?[16] The balancing pattern is implicit in the compromise resolution passed: disarmament was to make possible economic development, intensive study for the IFC and SUNFED was to go forward, and Belgium's Raymond Scheyven

[15] As cited in Robert E. Elder and Forrest D. Murden, "Economic Cooperation: Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED)," Woodrow Wilson Foundation, New York, September 1954, pp. 7-8.

[16] See United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, *Report on a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development,* New York, 1953; United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, 7th Session, Second Committee, *Summary Record of Meetings,* and the same document for the 8th Session. Also *Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries,* U.N. Doc A/2430 and A/2447; and Elder and Murden, *op.cit.,* for details on the laborious negotiations of the Working Party and the mediating role played by these four mavericks: Holland, Haiti, Greece, and Pakistan.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was to explore privately the willingness of member governments to contribute the necessary funds. While Western statesmen made it quite clear that their vote for the projects did not imply readiness to contribute to the institutions proposed, the American delegate's statement on the issue was sufficiently ambiguous to encourage expectations among the underdeveloped countries. The true implications of the compromise, however, may be seen within the context of the global balancing process.

Thus, the West clearly yielded the principle to the Afro-Asian and Latin American blocs. By merely endorsing the projects and—verbally—wishing them well, the Western governments also weakened their opposition to the idea. Refusal to participate at some future time will be that much more difficult to justify to a world which already accuses the West of sacrificing living standards to armaments. It may be suggested, furthermore, that the West's yielding was in turn motivated by the desire to retain for security issues the votes of the regional systems standing for economic development. As Jonathan Bingham noted: "The temptation to use the [technical assistance] funds for more spectacular purposes, or to use them to win some immediate political point from a wavering government (such as a favorable vote on a crucial issue in the United Nations) are constant and very great. Those who are responsible for the day-to-day conduct of our foreign policy are constantly looking for blue chips to play with, and an appropriation of several million dollars for an aid program in an area looks like a very nice blue chip indeed."[17] Afro-Asian and Latin American economic aspirations meet Western security aims and the result is a compromise by the West in the hope of retaining the loyalty of some present or future balancer. One recent consequence has been the American decision to contribute to IFC, made, significantly, at the OAS Conference at Rio. Another has been a lessening of European opposition to SUNFED, as illustrated in the Scheyven Report to ECOSOC.

But the Soviets yielded their principles as well. By abstaining instead of voting against the proposals, they too seemed to underwrite the demands of the underdeveloped countries in non-Soviet terms. Recent Soviet contributions to the United Nations Technical Assistance Program may be interpreted similarly. These steps imply a recognition of and a yielding to regional demands which may render a future retreat of the Soviet bloc quite hazardous in terms of propaganda.

The second major functional area in which balancing might be ex-

[17] Jonathan B. Bingham, "Partisan Politics and Point Four," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* x, No. 3 (March 1954), p. 85.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pected to operate is the realm of international policy toward colonial emancipation. The crucial index of clashing regional and national aspirations is provided by the dual issue of whether a list of factors should be adopted by which to judge the degree of advancement toward self-government or independence achieved by a given dependency, and the resultant question of whether Puerto Rico, as of 1953, was self-governing or not. The decision-making process displayed in the General Assembly on this occasion is likely to yield some fruitful insights.

A list of factors was considered necessary by a majority of the member states in order to be able to judge the claims of colonial powers who ceased to transmit annual reports to the General Assembly under Article 73e. By claiming that the possessions in question had achieved self-governing status, the colonial powers had withdrawn fifteen such areas from the scope of the Charter's Chapter XI since 1947, including Puerto Rico. While the factors were formulated and proposed to the General Assembly only for purposes of "guidance," a strong movement developed by 1953 to vest exclusive competence in the General Assembly for the application of these factors to any one territory. It followed, of course, that in the future colonial powers must seek United Nations consent to no longer reporting on their possessions; specifically, this implied American lack of competence to remove Puerto Rico unilaterally from United Nations examination and discussion.

The inter- and intra-regional balancing process was defined by the initial positions taken by the member governments on the dual issue of factors and of competence.[18] At one extreme of the spectrum, the West took a very dim view of the whole attempt. The European and Australasian nations, for various reasons, rejected the principle of the United Nations formulating and applying any set of factors over the possible dissent of the administering state. While objecting bitterly to the vesting of competence in the General Assembly, as forcing the pace and timing of establishing self-government or independence by an anti-colonial agency, the West nevertheless wished for a majority which would release the United States from the obligation to report on Puerto Rico, and thus give a colonial power a "clean bill of health."

[18] These generalizations are based on: United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, 7th Session, Fourth Committee, *Summary Record of Meetings,* and the same document for the 8th Session. Also see Sherman S. Hayden and Benjamin Rivlin, "Non-Self-Governing Territories: Status of Puerto Rico," Woodrow Wilson Foundation, New York, September 1954.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Soviet bloc occupied the opposite pole. Full and immediate independence for all colonies was demanded. No transitional stage of partial self-government or lingering associations with the colonial power after the grant of autonomy were admitted, although they were recognized in the General Assembly's list of factors. Indeed, the Soviets rejected the very idea of stating the factors as misleading and prone to introduce temporizing and evasion. While arguing for the competence of the General Assembly to examine claims for non-submission of reports under Article 73e, the Communist bloc also sought to condemn the Western stand on Puerto Rico and obstruct the release of the United States from its obligations.

The list of factors and the issue of competence, of course, had received their initial support from the combined Afro-Asian and Latin American blocs. However, there was by no means unanimity among these anti-colonial nations. The overwhelming majority in both blocs favored the list of factors, but seven Latin American delegations wished to avoid the issue of competence and release the United States unconditionally from further international responsibilities with respect to Puerto Rico. To this course, most of the Colombo Powers and three Latin American countries objected, proposing instead a United Nations investigation of Puerto Rican conditions in order to verify American claims. The compromise resolution worked out in the Fourth Committee resulted in giving the United States its clean bill of health, but also asserted the exclusive competence of the General Assembly to decide similar cases in the future.[19]

The voting in 1953 on both issues illustrates the tensions within and among blocs. The list of factors, for "guidance" only, was adopted by a vote of 27 to 23, with China and Thailand abstaining. The negative votes were cast by almost the entire NATO-ANZUS combination, four Latin American delegations, and the full Communist bloc. The debate was capped by a declaration from the colonial powers that they had no intention of implementing the resolution. But it was the issue of Puerto Rico which raised the competence question in full. In the Fourth Committee, the resolution absolving the United States from further responsibility but also asserting United Nations competence was passed 22 to 18, with 19 abstentions. Most Western states voted negatively or abstained because of the competence issue. The Soviet bloc plus Burma, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Guatemala, Mexico, and Yugoslavia voted negatively because they disputed the attainment of self-government by Puerto Rico.

[19] Proposals and votes are analyzed in Hayden and Rivlin, *op.cit.*, pp. 16-19.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the plenary meeting the same general tally of votes was obtained, falling short of the necessary two-thirds majority. However, earlier in the meeting, the Assembly had approved by a vote of 30 to 26 a Mexican proposal to apply the rule of simple majority to all questions under Chapter XI. Hence the West, the Soviets, and the dissident Afro-Asians and Latin Americans were outmaneuvered and the resolution was declared adopted. The United States, which had abstained in the Fourth Committee vote because of the competence issue, was compelled to vote for the resolution in the plenary meeting in order not to lose its clean bill of health on Puerto Rico.

In colonial matters, then, the pattern of balancing is far less marked than in the realm of economic development. The votes analyzed show very little adjustment and compromise on the part of the two polar camps in the direction of the balancing Afro-Asian and OAS systems. The same conclusion emerges from the positions taken in the 1955 vote on Algeria. No general compromise formula, compelling the chief antagonists to endorse the balancers' position, has yet been developed, as evidenced by the combined Western and Soviet opposition to the principle of factors. And so long as no such commitment is obtained, the balancing blocs lack an additional lever with which to condition the West and the Soviets to restraint and concession. However, it may well be that the introduction of the principle of simple majority voting will change this picture. No longer will the polar blocs be able to count on the defeat of balancing resolutions for lack of a two-thirds majority in plenary sessions. If the principle of bartering security votes for support on colonial and economic matters continues to be operative, therefore, it may well be surmised that balancing will emerge even in the colonial realm as a process of considerable importance. Already the policy of the United States on this issue gives some support to such a conjecture.

The actual impact of balancing in the field of economic development and the potential of a similar course of events in the colonial realm, then, are the constituents of a larger interregional process of balancing at the United Nations. The practice of collective security as advocated by the West or the denunciations of it uttered by the Soviets depend for their institutional effectiveness on the attention given to the functional aspirations of underdeveloped and anti-colonial regions. The Cold War may well be expected to deepen this interlocking relationship and thereby increase the bargaining position of the balancers, especially in the realm of collective security. Hence the mobilization of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the United Nations by one state or regional system will become less and less likely.

IV

It is evident that the process of exchanging concessions within each regional system is by no means uniformly successful. Consequently, issues of security, economics, or colonial emancipation may continue to form the substance of disagreement and rival aspirations even among members of the same regional system, once the issue reaches the level of United Nations discussion. Whenever such solidarity is not achieved at the regional level, the opportunity for balancing at the global level increases, since the regional partners are under pressure to bury their differences and since their opponents persist in seeking to prevent such agreement. Opportunity for negotiation, maneuvering, and compromise therefore improves at the universal level as the ease of reaching agreement regionally declines.

The net result of intra-regional and United Nations balancing procedures with respect to the two super-powers is a loss of the unilateral ability to implement national aims or dictate regional policy. In principle, the United States seeks to mobilize the United Nations on behalf of the containment policy, attempts to preserve the unilateral and bilateral nature of aid to economic development, and prefers to subject the remaining colonial empires to no immediate process of disintegration. In practice, the balancing process forces American policymakers to sacrifice elements in all these realms. In principle, the Soviet Union is eager to prevent the use of the United Nations for containment purposes, hinder organized schemes for economic development, and advance rapidly the dissolution of empires. In practice, however, the Soviet Union not only finds itself unable to achieve these aims but must frequently change its position to accommodate itself to the pressures of balancing. National policies, subjected to regional balancing, subjected further to United Nations pressures interregionally, are thus in effect deflected through the operations of international institutions. The degree of deflection now remains to be demonstrated.

Clearly, the Soviet bloc is far less subject to such influences than are the American-led systems. The Soviet system is united on all issues arising within the framework of international organizations. Further, a Soviet leadership which for tactical or strategic reasons is uninterested in catering to any external body of opinion has nothing to gain by concessions and will therefore be impervious to the forces of balancing. The fact that no single regional system accepts in full the Soviet positions

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on security, economic development, and colonial emancipation may therefore be quite irrelevant to balancing operations. In that event, negotiation and compromise cannot be expected.

If, however, the Soviet leadership should follow the tactical road of splitting the Western alliance, the regional and functional dynamics of United Nations processes offer ample opportunity for maneuver. Further, if the Kremlin were determined to bring about a long-range relaxation in the Cold War, immersion in the balancing process could hardly be avoided unless the Soviets are willing to relax tensions purely on American terms. Support for the Communist position must then be garnered; external opinion becomes vital. Hence, concessions to the Afro-Asian neutralists become necessary, especially in the realms of economics and colonies. Similarly, concessions on security grounds become vital if the European neutralists are to be wooed away from too close a tie with Washington. Efforts to split the already tenuous SEATO community of interests might bring with them economic and colonial concessions in the Far East and even the strongly anti-Communist OAS membership might be attracted by harping on these issues. But success in such ventures still presupposes departures from the basic arguments used in the United Nations. What evidence is there that such a road has been followed by Moscow?

In the field of security, it should be noted that the Soviet Union withdrew from Iran in 1946 partly as a result of very mild adverse publicity in the Security Council, even though no overwhelming force was brought to bear on Moscow. The Soviets, further, consented to the Korean truce, despite a considerable show of reluctance, after the Afro-Asian bloc had taken a strong hand in the negotiations—even though Russia stood to lose heavily in prestige in the prisoner repatriation process. And in Indo-China, the Geneva settlement by no means represents the best terms the Communist powers could have obtained—with NATO as well as Afro-Asian pressure again in evidence. Soviet contribution to the formerly maligned technical assistance program, participation in two much-denounced specialized agencies, and the initiation of bilateral economic aid schemes all represent modifications in Soviet tactics brought about by the pressures of balancing.

The likelihood that these changes are expedientially motivated and imply no basic change in policy does not detract from their importance in terms of a possible diminution of tensions. In making the commitment, however circumscribed, hopes and expectations will be created in the colonial, economic, and security realms which can be violated only at the risk of incurring the enmity of neutral regional blocs on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

some future security issue. Thus, balancing may make it far more difficult for the Soviet Union to obtain Afro-Asian support for global propaganda resolutions designed to embarrass the West. For a Soviet Union committed even to the verbiage of "peaceful coexistence," balancing results in an ever more complex pattern of interdependencies which has the cumulative effect of reducing the purity of all national—and regional—policy positions.

Evidence that balancing has resulted in a deflection of actual American policy is far more impressive. Of course, it remains true that a commitment to a course of "going it alone," of ignoring regional solidarity and United Nations endorsement, would render balancing pressure irrelevant to American policy. As in the case of the Soviet refusal to make any concessions, no possibility of negotiation and compromise would then remain.

Yet American policy has been concerned with achieving and maintaining the solidarity of NATO, SEATO, and OAS on all issues and on all levels. The heterogeneity of the alliance systems has not facilitated this task and it is likely that the community of interests in NATO will suffer dilution in Europe with the admission of Germany, while the indirect association of a rearmed Japan with SEATO is almost certain to have the same effect in Asia. Thus a Soviet leadership bent either on dividing the West or on placating dissident parts of it can take comfort from the regional dynamics of global organization by catering to the counsels of moderation which may be addressed to Washington from London, Paris, and Tokyo. At the same time, American policymakers prefer to obtain United Nations endorsement in the event that regional systems are mobilized against Communism. Regional arrangements "will be employed in the service of Charter principles and will not degenerate into mere military alliances, employing force or the threat of force for the achievement of narrow purposes inconsistent with the Charter," Benjamin V. Cohen told the General Assembly.[20] The attainment of solidarity within each regional system, the coordination of these diverse interests globally, and their subordination to the elusive two-thirds majority of the General Assembly combine to impose balancing on the United States, implying departures from doctrinal purity and concessions to all who require reassurance.

Within NATO, American concessions have been patent in the field of German rearmament, the military "stretch-out" in NATO, but most strikingly in the modification of America's Far Eastern policy

[20] Benjamin V. Cohen, "Collective Security Under Law," *Department of State Bulletin*, XXVI, No. 656 (January 21, 1952), p. 100.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the Korean and Indo-Chinese crises. NATO's restraining role in Asia is manifested further in the relatively modest role accorded to SEATO, despite earlier American demands to the contrary. Within OAS, the concession pattern is evident largely in the realms of economics and colonial caution, while concessions to the Afro-Asian neutralists make themselves felt in a reduction of security claims in the United Nations and in the role accruing to SEATO.

Recent concessions resulting from the pressures of balancing were made even in the case of Puerto Rico. The American announcement during the General Assembly debate that the island commonwealth may be granted independence if Puerto Rico requests it would hardly have been made without the pressure of the Asian and OAS critics of colonialism. In fact, the "tightrope-walking" of American policy in United Nations discussions of colonialism is in itself evidence of the impact of balancing, as demonstrated in the United States vote *for* the final resolution on Puerto Rico, despite the obnoxious competence clause. The colonial issue will thus become more crucial to balancing processes as the United States feels compelled to depart from its NATO-ANZUS allies.[21]

The most striking example of the continuing impact of balancing lies in the field of the atom. Recent major changes in American strategic planning certainly are not due solely to the influence of international organizations. Yet the coincidence of intra- and inter-regional tensions on the role of nuclear warfare and the revision of American policy statements is most striking. Thus "massive retaliation" has given way to "a system in which local defensive strength is reenforced by more mobile deterrent power," i.e., regional military strength.[22] And "limited atomic strategy" with reliance on tactical nuclear weapons has since emerged as a much more modest statement of American military planning. The continued need felt for the pursuance of disarmament negotiations, despite the lack of faith in their success and the contradiction they represent to much basic American strategic planning, implies a further concession to the United States' nervous allies and critical neutralist antagonists. It is likely that the United Nations-endorsed scheme for the industrial utilization of atomic energy was inspired by similar considerations. With this incidence of proposals, steps, and measures detracting from the dominance of the purely military aspects

[21] For an official statement of this point, see Vernon McKay, "The United States, the United Nations and Africa," *ibid.*, XXVIII, No. 712 (February 16, 1953).

[22] John Foster Dulles, "Policy for Security and Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXII, No. 3 (April 1954), pp. 358-59.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of United Nations strategy, American policy is more and more committed to restraint and patient negotiation.

V

If the preceding propositions and demonstrations possess the validity claimed for them, there would no longer be any reason for arguing that regional and universal international organization are incompatible. Clearly, the two not only coexist but depend on one another. The balancing pattern establishes the descriptive and conceptual link between the two types. Still, it should not be forgotten that the balancing pattern presupposes definite modes of state conduct. It assumes, first of all, the continuation of the present regional distribution of policy aims and aspirations, with its implied tripolarization of power. The Soviet bloc is expected to keep the United Nations from being used for permissive enforcement purposes, to prevent the West from turning it into an instrument of Western global policies. In default of any serious expectation of transforming the organization into an instrument of Soviet policy, this is the best the Kremlin can do. Further, balancing of course presupposes continuing American efforts to mobilize the symbols of the United Nations on behalf of global policies of anti-Communism. Finally, and most importantly, balancing rests on the assumption that these efforts will be resisted by the balancing bloc and by dissent within regional systems, so that compromise formulas straddling the American and Soviet positions will be advanced. In short, the conceptual apparatus here outlined simply would have no meaning if Asian neutralism did not exist and if opinion among NATO members endorsed the American position without a murmur of dissent. A veering away from neutralism on Nehru's part, for instance, as demanded by some in India, would disrupt the balancing pattern. So would a British decision to underwrite completely the American policy on China.

If these preconditions of balancing continue to exist, the nature of universal international organization would undergo considerable change. The interdependence of economic with security features would most likely result in increased financial support for international development efforts. Similarly, the aspirations for colonial emancipation might be expected to be gratified increasingly as a result of the processes at work, with universal organizations acquiring broader functions in both these fields. The crucial change, however, would occur in the realm of collective security. Balancing here might operate so as to reduce the emphasis on universal commitments to resort to collective enforcement measures. By its encouragement of regional commitments,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

subject not to the formal supervision of the General Assembly but to the moderating influence of continuous multilateral and interregional negotiations, balancing may well change the nature of the United Nations by putting primary emphasis on the pacific settlement of disputes. "As things are," wrote Sir Gladwyn Jebb, "though one may admit that collective resistance to aggression remains a 'primary' function, pacific settlement seems to me . . . to have become the more important from a practical point of view. For, after all, if World War III actually does break out, nobody can pretend that what the United Nations does or says, however useful it may be, will be an element of the first importance in the winning of the war. Whereas if we are to avoid World War III there must be a long period of coexistence with the Soviet world during which the United Nations might be of the greatest value."[23] Through the continuation of the balancing process the United Nations would become an agency for conciliating and mediating the tensions which produce the Cold War.

If regional systems fulfill an active function in global organization by restraining each other's aspirations, how does this conception of international organization differ from the conventional doctrine of the balance of power? It could be argued that the rival regional systems are the equivalent of the traditional "weights" in the balance, and, to carry the descriptive analogy one step further, that the Afro-Asian bloc fulfills the role of the balancer. If the balance of power concept is considered as a tool of political analysis, could it not be concluded that active hostilities between the two major antagonists will not come about because of the restraining influence of the balancer, who could throw his weight into either scale? Proceeding along these lines, it might appear feasible to treat international organization today as no more than a special case of a general balance of power theory.

A number of factors, however, argue against this procedure. In the first place, none of the regional systems in question—with the exception of the Soviet—are sufficiently homogeneous to permit any definite analysis in balance of power terms. The West cannot be presumed to act against the Soviet bloc in unambiguous fashion because of the fissures within it. The same is true of the balancing bloc, which is most unlikely in any event to side completely with the Soviets and already shows signs of favoring the West. Despite its neutralism, the balancing

[23] Sir Gladwyn Jebb, "The Free World and the United Nations," *ibid.*, XXXI, No. 3 (April 1953), pp. 386-87. The same point is well made in W. T. R. Fox, "The United Nations in the Era of Total Diplomacy," *International Organization*, V, No. 2 (May 1951), p. 266.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bloc is by no means as disinterested in the merits of the issues of the Cold War as would be required by a rigorous theory of the balance of power.

Another consideration which makes the similarity between the United Nations balancing process and the balance of power even more superficial is the military weakness of the balancing bloc. In the classical prototype, the balancer is supposed to be sufficiently strong to furnish the crucial weight in a showdown. The current military power of the Afro-Asian bloc could hardly qualify for this role, though possession of and control over the resources of the area would be a choice prize indeed for either of the major antagonists. Rather, the contemporary importance of the Afro-Asian combination lies in its psychological role. Since the region controls one-third of the world's population, attitudes of hostility or friendship toward either of the super-powers are of vital concern in any future division of power between them. To win the balancer is a policy aim of some moment for the major antagonists, even if he possesses no armies of consequence.

Finally, the analogy to the classical balance of power is deficient since, as Liska has demonstrated, the traditional pattern is one-dimensional: it is concerned only with physical power and the relations of states in terms of territory and security. The contemporary balancing process is unique in its multiple aspects, in the complex system of interdependencies created between distinct regional and functional aspirations, having little to do with security and territory so far as some of the chief protagonists are concerned.

In fact, even without agreeing to the liberal's preconceptions concerning international life, it may be readily granted that the balance of power and international organization imply hostile rather than complementary principles. The classical doctrine of the balance of power rested in large part on an assumed ability of the balancing state to align itself with whatever belligerent, actual or potential, seemed likely to be defeated. Free-wheeling was of the essence in the conduct pattern associated with the balance of power; neither ideological nor institutional restraints were considered necessary or even desirable.

Collective security under the aegis of an international organization, however, makes such free-wheeling practices much more difficult, and in principle is supposed to make them impossible. If balancing rests not on unrestrained commitment based on national assessments of self-interest, but depends instead on such mechanistic institutional devices as two-thirds majorities, vetoes, and double vetoes, free-wheeling tends to be curtailed. These devices derive their sanction, in turn, from pat-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

terns of expectations, basic hopes, and national aspirations for a modicum of international order and predictability of conduct. This factor, therefore, limits the freedom of maneuver of the chief antagonists, but it also conditions the movements of the balancing blocs. Their consequent inability to align themselves unconditionally in accordance with balance of power prescriptions implies a quite different species of international intercourse. Restraint is imposed on the welter of policy aims not by outside force, nor by a voluntary resignation of will or a determined striving for world community, but by the need to cater to the forces let loose by the multiple process of balancing.[24]

Expediential Cold War considerations, as reflected in national policies pursued in the United Nations framework, are sufficient to assure the continuity of this pattern so long as each "actor" follows his proper "role" in the global drama. Nevertheless it is more than likely that the very forces which gain from the balancing process—the aims of economically underdeveloped, anti-colonial, and pro-conciliation governments—will ultimately contribute to its drastic transformation. The growth of industrial strength and independence in Afro-Asia will reduce the efficacy of bartering economic for security concessions. The increase in the number of independent states will eliminate another area of mutual compromise and ultimately perhaps reintroduce a multipolar pattern of organization in global politics, displacing the current tripolar scheme. This is the more likely inasmuch as diffusion of technology and especially of nuclear knowledge will give the smaller states an increasing military potential. The balancing process, therefore, may be a useful conceptual tool for elucidating the impact of international organization during the Cold War era and at the same time contain the seed of its own destruction in the long run. International organization, understood in these terms, would not produce the millennium of law, progress, and order expected by ardent advocates of international cooperation. But it might ensure the international breathing spell necessary to develop a multi-polar and multi-functional pattern of policy expectations and thereby further the habits of peaceful adjustment of basic tensions.

[24] Reinterpretations of United Nations concepts based on similar materials, although not necessarily reaching identical conclusions, are to be found in Liska, *op.cit.;* Coral Bell, "Korea and the Balance of Power," *Political Quarterly,* XXV, No. 1 (January-March 1954); and Kenneth Dawson, "The United Nations in a Disunited World," *World Politics,* VI, No. 2 (January 1954).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA

A Reappraisal

By HENRY A. KISSINGER

I

IT is only natural that a period anxiously seeking to wrest peace from the threat of nuclear extinction should look nostalgically to the last great successful effort to settle international disputes by means of a diplomatic conference, the Congress of Vienna. Nothing is more tempting than to ascribe its achievements to the very process of negotiation, to diplomatic skill, and to "willingness to come to an agreement"—and nothing is more dangerous. For the effectiveness of diplomacy depends on elements transcending it; in part on the domestic structure of the states comprising the international order, in part on their power relationship.

Any international settlement represents a stage in a process by which a nation reconciles its vision of itself with the vision of it by other powers. No state can doubt its own good faith; it is the vehicle of its social cohesion. But, equally, no power can stake its survival entirely on the good faith of another; this would be an abdication of the responsibility of statesmanship. The whole domestic effort of a people exhibits an effort to transform force into obligation by means of a consensus on the nature of justice. But the international experience of a state is a challenge to the universality of its notion of justice, for the stability of the international order depends on the reconciliation of different versions of legitimacy. Could a nation achieve all its wishes, it would strive for absolute security, a world order free from the consciousness of foreign danger, and one where all problems have the manageability of domestic issues. But since absolute security for one power means absolute insecurity for all others, it is obtainable only through conquest, never as part of a legitimate settlement.

An international settlement which is accepted and not imposed will therefore always appear *somewhat* unjust to any one of its components. Paradoxically, the generality of this dissatisfaction is a condition of stability, because were any one power *totally* satisfied, all others would have to be *totally* dissatisfied and a revolutionary situation would ensue. The foundation of a stable order is the *relative* security—and therefore the *relative* insecurity—of its members. Its stability reflects, not the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

absence of unsatisfied claims, but the absence of a grievance of such magnitude that redress will be sought in overturning the settlement rather than through an adjustment within its framework. An order whose structure is accepted by all major powers is "legitimate." An order containing a power which considers its structure oppressive is "revolutionary." The security of a domestic order resides in the preponderant power of authority, that of an international order in the balance of forces and in its expression, the equilibrium.

But if an international order expresses the need for security and an equilibrium, it is constructed in the name of a legitimizing principle. Because a settlement transforms force into acceptance, it must attempt to translate individual demands into general advantage. It is the legitimizing principle which establishes the relative "justice" of competing claims and the mode of their adjustment. This is not to say that there need be an exact correspondence between the maxims of legitimacy and the conditions of the settlement. No major power will give up its minimum claim to security—the possibility of conducting an independent foreign policy—merely for the sake of legitimacy. But the legitimizing principle defines the marginal case. In 1919, the Austro-Hungarian Empire disintegrated not so much from the impact of the war as from the nature of the peace, because its continued existence was incompatible with national self-determination, the legitimizing principle of the new international order. It would have occurred to no one in the eighteenth century that the legitimacy of a state depended on linguistic unity. It was inconceivable to the makers of the Versailles settlement that there might be any other basis for legitimate rule. Legitimizing principles triumph by being taken for granted.

Although there never occurs an exact correspondence between the maxims of the legitimizing principle and the conditions of the settlement, stability depends on a certain commensurability. If there exists a substantial discrepancy *and* a major power which feels disadvantaged, the international order will be volatile. For the appeal by a "revolutionary" power to the legitimizing principle of the settlement creates a psychological distortion. The "natural" expression of the policy of a status-quo power is law—the definition of a continuing relationship. But against a permanently dissatisfied power appealing to the legitimizing principle of the international order, force is the only recourse. Those who have most gain from stability thus become the advocates of a revolutionary policy. Hitler's appeal to national self-determination in the Sudeten crisis in 1938 was an invocation of "justice," and thereby contributed to the indecisiveness of the resistance: it induced the West-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ern powers to attempt to construct a "truly" legitimate order by satisfying Germany's "just" claims. Only after Hitler annexed Bohemia and Moravia was it clear that he was aiming for dominion, not legitimacy; only then did the contest become one of pure power.

The major problem of an international settlement, then, is so to relate the claims of legitimacy to the requirements of security that no power will express its dissatisfaction in a revolutionary policy, and so to arrange the balance of forces as to deter aggression produced by causes other than the conditions of the settlement. This is not a mechanical problem. If the international order could be constructed like a mathematical axiom, powers would consider themselves as factors in a balance and arrange their adjustments to achieve a perfect equilibrium between the forces of aggression and the forces of resistance. But an exact balance is impossible, and not only because of the difficulty of predicting the aggressor. It is chimerical, above all, because while powers may appear to outsiders as factors in a security arrangement, they appear domestically as expressions of a historical existence. No power will submit to a settlement, however well-balanced and however "secure," which seems totally to deny its vision of itself. There exist two kinds of equilibrium then: a general equilibrium which makes it risky for one power or group of powers to attempt to impose its will on the remainder; and a special equilibrium which defines the historical relation of certain powers among each other. The former is the deterrent against a general war; the latter the condition of smooth cooperation. An international order is therefore rarely born out of the consciousness of harmony. For even when there is an agreement about legitimacy, the conceptions of the requirements of security will differ with the geographical position and the history of the contending powers. Out of just such a conflict over the nature of the equilibrium the Congress of Vienna fashioned a settlement which lasted almost exactly a century.

For the problem at Vienna was not simply how to protect Europe against a renewed French onslaught. There was general agreement about the extent of France compatible with the peace of Europe, but this only sharpened the disagreements *within* the victorious coalition about the relative spheres of influence of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Great Britain. And this contest was made all the more intractable because each of the protagonists meant something different by the term "equilibrium" so frequently invoked: When the British Foreign Minister, Castlereagh, spoke of the equilibrium, he meant a Europe in which hegemony was impossible; but when Metternich appealed to the equi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

librium, he included a Germany in which Prussian predominance was impossible. Russia's demand for Poland threatened the equilibrium of Europe and Castlereagh could, therefore, hardly believe that any other problem was worth discussing before the Tsar's pretensions were thwarted. Prussia's insistence on Saxony merely imperiled the balance within Germany, but this was enough to absorb the full energy of Metternich. Castlereagh was interested in creating a Central Europe which would be strong enough to resist attack from both the West and the East; Metternich desired the same thing, but he was also concerned about Austria's relative position *within* Central Europe. To Castlereagh, the Continental nations were aspects of a defensive effort; but to the Continental nations the general equilibrium meant nothing if it destroyed the historical position which to them was the reason for their existence. To Castlereagh, the equilibrium was a mechanical expression of the balance of forces; to the Continental nations, a reconciliation of historical aspirations.

This led to a diplomatic stalemate, made all the more intractable because Britain and Austria had secured most of their special objectives during the war so that few bargaining weapons were left to Russia and Prussia, a stalemate which could be broken only by adding an additional weight to one side of the scales. Since the sole uncommitted major power was France, the former enemy emerged as the key to the European settlement. Thus grew up a myth about Talleyrand's role at the Congress of Vienna, of the diabolical wit who appeared on the scene and broke up a coalition of hostile powers, who then regrouped them into a pattern to his liking by invoking the magic word "legitimacy" and from an outcast emerged as the arbiter of Europe.[1] To be sure, since the Treaty of Paris had settled France's boundaries, Talleyrand could afford perhaps the most disinterested approach. His wit and caustic comments became famous, so that Gentz could say of him that he had both the laughers and the thinkers on his side. But these efforts would have availed little, had not the threat of France been eclipsed by the danger from the East, had not the differences among the Allies become greater than their common fear of France. So long

[1] It is a legend spread by those who confuse results and causes and by professional diplomats wont to ascribe to mere negotiating skill what is possible only through the exploitation of more deep-seated factors. It has gained currency because Talleyrand, whose monarch had not come to Vienna, was obliged to write voluminous reports, and in order to cement his shaky domestic position, the former Foreign Minister of Napoleon tended to emphasize his indispensability. See, for example, Harold G. Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna,* New York, 1946; Duff Cooper, *Talleyrand,* New York, 1932; Crane Brinton, *The Lives of Talleyrand,* New York, 1936; Guglielmo Ferrero, *The Reconstruction of Europe,* New York, 1941.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as the Coalition still believed that the memory of the common wartime effort would provide the motive force of a settlement, Talleyrand was powerless. Once this illusion was shattered, the issue became one of the limits of self-restraint, whether a power would fail to add a factor to its side merely for the sake of the appearance of harmony. The logic of the situation provided the answer: France came to participate in European affairs, because they could not be settled without her.

II

As the plenipotentiaries were assembling in Vienna, however, the course of events seemed by no means this clear. It was still thought that the settlement would be rapid, that France would appear as but a spectator, that the rest of Europe would only be called upon to ratify an instrument drafted in relative harmony. This was reflected in the procedural scheme agreed to at preliminary conferences between Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Great Britain which placed the effective control of the Congress in the hands of the "Big Four." Talleyrand protested strenuously against the exclusion of France and the minor powers from the deliberations of the Congress, but despite his brilliance and sarcasm, he achieved only a few minor concessions. It was decided to adjourn the formal opening of the Congress until November 1, 1814, and to have the pending questions examined in the meantime by the eight signatories of the Treaty of Paris, the "Big Four" plus France, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden. The "Big Four" left no doubt, however, that they intended to continue their private discussions and to treat the "Eight" merely as a ratifying instrument or as one for settling peripheral issues.

Talleyrand's first sally failed, because a logical inconsistency is not sufficient to dissolve coalitions. Only after the claim of special righteousness, which is characteristic of coalitions, had disappeared in a conflict which indicated that the relations of the Allies among each other were simply those of contending powers, could Talleyrand emerge as an equal partner. But first one more effort to determine whether the Tsar could be induced to limit his claims without the threat of force had to be made. So well had Castlereagh established himself as the prime contender for the European equilibrium that it was he who entered the arena to try the Tsar's resolution.

There ensued a strange and unreal series of interviews between Castlereagh and Alexander; strange, because their bitterness was accompanied by protestations of unending friendship, and unreal, be-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cause Alexander and Castlereagh could never agree on basic premises. In order to obtain a framework for negotiation, the protagonists constantly shifted positions, pretending to agree with the other's principles, but interpreting them in a manner which reduced them to absurdity. Thus Castlereagh at one stage became an avid defender of a completely independent Poland, while Alexander on another occasion defended his Polish plan as a contribution to European security. That Alexander did not propose to let protestations of Allied unity deprive him of his Polish spoils became apparent on the occasion of his first interview with Castlereagh on the day after his arrival.[2] For the first time, he avowed his Polish plans in detail. He proposed to keep all of the Duchy of Warsaw with the exception of a small portion to be ceded to Prussia. These claims, Alexander argued, were not the result of ambition, but the outgrowth of a moral duty and motivated by the sole desire of achieving the happiness of the Polish people. In short, since they were not advanced in the name of security, they could not threaten anyone. Castlereagh, in reply, urged that a Russian appendage extending deep into Central Europe would constitute a constant source of disquiet for the rest of Europe. But the Tsar left no doubt that he was unwilling to withdraw from his Polish possession. The interview between Castlereagh and Alexander had thus made evident that persuasiveness would not suffice and that the next stage of the negotiations would have to be based on force or the threat of force.[3]

III

While Castlereagh was negotiating with the Tsar, he made every effort to assemble such a force. As an abstract problem in diplomacy his task seemed simple. But although the equilibrium might be indivisible, it did not appear so to its components. The Tsar could not be resisted without a united front of the rest of Europe, but the powers of Europe were not at all in accord regarding the real danger. They did not wish to see the general equilibrium overturned, but they were not prepared to resist at the sacrifice of that part of it on which their historical position depended. A strong Russia might dominate Europe, but a too powerful Prussia would outstrip Austria and a united Germany might menace France. Hardenberg, the Prussian minister, was

[2] Castlereagh's report. See Charles Webster, *British Diplomacy, 1813-1815*, London, 1921, pp. 197ff., October 2, 1814.

[3] The exchange continued through October in a series of memoranda: Castlereagh to the Tsar, October 12, 1814, see Duke of Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda,* 15 vols., ed. by his son, London, 1855-1872, IX, p. 332; the Tsar's reply, October 30, p. 386; Castlereagh's reply, November 8, p. 410.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more interested in Saxony than in Poland; Talleyrand was almost as afraid that the problem of Poland would be settled *without* him as that it would be settled *against* him; and Metternich, while not indifferent to the extension of Russia into Central Europe and of Prussia into Central Germany, did not wish to resist openly since this would cause the brunt of the effort to fall on Austria, the most exposed power, while surrendering the policy of close cooperation with Prussia which Metternich considered the key to Austrian security. "I barricade myself behind time," Metternich told the Saxon envoy, "and make patience my weapon."[4]

Thus Castlereagh's effort to create a united front against Russia led to an ambiguous series of constellations, of half-hearted coalitions and tentative betrayals, of promises of unyielding support coupled with hedges against bad faith. Matters were finally brought to a head by Prussia, the power which could least afford delay. For although the treaties of Kalish, Teplitz, and Chaumont had guaranteed Prussia its territorial extent of 1805, they had never specified where Prussia might find the requisite territories, particularly if it lost its Polish possessions to Russia. The available compensations, composed of former provinces or former satellites of France, primarily in the Rhineland, were inadequate. And they were undesirable because of their geographic separation from the main part of the Prussian monarchy and the Catholic religion of their inhabitants. Thus Prussia came to look toward Saxony, coveted since the time of Frederic the Great, contiguous with its own territories and with a predominantly Protestant population. But Prussia's negotiating position was the weakest of those of the major powers. Unlike Russia, it was not in possession of its prize. Unlike Austria, it had not made its participation in the war dependent on obtaining its special conditions. If now the Polish question was settled before that of Saxony, Prussia would have paid the penalty for its total commitment; of having fought the war with so much fervor that its participation had never been negotiable, of neglecting the peace because the war, in effect, had become an end in itself. And Prussia required Austrian acquiescence in the annexation of Saxony, because the organization of Germany, the indispensable condition of Prussia's security, would become illusory if Austria emerged on the Saxon issue as the protector of the secondary German powers.

It is not surprising, therefore, that on October 9, 1814, Hardenberg submitted a memorandum agreeing to an "intermediary system based

[4] Wilhelm Schwarz, *Die Heilige Allianz*, Stuttgart, 1935, p. 13.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on Austria, Prussia and Britain," and directed against Russia.[5] But he made Prussia's cooperation on the Polish question dependent on Austrian agreement to the annexation of Saxony and to the provisional occupation of Saxony by Prussia as a token of good faith. In its tentative quest for allies, in its pedantic effort to achieve the advantage of every course of action, the Hardenberg memorandum merely served to illustrate Prussia's dilemma: Russian support might gain it Saxony, but not legitimacy; while Austrian support might yield it Poland, but not Saxony. The Hardenberg memorandum was a plea not to leave Prussia dependent on the good will of the Tsar; to create a European order based on Austro-Prussian friendship, but also on Prussian possession of Saxony.

But this effort to combine incompatible policies provided Metternich with the means to separate the Polish and Saxon question by one of his intricate maneuvers. On October 22, he transmitted two notes to Hardenberg and Castlereagh whose tone of grudging agreement to Hardenberg's proposal obscured the fact that the moral framework which was being created to resist in Poland would prove equally effective to resist in Saxony, and that Hardenberg, in his effort to hedge his risks, had made his defeat inevitable. For Castlereagh in his overriding concern with the balance of power and Hardenberg in his obsession with Saxony overlooked two subtle and mutually inconsistent reservations in Metternich's despatches: that Prussia's annexation of Saxony should not lead to a "disproportionate aggrandizement," a condition clearly impossible of fulfillment if Prussia regained her Polish provinces,[6] and that Austria's agreement on the Saxon point was conditional on the *success* of the effort to thwart the Tsar's design on Poland[7]—which, in turn, would leave Prussia isolated in the inevitable contest over the interpretation of the first reservation.

But while Metternich was preparing the moral framework for an effort to separate Prussia and Russia, Castlereagh was looking only to Poland, as if the European equilibrium could be created with the necessity of a mathematical equation. On October 23, he finally succeeded in getting Prussia to agree to a common plan of action against Russia on the basis of Metternich's memoranda.[8] The three powers undertook to force the issue by confronting the Tsar with the threat of bringing the Polish question before the full Congress if a reasonable settle-

[5] Comte d'Angeberg, *Le Congrès de Vienne et les Traités de 1815*, Paris, 1863-1864, II, p. 1934.
[6] Text of note to Castlereagh, *ibid.*, II, pp. 1939ff.
[7] Text of note to Hardenberg, *ibid.*, I, pp. 316ff.
[8] Castlereagh's report, Webster, *op.cit.*, p. 212, October 29, 1814.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment could not be obtained by direct negotiations. They proposed three acceptable solutions: an independent Poland as it existed prior to the first partition, a rump Poland on the scale of 1791, or the return of the three partitioning powers to their former possessions.[9]

The threat of an appeal to Europe in Congress was the last effort to settle the European equilibrium by a combination *within* the anti-French coalition. When Metternich called on the Tsar to present the ultimatum on the Polish question, he was dismissed haughtily and even challenged to a duel. And when, on October 30, the three sovereigns left to visit Hungary, Alexander appealed to his brother monarchs against their ministers. He failed with the Austrian Emperor, but it did not prove too difficult to convince the stodgy and unimaginative Prussian King that the secret negotiations of the three ministers were an act of bad faith. When the monarchs returned to Vienna, Hardenberg was ordered, in the presence of the Tsar, to refrain from any further separate negotiations with his Austrian and British colleagues. In this manner, on November 5, the contest over Poland ended for the time being. The effort to achieve an international order based on agreement and not on force seemed to have returned to its starting point.

IV

But this was a mistaken impression. For if Castlereagh's failure had proved that the equilibrium could not be achieved through a demonstration of its necessity, Metternich's almost imperceptible complementary effort had created the moral framework for reopening the issue by an appeal to legitimacy. The procrastination which had proved so maddening to Castlereagh had in fact been Metternich's most effective means to overcome his dilemmas, for delay strengthened Austria's chief bargaining weapon, that legitimacy can be conferred but not exacted, that it implies agreement and not imposition. So the weeks had passed while Europe complained about the frivolity of the Austrian minister and the old school of Austrian diplomats raged that their "Rhenish" minister, whom they nicknamed Prince Scamperlin, was betraying the Empire to Prussia. But in the admiration for the famous phrase of the Prince de Ligne: "Le Congrès danse, mais il ne marche pas," it was overlooked that the Congress was dancing itself into a trap.

When Hardenberg offered Metternich his cooperation, he believed

[9] Memorandum re procedure, *ibid.*, pp. 213ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that he was clinching his gains and that he was obtaining a guarantee of Saxony, however the Polish negotiations ended. But because Metternich's reply had made Austrian agreement to the annexation of Saxony conditional on the *success* of their common measures, the effort to connect the two issues became a means to separate them. For if the Polish negotiations succeeded, Prussia would lose her moral claim to Saxony in the eyes of Europe. If Prussia regained her Polish possessions, the annexation of Saxony would represent the "disproportionate aggrandizement" against which Metternich had warned Castlereagh. But if the Polish negotiations failed, Prussia would lose her moral claim to Saxony in the eyes of Austria. Prussia's isolation was assured none the less surely, because the fact of resistance was almost as certain to alienate the Tsar as its success. Having demonstrated Austria's European concern by yielding in Saxony, intransigence could now be defended by the requirements of the European and not the German equilibrium. And Castlereagh, having obtained Austrian support in the Polish negotiations, would no longer be able to treat the Saxon issue as an internal German affair. There could be no doubt of the attitude of France or of the smaller German states. Prussia, in its effort to obtain reinsurance, had only succeeded in achieving its isolation.

When, on November 7, Hardenberg informed Metternich of the King's orders and of the difficulty of carrying out the agreed plan with respect to Poland, Metternich finally had the moral basis for action.[10] Austria was interested in the closest relationship with Prussia, he replied, but no longer at the price of the destruction of Saxony.[11] After being forced to tolerate Russian aggrandizement in Poland, Austria could not acquiesce in Prussian aggrandizement within Germany without upsetting the equilibrium completely. Metternich suggested an alternative plan which maintained a nucleus of Saxony, while giving a large part of it to Prussia, together with other compensations in the Rhineland. But all protestations of friendship could not hide the fact that Prussia was outmaneuvered, that Metternich had lost out in Poland only to win in Saxony and then partially to restore the situation in Poland by means of Saxony.

It did not matter that, on November 8, the Russian military governor of Saxony turned over the provisional administration to Prussia, or

[10] D'Angeberg, *op.cit.*, I, p. 406 (Hardenberg's note to Metternich). There is yet another indication, although no proof, that Metternich never intended the Polish negotiations as anything but a means to isolate Prussia on the Saxon question: his dismal defeat during his interview with Alexander. At no other time in his career did Metternich choose a frontal attack, negotiate so ineffectively, or surrender so easily.

[11] Text, *ibid.*, I, p. 505.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the Prussian military were threatening war. Russia, at the periphery of Europe, might rest its claim on Poland on the fact of possession, but a power situated in the center of the Continent could survive only as the component of a "legitimate" order both within Germany and in Europe. Thus, although by the middle of December the Congress of Vienna seemed to have reached a complete stalemate, behind the scene a fundamental transformation was preparing itself. A stalemate is not total until all the factors are engaged and France was still uncommitted. The contests during October and November had exploded the myth of Allied unity and the threat of France no longer loomed larger than that of the erstwhile ally. While Castlereagh was despairing about the Polish failure and accusing Metternich of never having really intended to resist,[12] a combination was forming on the Saxon question which was to give a new direction to the contest. For the coalition which could resist in Saxony was, by definition, also the coalition which could resist in Poland. And the claims of power defeated in one quarter would, almost necessarily, limit the assertions of arbitrariness in the other. So it was proved, after all, that the equilibrium was indivisible, although the solution did not come about through a consciousness of this. It was not in the name of Europe that Europe was saved, but in the name of Saxony.

V

But before this new combination could be formed, domestic pressures on Castlereagh nearly wrecked Metternich's finely spun plan. An insular power may fight its wars in the name of the European equilibrium, but it will tend to identify the threats to the equilibrium with threats to its immediate security. Because its policy is defensive and not precautionary, it will make the cause of war depend on an overt act which "demonstrates" the danger. But the danger to the equilibrium is never demonstrated until it is already overturned, because an aggressor can always justify every step, except the crucial last one, as the manifestation of limited claims and exact acquiescence as the price of continued moderation. To be sure, Britain had entered the fray against Napoleon at an early stage and continued the contest with great persistence. But the threat to the equilibrium had become manifest through an attack on the Low Countries and a challenge to Britain's command of the seas. Now the issue was Poland, however, a "distant" country both geographically and psychologically. It was not clear until it was

[12] Webster, *op.cit.*, pp. 248ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"proven" that the Rhine was best defended along the Vistula or that there existed any threat to peace except France. In this frame of mind the Cabinet considered the Polish dispute an irritating outgrowth of Continental rivalry, threatening a peace dearly won, and dealt with it primarily under the aspect of its impact on British domestic politics.

On October 14, Liverpool, the British Prime Minister, wrote Castlereagh that the "less Britain had to do with [Poland] . . . the better" and he transmitted a memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Vansittart, who simply denied the reality of the Russian danger. With the petulance of mediocrity convincing itself that the easy way out is also the course of wisdom, Vansittart argued that the absorption of Poland would add an element of weakness to the Russian state while proving conducive to British commerce.[13] Finally, on November 22, the Cabinet sent its first instructions to Castlereagh since his arrival in Vienna: "It is unnecessary," wrote Bathurst, "for me to point out to you the impossibility of . . . consenting to involve this country into hostilities . . . for any of the objects which have hitherto been under discussion at Vienna."[14]

Thus, at the crucial point in the negotiations, Castlereagh was deprived of his only means of exerting pressure and at a moment when the issue was becoming one of pure power. For Prussia was being drawn by Metternich's temporizing into precipitate action. As it observed its moral and material basis slipping away, its tone became increasingly bellicose. Its military were openly speaking of war and even the more moderate Hardenberg hinted at extreme measures. But if possession without legitimacy was illusory, legitimacy through force proved chimerical. Castlereagh was merely defining Prussia's dilemma when he told Hardenberg that "he [Hardenberg] could not regard an unacknowledged claim as constituting a good title and that he never could in *conscience* or *honor* . . . make the mere refusal of a recognition a cause of war. . . ."[15] In this situation Castlereagh did not propose to follow his Cabinet's instructions. To announce British disinterest would remove the major deterrent to war and, in its effort to guarantee peace, the Cabinet would have brought about what it feared most. Or else, a British withdrawal from the contest would have led to an Austrian surrender and to a complete overturn of the equilibrium.

So it happened that Castlereagh and Metternich found themselves on the same side in a battle whose moral framework had been defined

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 220ff. [14] *Ibid.*, pp. 247ff.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 255. December 7, 1814.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by the wily Austrian Minister. The more intransigent Prussia's attitude, the stronger became Metternich's position. Without the necessity for abstract discussion, Austria emerged as the protector of the secondary powers. When Metternich proposed an alliance to Bavaria and Hanover and the construction of a German League without Prussia, he was simply giving expression to a general consensus. It was at this point, when the last vestiges of the Alliance were disappearing, that Talleyrand reappeared on the scene. He emerged because Metternich put him on the stage and his eloquence was but a reflection of Metternich's desire for anonymity, for Metternich was not interested in appearing as the agent of Prussia's humiliation. It was Metternich's desire that events should come about "naturally," because that would minimize the danger of personal schisms; it was Talleyrand's effort that they should appear "caused," for that would cement his shaky domestic position.

Talleyrand was given his opportunity by Metternich, who communicated to him the Austrian note to Hardenberg and thus made clear that the Big Four had not been able to settle the issue.[16] Talleyrand replied in a trenchant memorandum, which asserted the superiority of the claims of legitimacy over the requirements of the equilibrium and denied the possibility of deposing kings, because sovereigns could not be tried, least of all by those who coveted their territories. It was not for Prussia to state what she would take, Talleyrand argued boldly, but for the "legitimate" King of Saxony to define how much he would yield.[17] It was a masterly summary of all the inconsistencies of two months of acrimony, but this was not its significance. Talleyrand had served France better by remaining "available" than by writing memoranda. The real importance of the exchange lay in the fact that France was once again part of the concert of Europe.

Only a short step separated Talleyrand from full participation in the deliberations. Castlereagh, who had hoped to avoid so drastic a step, finally agreed on December 27. When, on December 31, Castlereagh and Metternich proposed that henceforth Talleyrand participate in the meetings of the Big Four, it was clear that the special claims of the Alliance had ceased before Prussia had gained the fruits of its war effort. Even the Tsar, in Castlereagh's words, "would not advise Prussia to resist now that he has secured his own arrangement in Poland." Thus driven back on its last resources, Prussia threatened war.

[16] Clemens Metternich, *Aus Metternichs Nachgelassenen Papieren*, 8 vols., ed. by Alfons von Klinkowstroem, Vienna, 1880, *II*, pp. 503ff.

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 510ff., December 19, 1814; D'Angeberg, *op.cit.*, pp. 546ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But the reaction merely served to indicate Prussia's impotence. Castlereagh replied sharply that "such an insinuation might operate upon a power trembling for its own existence but must have the contrary effect upon all alive to their own dignity; and I added that if such a temper really prevailed, we were not deliberating in a state of independence and it was better to break up the Congress."[18] That same day, Castlereagh proposed a defensive alliance between France, Austria, and Britain. To be sure, Talleyrand was required to guarantee the Low Countries and to reaffirm the provisions of the Treaty of Paris. But Talleyrand's greatest achievement at Vienna was precisely this exhibition of self-restraint, this refusal to attempt to sell French participation in the alliance for a territorial advantage, an effort which would have united all the other powers against him. As a result he gained something more important, the end of the isolation of France and the real recognition of its equality.

If the defensive alliance provided the crisis of the Congress of Vienna, it also paved the way for its resolution. In any negotiation it is understood that force is the ultimate recourse. But it is the art of diplomacy to keep this threat potential, to keep its extent indeterminate, and to commit it only as a last resort. For once power has been made actual, negotiations in the proper sense cease. A threat to use force which proves unavailing does not return the negotiation to the point before the threat was made. It destroys the bargaining position altogether, for it is a confession not of finite power but of impotence. By bringing matters to a head, Prussia found itself confronted by three powers whose determination could not be doubted, although the treaty itself remained secret. And the Tsar proved a lukewarm ally. A series of partial settlements had isolated Prussia because "satisfied" powers will not fight for the claims of another, if an honorable alternative presents itself.

Castlereagh, therefore, took up the proposal of Metternich's memorandum of December 10 by which Prussia was to obtain part of Saxony and extensive territories in the Rhineland. It soon became apparent that Prussia would not carry out her threat of war. By January 3, 1815, after Metternich and Castlereagh had refused to negotiate without Talleyrand, Hardenberg, to save face, himself recommended Talleyrand's participation.[19] On January 5, Castlereagh could report that "the alarm of war is over."[20] The Saxon question was henceforth officially discussed by the now Big Five and was resolved largely

[18] Webster, *op.cit.*, p. 278, January 1, 1815.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 280. [20] *Ibid.*, p. 282.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

through unofficial negotiations in which Castlereagh played the role of the intermediary between Metternich and Talleyrand on the one side and the Tsar and Hardenberg on the other.

In his endeavor to achieve a final settlement, Castlereagh had to resist an attempt by Prussia to move the King of Saxony to the left bank of the Rhine and an effort by Austria to save the Elbe fortress of Torgau for Saxony. But with the aid of the Tsar, he convinced Prussia that in the interest of the European equilibrium she would have to assume the defense of the Rhineland, and he made clear to Austria that the defensive alliance extended only to an actual attempt to overthrow the European equilibrium, not to internal German arrangements.[21] The danger of war had also made the Tsar more pliable. When Castlereagh suggested some concessions in Poland in order to make the Saxon arrangement more palatable to Prussia, Alexander agreed to return the city of Thorn to Prussia. On February 11, a final agreement was reached. In Poland, Austria retained Galicia and the district of Tarnopol, while Cracow was constituted a free city. Prussia retained the district of Posen and the city of Thorn which controlled the upper Vistula. The remainder of the Duchy of Warsaw with a population of 3.2 million became the Kingdom of Poland under the Tsar of Russia. In Germany, Prussia obtained two-fifths of Saxony, Swedish Pomerania, much of the left bank of the Rhine, and the Duchy of Westphalia. Austria had already been assured compensation in Northern Italy and predominance in all of Italy through the establishment of dependent dynasties in Parma and Tuscany.

On June 9, 1815, the final acts of Vienna were ratified by Europe assembled in congress. It was the only meeting of the Congress of Vienna.

VI

There are two ways of constructing an international order: by will or renunciation, by force or legitimacy. For twenty-five years Europe had been convulsed by an effort to achieve order through force and to contemporaries its lesson was not its failure but its near success. Under Napoleon Europe had been unified from the Niemen to the Bay of Biscay but its cohesion was supplied by the power of the Grande Armée. It is not surprising, then, that in their effort to create an alternative the statesmen of Vienna looked back to a period which had known stability and that they identified this stability with its

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 295, January 29, 1815.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

domestic arrangements. Nor was this assessment as ludicrous as a self-righteous historiography made it appear later on. For one of the reasons which had impelled Napoleon ever further was his often repeated conviction that the survival of his dynasty in a world of "legitimate" monarchs depended on the success of his arms. In short, Napoleon confronted Europe with a revolutionary situation because he considered the unimpaired maintenance of the other sovereign states as incompatible with his own existence.

By contrast, one of the reasons for the success of the Vienna settlement was precisely the absence of such an ideological gulf. When a power considers the domestic notion of justice of another sovereign state a mortal threat to its own survival, no basis for negotiation exists. Safety can then only be found in physical extent; diplomacy is reduced to maneuvering for position and such adjustments as do occur have but a tactical significance: to prepare the ground for the inevitable showdown. This is not to say that domestic structures must be identical before meaningful negotiations can take place. It is enough that there exists no power which claims both exclusiveness and universality for its notion of justice. For diplomacy the art of relating powers to each other by agreement can function only when each major power accepts the legitimacy of the *existence* of the others.

In Vienna, of course, the consensus went further than this. There existed a general agreement about the nature of "just" domestic arrangements, which by limiting risks made for flexibility of relationship. The problem of relating a state's vision of itself to the vision of it by the powers, defined in the beginning as one of the key problems of an international settlement, was rarely simpler than at Vienna. This was the reason for the success—for the possibility—of "secret diplomacy," that intangibles were understood in the same manner. To be sure, the results of the Vienna Congress reflected to no small degree the skill of the diplomats in making use of their opportunity. Both Metternich and Castlereagh were extraordinary negotiators capable of shaping a conference to their ends: Castlereagh through his ability to reconcile different points of view and a singlemindedness which enabled him to keep discussions focussed on essentials; Metternich through the art of defining a framework which made concessions appear, not as surrenders, but as sacrifices to the common cause. But whatever the skill of the diplomats, the second reason for the success of the Congress is no less fundamental: that in the face of all protestations of friendship and of a real measure of ideological agreement the importance of power-relationships was never lost sight of. The con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

viviality of the statesmen must not obscure the fact that the European order emerged from the threat of war and the formation, however temporary, of two hostile alliances. The issue was decided not only by the persuasiveness of the statesmen but by the relative strength of the opposing camps.

The settlement proved all the more lasting because the negotiators at Vienna did not confuse the atmosphere of the conference table with the elements of stability of the international system. A statesman cannot make the survival of his charge entirely dependent on the continued good will of another sovereign state; not only because he has no control over the continuation of this good will, but more importantly because the best guarantee for its remaining good is not to tempt it by too great a disproportion of power. The Vienna settlement took into account this relationship of security and legitimacy. It did not rest on unsupported good faith, which would have put too great a strain on self-limitation; nor on the efficacy of a pure evaluation of power, which would have made calculation too indeterminate. Rather, there was created a structure in which the forces were sufficiently balanced, so that self-restraint could appear as something more than self-abnegation, but which took account of the historical claims of its components, so that it met general acceptance. No power felt so dissatisfied that it did not prefer to seek its remedy *within* the framework of the Vienna settlement rather than in overturning it. Since the international order did not contain a "revolutionary" power, either ideologically or in power terms, its relations became increasingly spontaneous, based on the growing certainty that a catastrophic upheaval was unlikely. The result was a century without a major war.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Decision making

CONCERNING STRATEGIES FOR A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS*

By HERBERT McCLOSKY

Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, *Decision-making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics,* Princeton, N.J., Foreign Policy Analysis Project, Princeton University, 1954, 120 pp.

Feliks Gross, *Foreign Policy Analysis,* New York, Philosophical Library, 1954, 174 pp. $3.75.

I

THE outsider who presumes to instruct specialists in the needs of a field which is theirs and not his is very like the bachelor who dares to lecture parents on the requirements of child-rearing: having learned everything secondhand, he is in frightful danger of talking nonsense and, what is worse, of thinking it sagacity.

Two things encourage me to undertake the risk: (1) The difficulties which beset the study of international politics do not seem to me peculiar to that field alone, but are encountered firsthand and in substantially the same form in other fields of which I have direct knowledge. (2) It is apparent from even a casual exposure to the field that its own practitioners are currently in a stock-taking mood in which they seem eager to scrutinize their own product and to have its value assessed. This mood of disquiet has also begun to express itself in proposals for new general approaches to the field, new areas of inquiry, new schemes for collating and analyzing data, explorations into questions once thought remote from the concerns of international politics, and other such developments signifying vitality and a lively spirit of inquiry. The two works which provide the occasion for this essay are items in point, but many others could be cited.

Any attempt to explain this development has, I think, to begin

* This paper has been written during the author's residence as a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, established by the Ford Foundation. Gratitude is hereby expressed to the Center for a unique opportunity to think about and inquire into such questions as this paper discusses, as well as other questions fundamental to the content and procedures of social science.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with the fact that many students of international affairs are troubled by their failure so far to achieve a more cumulative science—one in which they could build, increment by increment, upon an existing body of knowledge and a demonstrable set of laws. They find themselves with a "science" that has in each instance to face its oldest and most persistent problems as though for the first time, almost as though the long record of previous scholarship had failed to establish any guides whatever for handling these problems in their current form. Imagine, if you can, a natural science virtually bereft of established principles, one that has never in a systematic way plotted the characteristic relationships, the uniformities, and the variations present among the events the science is concerned to explain, so that each investigator has to begin anew, with no "laws" to draw upon and only an infirm base on which to anchor his efforts. With some allowance for the exaggerations arising from emphasis, this approximately describes the present state of the field of international relations and, I regret to say, my own field of political science as well.

It will not do to rejoin to this by asserting, as some do, that the study of international relations is not really a science and does not claim to be one. For it is plain that, like all the subdivisions of the social sciences, it implicitly presumes to be a science of sorts and, in a manner of speaking, it *is* one. In contrast to those lines of endeavor which, like theology and ethics, defy empirical handling, the study of international politics is unequivocally a field of empirical knowledge which attempts more or less rigorously, more or less systematically, to ascertain and relate certain facts about the behavior of men and/or their nation-states. Concerning these, it seeks to relate cause and effect and to discover demonstrable empirical explanations that will hold for all phenomena of certain specified characteristics. These are the concerns of an enterprise that hopes to be scientific, by whatever name it is called. The question which might better occupy the field's practitioners, then, is not so much whether the study of international politics is or is not a science, but whether, and how, it can become a more adequate one.

The present shortcomings of the field of international studies in part reflect the low level of scientific achievement in the social sciences generally, but it seems to me that it suffers, in addition, from certain difficulties which are especially evident among the so-called "documentary" disciplines. There is a tendency for the fields to be mainly concerned with the investigation of *individual* phenomena instead of *classes* of phenomena, treating events as though each of them were

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unique instead of searching out among them the uniformities and the parallels required for generalization. It is doubtful that very much of a science can emerge from a preoccupation with questions which attempt merely to describe, or to ascertain the causes of, single events. Questions concerning, say, the reasons for the Stalin-Hitler pact or the motives for the Chinese intervention in Korea may be fascinating, and important for many purposes. They may help to pile up great masses of data about the events in question and add vastly to our general store of knowledge about world affairs. But such questions do not usually move us far toward a systematic understanding of the classes of events of which they are instances. The data they elicit are largely of the anecdotal variety and would need to be drastically rearranged and set into more appropriate analytical categories before they could have much meaning for the development of a science. Furthermore, the habit of concentrating on the study of single events has the effect of emphasizing whatever is "special" and "different" about each of them and is likely to obscure the many respects in which the events are alike and could be compared for scientific purposes.

The disposition to be occupied with the "unique" and the "anecdotal" is reinforced by the field's habitual concern with history and the historical approach. While the historical approach has obvious value in its own right, it has the effect in this instance of diverting scholars from attempts to *test* theories or hypotheses in favor of efforts which merely "tell a story." Thus one learns that Professor A has "told the story of the United Nations," that Professor B has "told the story of the Nazi invasion of Poland," or that Professor C has "told the story of Chinese foreign policy from the Ming dynasty until the present." I do not cite such efforts in order to derogate them, but only to remark the fact that the piling-up of narratives will not in itself yield systematic knowledge about *classes* of events and hence may not contribute much to the growth of an "additive" science. Indeed, generalizations offered in consequence of those efforts may turn out to be worse than none at all, for although they are unwarranted by usual scientific criteria, they nevertheless appear to carry with them the warranty of solid historical scholarship. It is this as much as anything, perhaps, that allows improbable explanatory notions to hang on far longer than they otherwise might. Then, too, the narrative approach, with its opportunities for the arbitrary selection of data and its neglect of rules for establishing proof or refutation—beyond the criteria of historiography—often enables misleading "explanations" to survive

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

simply because no adequate tests are available for laying them to rest.

It often seems, too, that a great part of the study of international politics is given over to "descriptive" investigations that do not begin with questions of *any* sort, but only with topical headings under which great masses of information are bunched. Facts are collected about certain events or institutions, organizational structures are described, or incidents are recounted in detail with little regard for the purpose those efforts might serve or are intended to serve. Data are, of course, essential ingredients of any empirical science, but merely to gather them in quantity does not make a science. For that we need data ordered by questions and, preferably, by the theories and hypotheses those questions evoke. The habit of collecting facts and describing everything that falls within the range of a chosen topic produces scholars who are extremely knowledgeable but who can rarely offer anything better than intuitive "explanations" for the phenomena they observe. Astonishingly, they have never really troubled to develop explanations that are demonstrably more reliable.

It may be, too, that the progress of the field has been somewhat retarded by its heavy involvement with matters of public policy. This has encouraged several tendencies in the field, none of them likely to be of much value for science. One of these is the tendency to be primarily concerned with the normative questions of statecraft and to be forever busy with the tasks of justifying or condemning the actions of one or another of the several governments of the world. A second is the tendency to turn oneself into an information resource for policy, occupying oneself with what are essentially the tasks of reporting and interpreting recent international developments. A third is the tendency to become identified with some international reform or other (e.g., support for the U.N., world federalism, etc.), directing one's scholarship to what are really the functions of advocacy. However worthwhile these tendencies may be in their own right, they are likely to obscure goals that are intrinsic to a scholarly enterprise and to deflect energies from scientific pursuits to political ones.

Other such factors could be cited, but the point is sufficiently clear perhaps to require no further laboring: for several reasons arising mainly from the failure to assume a more scientific posture, the field of international studies has so far neglected to produce a significant body of valid generalizations and, *by the standards of science*, has far less to show for its many years of devoted labor than it should have. Apparently, it is with the hope of correcting this state of affairs that some members of the discipline have been turning their attention to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

new questions, new methods and approaches, and new ways of organizing, relating, and understanding the data with which the field has traditionally been concerned.

II

Not all the documents to which the current ferment in the field of international studies has given rise add much that is new to the discussion. The Gross proposal "to apply scientific thinking and concepts to foreign policy analysis" has its heart in the right place and will serve to remind us of some of the considerations we should take into account when engaged in research on foreign policy. Also, it is a useful restatement, in a fairly elementary form, of well-known principles of scientific method and reasoning. Beyond that, there is not a great deal to be said about it.

The publication of the Snyder, Bruck, Sapin volume on decision-making must, on the other hand, be counted among the most significant products of the present agitation in the field. Even those who disagree with its specific proposal for a decision-making focus in the study of international politics will, I think, be compelled to grant that it is a first-rate intellectual effort—intelligent, serious, thoughtful, honest, and willing to face up to the most troublesome questions to which the proposed scheme gives rise. The reader will find that there is no falling back here upon rhetoric, no refuge in the flashing phrase when the expository terrain is rugged and the problem of traversing it challenging. Almost invariably, the questions raised are followed through to their conclusion; the definitions attempted are carefully elaborated; and the propositions asserted are repeatedly qualified so as to state the authors' meaning precisely. The result is a solid intellectual product which, while well-written, makes no concessions to laziness and demands an attentive reader.

Even the critic who has decided from the outset that he can happily forego "decision-making as a focus" will find the volume worth the effort, for he will discover that it sets forth, especially in its early sections, a number of observations on the present state of the field that are as thoughtful and perceptive as any he is likely to encounter. He will find that a number of difficulties common to research in international affairs are cited and considered, among them the absence of a frame of reference for relating the several aspects of the field; the random nature of the search for important variables; the tendency to construct entire systems of explanation around single factors (e.g.,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

power); the lack of a clear definition of purpose and the consequent tendency for policy, empirical, value, and scientific questions to be thoughtlessly thrown together in the same investigation; the failure to make explicit the assumptions and concepts employed in research; the habit of confusing analytic and concrete structures; the preoccupation with questions that are not stated in researchable form, etc.

It is in the hope of overcoming precisely such difficulties, and of speeding progress toward a "cumulative" science, that the authors have come up with their proposal for a "decision-making focus." What the field has greatest need of, they are saying in effect, is some way to coordinate the intellectual efforts of its numerous practitioners, so that they can address themselves to a related set of problems, employing a common set of assumptions and concepts, collecting comparable sets of data, and applying common standards for testing the validity of their interpretations. In short, a common frame of reference is required which would make it possible to specify what data ought to be collected and how those data could most fruitfully be ordered.

The frame of reference they are proposing would make decision-making its central focus. It is not difficult to see why, of the many foci that might have been employed, they have hit upon this one. For one thing, decision-making is common to virtually all important actions in international politics. For another, it is usually a critical point in the process of international politics—a point of "input," where the several influences that have gone into the decision can be detected and their relative effectiveness measured; and a point of "output," where policies are unleashed and begin to register their effect on the course of international affairs. Furthermore, the decision-making unit is simple to identify and easy to locate; in the present scheme at least, it is considered to be the governing body which *officially* makes a given decision. It is the body or unit which, in relation to that decision, acts, so to speak, for the nation-state itself.

The matter becomes more complicated from here on, for many different variables have to be taken into account in assessing the influences on any particular decision. Psychological, social, and economic factors may need to be investigated, in addition to the usual political ones. For example, one would have to consider such matters as the internal and external *setting* (i.e., the various non-governmental factors, including the forms of social organization, the type of economy, the state of international conflict, etc.); the *situation* ("the pattern of relationships among events, objects, conditions and other actors organized around a focus which is the center of interest for the decision-makers");

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the *objectives* which the actors (decision-makers) desire to achieve by their decisions; the prevailing *policy* and the *rules* which govern its making, and so on.

These and other possible influences on decision-making can be handled, the authors suggest, through the elaboration of three major concepts, each of which is assumed (sic) to be an important determinant of decision-making actions. The first determinant is called *spheres of competence*, and is itself a complex notion. It refers to all of the activities of a decision-maker which are related and necessary to the achievement of the organization's objectives. The second determinant is *communication and information*, which has reference both to the system ("network") of communications by means of which information is channeled, and to the information (including meanings, values, and preferences) actually available to the actors at the time they make their decisions. The third is labeled *motivation*, a heading that is apparently meant to encompass a number of psychological, personality, and value factors which, via the actors, enter into the decision process and affect its outcome. I have considerably oversimplified all of these for purposes of clarity and communication, for each of the so-called determinants has numerous ramifications and is not, as one might think, a single, unidimensional "determinant" in the sense in which we are accustomed to employ that term. It would be more accurate to describe each of them as a complex cluster of variables, which, depending on one's imagination, could be proliferated even further. From these so-called determinants one would be led to a host of questions concerning such matters as the general setting in which a decision is made; the actors' perceptions of their roles and the actual authority they are free to exercise; the information, attitudes, and beliefs they bring to the decision-making event; the actors' views of the alternative choices and consequences; the actual and perceived goals of the organization and its actors; the personality, skills, and needs of the decision-makers; and dozens of other matters of a similar order.

It will immediately be evident that one would require a very large and multi-chambered "box" to contain the many varieties of data which have to be gathered for an analysis of even a single instance of decision-making. Speaking figuratively, what Snyder *et al.* have done in this volume is to construct such a "box," demarcating and labeling the several compartments into which data are to be sorted, and assigning each compartment to its appropriate location in the box. Occasionally they have ventured to suggest, albeit only tentatively, how the data of two or more of the compartments might be related to each

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other. For the most part, however, their offering might be described as more in the nature of a taxonomy than a theory (although a measure of theory is, of course, implicit even in a pure taxonomy). Presumably, with the "box" and its appropriately labeled slots already before him, the research worker who employs the device would not only be alerted to the kinds of data he would need, but he would also have guides for handling and ordering the great varieties of data he is likely to collect. Equally important—and here, I would guess, is what has chiefly prompted the authors to develop their scheme—by employing the decision-making focus and making use of the "box," a number of research workers, separately engaged in their own respective projects, could collect parallel sets of data, order those data in precisely the same way, and thereby force a measure of uniformity upon materials which, if handled without reference to a common framework, might appear to be hopelessly disparate. This in turn would make comparison, and hence generalization, possible.

Since there has been some confusion about the matter, I might point out—in the interests of clarifying just what it is we are being offered—that while the Snyder group has employed notions taken from other general systems of analysis (e.g., Parson's *action* system and Levy's *structure-functional requisite analysis*), they have not ventured in the present volume to develop a "general system" or "general theory" of their own. Before they could have very much of a "theory," they would need to specify far more about the decision-making process than they have. They would need, for example, to disclose some of the empirical propositions that could be derived from their scheme, setting forth in far more developed form the expected relationships among variables and the conditions under which certain named variables are likely to influence each other. As the proposal now stands, it includes few propositions which refer to the actual *content* of decision-making in international affairs, but has mainly to do with the *kinds* of data one would collect *if* one were to do research using the decision-making device. The authors themselves regard their present effort more as a *preparation* for a general theory which they someday hope to develop than as a present statement of a theory.

The notion seems to be abroad, too, that Snyder *et al.* have come up with a new single-motive explanation for the study of international behavior, an explanation comparable in its sweep and generality to the so-called "power analysis," for example. Nothing could be more mistaken. If anything, they have gone to the other extreme and have tried to evolve a scheme that would accommodate a great many of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the analytical categories now employed in the field. As I see it, "decision-making" is not in itself an explanatory concept (in the sense, for example, that *power, social class*, or *group membership* are explanatory concepts) but is mainly a point of focus through which such concepts could be related. Equally, the authors evidently believe that by concentrating on this focus they can integrate their colleagues' interests in such divergent matters as ideology, policy, organization, events, institutions, public opinion, law, and national character.

III

Some of the advantages that might possibly be gained from employing the Snyder, Bruck, Sapin frame of reference have already been suggested. I have cited the possibility, for example, that the use of the scheme might permit different investigators to coordinate their research efforts and tie together their multiple interests. If a number of scholars working in their own problem areas could be persuaded to employ the concepts and categories set forth in the proposal, ordering their findings in the ways that are prescribed, there is a possibility at least that parallel sets of data would emerge which could be compared and otherwise manipulated in the hope of eliciting valid generalizations. Hypotheses drawn from a decision-making model could be tested in a number of actual decision-making contexts; gaps in the existing state of knowledge could more easily be identified and corrected; and the individual investigator who may be unclear about the objectives his efforts are designed to accomplish would have on hand a prefabricated structure to help him direct and give greater meaning to his research.

The point is, I think, that schemes like this allow for the possibility of introducing a measure of order into a field which needs it badly and which, partly owing to its present disarrangement, is inclined to dissipate its energies on tasks that yield results of only transitory value. Such schemes compel anyone who employs them to adopt a more rigorous scientific posture and to proceed with greater awareness of the limits and possibilities of what one is doing. The insistence on the definition of key terms and on making concepts explicit and "operational" contributes to the same end. The scheme also proposes to delimit the areas of inquiry so that data might be gathered in a more economical manner and with greater assurance of their relevance. At a minimum, its adoption would in some measure serve to overcome

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the tendency to assemble great masses of data without regard to their significance for the important questions of the field.

Like most proposals for the application of a specified frame of reference, this one holds out the hope that it will generate fruitful theory and hypotheses where none were likely before. By concentrating effort on a single focus whose component elements have been identified and described, and by pooling the findings of many investigators who have acquired detailed knowledge about numerous decision-making experiences, enough could presumably be learned about the habitual patterns and variations in decision-making behavior to allow fairly refined theories to be created and their derivations to be tested. As observations steadily accumulate around the central set of problems outlined by the new focus, the opportunity to build empirically valid theory might very well exceed anything now known.[1]

The proposal for a decision-making focus may also serve as a heuristic device for stimulating interest in questions that go beyond the categories of explanation traditionally employed in studies of international affairs. Specialists in international studies have been showing an increasing interest in materials from sociology and social-psychology, and some of them have even undertaken to investigate questions concerning such esoteric (for them) matters as public opinion, patterns of communication, group interest and ideology, elite composition, and the like. The decision-making proposal not only reflects this trend but is likely to stimulate new explorations along the same lines. Without overthrowing the "institutional" framework so familiar in this field, it tries to cast the problems of international politics in a broader perspective so that new and possibly important variables can be taken into account. Eventually, perhaps, a decision-making model could be worked out that successfully bridges the gap between "institutional" and "behavioral" studies.

It might be worth noting, finally, that a scheme which could be applied to many contexts outside the sphere of international politics—one which could be used, as the authors suggest, in the study of *any* organization engaged in making decisions—has the obvious advantage of making possible some carry-over from one context to another. If the proposed frame of reference were adopted for use by scholars in

[1] It might be noted that there already exists a body of theory in the form of "game theory" which purports to handle decision-making in contexts of conflicting interests. Game theory might prove useful in helping to conceptualize certain strategic aspects of conflict situations, but it is cast in a form and proceeds at a level of abstraction that severely limit its utility for empirical research, especially for contexts like international decision-making, which are extremely complex.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

related fields, their findings would doubtless have direct significance for corresponding studies in international contexts. The possible benefit to be derived from such cross-disciplinary support could well turn out to be one of the most significant features of the entire proposal.

IV

Having said all this, I am obliged, regrettably, to point out another side of the story and to advise that there are other, less encouraging considerations which also have to be taken into account.

To begin with, the benefits to be gained from the use of the decision-making focus presuppose a more developed form of the scheme than anyone has yet worked out. Until a greater measure of theory is introduced into the proposal and the relations among variables are specified more concretely, it is likely to remain little more than a setting-out of categories and, like any taxonomy, fairly limited in its utility. A research worker casting about for some way to manage his subject matter more effectively may be reluctant to take up a scheme that tells him what data to collect and where to file it but not how to use it. He can hardly be expected to fuss with unfamiliar and difficult procedures unless he has reason to think that important or interesting consequences will result from their adoption. This difficulty is not insurmountable, of course, but neither is it easily corrected. There is still a considerable gap between the proposal as it stands and the set of working theories that need to be prepared if the new frame of reference is ever to mean much to the research worker in the field.

This is a fairly serious problem, for it is one of the unfortunate aspects of the decision-making device that its value especially depends, I think, on the frequency of its adoption. Many people have to be persuaded to employ it in order for parallel sets of data to be collected in sufficient number for meaningful comparisons to be made. There are some ways of working which might allow a single investigator to base low-order generalizations on the outcome of his own research alone, but the decision-making approach does not seem to be one of them. The survey worker, for example, can sometimes do this, for he can confine his efforts to the study of a single problem and in a single survey can gather thousands of instances of the one type of behavior he wishes for the moment to observe and generalize about. This situation is almost reversed for the scholar who employs the decision-making approach as outlined, since a study of any instance

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the phenomenon is so complicated, explores such an elaborate set of categories, and requires such an exhaustive set of data about that single instance, that the investigation of one decision-making event might very well take years to complete. If, therefore, the number of cases is ever to become large enough to be useful for scientific purposes, it will be necessary for a great many investigators to put the scheme into effect. Failing this, I do not see that using a decision-making focus in isolated studies would yield much gain over the present state of affairs. The study of one or a few decision-making events is not likely to disclose anything more startling than we already get from any other study of unique events.

The inordinate complexity of the scheme as it has so far been outlined is unquestionably its greatest shortcoming, one which in the end may prove its undoing. Whatever is gained by concentrating on a single framework is quickly lost by the attempt to accommodate every variable that may possibly have influence, however minor, on the outcome of a decision. A research design that requires an investigator to collect detailed information about such diverse matters as the social system, the economy, the foreign situation, the actors, the perceptions, the motivations, the values, the goals, the communication problems, the personality—in short, that asks him to account for a decision-making event virtually *in its totality*—places a back-breaking burden upon him, one that he could never adequately accomplish even if he were willing to invest an exorbitant effort. If the mere magnitude of the task does not frighten him off, he is likely to be discouraged by the unrewarding prospect of having to collect data about a great number of variables whose relative importance he can only guess at and whose influence he cannot easily measure in any event. What he faces in effect is a situation in which everything is treated as a variable, in which neither the conditions nor the constants are specified or, alternatively, left to chance.

The main difficulty here is once again the absence of theory and the consequent lack of guides for deciding, if only on intuitive grounds, which variables are likely to pay off and which ones are unlikely to do so. My own, possibly perverse, guess would be that the most exotic variables are not likely to produce much payoff and could safely be set aside, at least to begin with. I doubt, for example, that personality factors are going to account for much of the variance in the character of international decisions, especially if the decisional unit is regarded as a governing organization. Similarly, I have yet to be persuaded that an intensive study of the "networks of communication" within de-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED.

cisional units is likely to account for much of the difference between, say, decisions that lead to war and those that lead to peace. Even if there are international contexts in which personality and communication factors play an important role (and doubtless there are such), the research worker should have good reason to suppose that decision-making is one of those contexts before he takes on the difficult job of collecting the masses of data appropriate to those factors.

My point is the rather simple one that it would seem to me wise, considering the limitations on our resources and the impossibility of learning *everything* about an event anyway, to place our bets on those few variables we have reason to believe can account for the greatest amount of the variance in any given set of events. If, for example, I were studying the phenomenon of aggression among nations, I would be far better advised to investigate the ideologies of "aggressive" and "non-aggressive" states than to concentrate, say, on the diapering habits or the patterns of authority in the family structures of the several nations. Even in this extreme instance I might guess wrong, of course, but I would at least have come in to the game with the odds in my favor. I might adopt another alternative and proceed in a purely random search for the significant variables, but this too would likely prove uneconomical, and I would doubtless be better off to collect data according to some initially plausible theory or set of theories. If I attempted to handle *all* the possible influences, I might find myself in the toils of an infinite regression, for I would soon discover that, having neglected to prescribe limits, all relations and causes were forever being shifted, in appropriately translated form, from one set of explanations to another. Similarly, by failing to discriminate between the relative power of the innumerable variables that are in play, I would find that I had unwittingly gone full circle and had returned to that formless and haphazard state from which the scheme was supposed in the first place to have extricated me.

One does not effectively meet this objection by reciting the exceptional instances in which factors like personality seem to have been important, and by contending that one cannot afford, therefore, to overlook any bets. As we have said, a good theory not only specifies the variables to be considered and the relations among them, but, equally, the conditions under which those variables will evoke their predicted consequences. To put the point in its most simple-minded form (it is so obvious that it is habitually ignored), no variable is more important for a given analysis than the amount of measurable influence it actually exerts. What might score at a value of .50 in one

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

set of conditions may be valued at .01 in another. Some factors will be found to be significant under most, if not all, conditions in which a given phenomenon occurs, and these, of course, should be taken into account at all times. Others, however, are likely to be largely idiosyncratic, scarcely worth the effort it would take to track them down.

One must also be alert to possible dangers inherent in any effort to achieve a uniform focus in a field that is still in its early stages of development. There is the possibility, for one thing, that the wholesale adoption of a given scheme may foreclose for a time the use of other devices that might have proven themselves more fruitful. The likelihood of this is less real, however, than the danger that certain questions which are vital to the field will be dropped from consideration because they cannot readily be fitted into the prescribed framework. There are questions that a decision-making focus cannot really handle or can only handle clumsily. Many problems that I would take to be central to the study of international politics—e.g., the relation of geography to policy; of forms of government to militarism; of ideology to aggressiveness; of population and economic pressures to imperialism, etc.—might well be managed more effectively by a framework other than decision-making. In offering a single design for research, one introduces a risk that problems will be selected less for their intrinsic interest or their significance for the field than for their adaptability to the devices of the all-important scheme. This version of the Procrustean fallacy may sap the vitality of certain questions by forcing them into a mold they cannot fit, and of certain other questions by denying them a chance to be dealt with in a manner that for them would be most effective. The greatest investment tends, in short, to rest in the instrument—often at the expense of the object. These difficulties are likely to be intensified whenever the scheme exhibits a tendency to ring in many new types of variables. When this happens, the investigator may find himself moving even further away from the traditional questions which have until now defined the field and given it its character.

Some of these difficulties, as I have suggested, might be reduced or might even disappear if a greater measure of theory were to be introduced into the proposal. By this, however, I did not have in mind a so-called "general theory," for that is vulnerable to many of the criticisms already cited, and its adoption would doubtless add further problems. It requires, I think, quite a presumption to believe that one can leap from a state of affairs in which tested, valid generalizations are remarkably scarce to a full-blown system of sound, or at least

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

meaningful, generalizations about the entire range of events that enter into the study of international politics. Any such *a priori* effort, however brilliant, is likely to be as unfruitful as most of its predecessors have been and I would hope that Snyder and his colleagues would save their considerable gifts for more promising tasks.

The need, in my opinion, is for *limited* theory, developed in a context of research on significant questions and drawn, as Antaeus' strength was drawn, from contact with the earth itself. Again, this is partly a matter of where one places his bets. For myself, I would be inclined to wager that intellectual and scientific progress will be speeded far more by a preoccupation with specific, concrete problems in which one has developed a thirsting curiosity than by a concern to act out in a research project the requirements of a large, unwieldy, and all-encompassing "general system." The two are not mutually exclusive, of course, but the fact remains that the investment of energy in the one is likely to discourage involvement in the other.

One can understand the desire among social scientists for a "system" or "theory" that does for their respective disciplines what Newton's "mechanics" once did for physics. Considering, however, that even biology and other natural sciences have never achieved anything comparable, the search for a great unifying theory for the social sciences strikes me as a pursuit of the will-o'-the-wisp. To be sure, there is no exclusive road to scientific "salvation" and it could even turn out that the "general systems" route will prove the shortest and most scenic. So far, however, while several such routes have been mapped, no one has successfully traveled them and shown that they in fact lead to the destination claimed. Until someone does, the rest of us might be well advised to stay with more familiar routes, widening them where necessary, improving their surfaces, and eliminating their more severe hazards so that we might proceed along them with greater security and confidence. The Snyder, Bruck, Sapin proposal, if represented in its less grandiose form, i.e., as one of several possible ways for guiding and ordering the collection of data in order to test specific hypotheses, is a not unfamiliar route. Considered in this perspective, its potential value is very great indeed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE FALL OF CHINA

By FRANZ MICHAEL

Ssu-yü Teng and John K. Fairbank, *China's Response to the West, A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923,* Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954, 296 pp. $6.75.

Allen S. Whiting, *Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1954, 350 pp. $5.50.

Robert C. North, *Moscow and Chinese Communists,* Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1953, 306 pp. $5.00.

Werner Levi, *Modern China's Foreign Policy,* Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1953, 399 pp. $5.50.

Max Beloff, *Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944-1951,* London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1953, 278 pp. $4.00.

THE Communist conquest of China has been the topic of a heated American debate. This debate has been concerned mainly with American politics, and has often been based more on opinion than on knowledge and has dealt more with political argument than with historical fact. The result has been a good deal of confusion and of misinformation, which is always hard to eradicate. However, as we gain more perspective on the events of the Chinese tragedy, it is becoming possible to reconstruct the basic story of the fall of China.

This story cannot be understood merely by tracing Chinese postwar developments: the moves of the Chinese Communists, the obvious weaknesses of the National government, the question of American support to the Nationalist side, and of aid given by the Russians to their fellow Communists. These developments have to be seen against the double background of world Communism and the modern history of China. The Communist victory in China is but one case of a world-wide struggle, the special problems of which must be examined within the setting of the Communist system, its general aims, its strategy and tactics, its use of dogma, and its inner conflicts. This struggle took its special course in China because of certain conditions which made her particularly vulnerable to the Communist onslaught. These conditions were the result of a transformation which began about a hundred years ago and which led to an attack against her whole cultural tradition. More than that, while other Asian countries have also been in the process of transformation brought about by the advent of Western civilization, the case of China has been unique; for the overthrow of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the traditional value-system of Confucianism has no parallel in other Asian cultures.

The traditional society of imperial China was dominated by an educated elite, the literati, or the scholar-gentry. The scholar-gentry was the stratum from which the official bureaucracy was drawn, but as the leading social class it also managed the many public affairs with which the government could not concern itself or for which it needed more personnel than its limited official staff could provide. The scholar-gentry based its position on a mastery of Confucian learning, which was designed to equip its students with an ethical code, a knowledge of human relations, and the literary skills necessary to manage the agricultural society of a vast country. This elite had in fact a monopoly on education and was the propagator and guardian of the Confucian ideology which gave Chinese society its moral cohesion. Of decisive importance to the fate of China was "The way in which the scholar-official class of China, faced with the aggressive expansion of the modern West, tried to understand an alien civilization and take action to preserve their own culture and their political and social institutions."[1]

The reaction of China's leading class to the Western impact is the topic of a study, *China's Response to the West*, by Ssu-yü Teng and John K. Fairbank, which surveys the period from the Opium War to Sun Yat-sen's alliance with the Soviet Communists. It is a documentary collection of the views of Chinese intellectual leaders on problems created when the advent of the West challenged the whole Chinese order. From Commissioner Lin Tse-hsü, who already understood the lessons of Western military superiority and directed the Chinese resistance against the import of opium that led to the Opium War, to Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, an outstanding writer of the early twentieth century who was one of the leaders of the Chinese Reform Movement, a large number of Chinese scholars and officials indicated their concern about the imminent dangers and far-reaching implications for China's society inherent in the coming of the West. This book contains a selection of statements representing a whole scale of opinion, from an early willingness to accept Western technical innovations to eventual readiness to adapt Chinese tradition to the needs of a Westernized world or to abandon it altogether.

The attitude of Chinese scholars and officials toward the West went through several stages. At first the military victories of the Western

[1] Teng and Fairbank, *op.cit.*, p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

powers brought a realization of Western military superiority. In order for the Chinese to be able to produce arms and naval vessels that could compete with those of the West, it was necessary to understand their manufacture and to establish modern arsenals and shipyards in China. A determination to retain military independence motivated the attempts at "self-strengthening" which were made by a new group of Chinese provincial leaders in the second half of the nineteenth century.

At the end of the century, it was demonstrated by the defeats of the Sino-Japanese War that Westernization had to go deeper, and the struggle began between those who wanted to bring about institutional changes through the reform of Confucianism and those who wanted to discard the whole Chinese tradition and begin anew. The reformers lost out, and when, in the Chinese Revolution of 1911, the old order crumbled, a period began in which nearly every Western philosophical school found its disciples in China. But many of them influenced only a small academic coterie, and the main effect of this period of ferment was to prepare the ground for the acceptance of a new doctrinal system which would provide a way out of the confusion. This new doctrine was Communism, which claimed to possess the scientific answers to the problems of the day.

These stages of Chinese reaction to the West provide a natural chronology for the documentary survey by Teng and Fairbank, which through an excellent selection of material makes available in English the most important documents of each period and each point of view, providing a kaleidoscopic picture of this fateful ideological development. The issue was whether the Chinese heritage was to be reinterpreted in the light of modern conditions or totally rejected. In the end, not only the imperial state but also the Confucian tradition of Chinese society was altogether abandoned.

The question why this total rejection occurred has not been directly posed in *China's Response to the West*, and no definite answer is suggested. The title of the book and the authors' commentary seem to imply that the end of the Confucian order resulted from the "corrosive influence of Western power and Western ideas." One may ask, however, whether the inner logic of its development had not brought the Confucian order to a point of decline where a new beginning would have been necessary even without the destructive Western influence. As it was, Confucianism had become so formalized and so closely allied to the imperial state that the fall of the Chinese monarchy brought with it the disintegration of Confucian institutions. In fact, when the Confucian examination system was given up in 1905, the whole system

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Confucian education was abolished and with it the scholar-gentry, so that the end of the Confucian tradition came a few years before the fall of the monarchy. There was no other set of beliefs to take its place. In the words of the authors, "It may be that the weakening of the ethical basis of the Confucian State was not compensated by a firm establishment of Western legal institutions, and that China has been left somewhere in between" (pp. 2-3). One should add that a legal system in itself can never take the place of ethics, but only give them a normative expression.

The struggle for a synthesis between Chinese tradition and the West finds expression in the words of the reformer Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, who regarded "The Renovation of the People as the First and Most Urgent Matter for China Today" (p. 221); but who said that his "'new people' are not those who are intoxicated with Western customs, despising the morals, academic learning, and customs of our several-thousand-year-old country in order to keep company with others; nor are they those who stick to old paper and say that merely embracing the several thousand years of our own morals, academic learning, and customs will be sufficient to enable us to stand up on the great earth" (p. 223). Liang especially warned against an uncritical acceptance of Western civilization, whose bankruptcy had been revealed to him by the events of the First World War. But his attempt at synthesis, like that of others, was swept away by the new schools of Western learning, among which Hu Shih's pragmatism took a leading place for a time, but which included almost all contemporary schools of Western thought. The ideas of the men of this period are suggested, for example, by the statements made in 1919 by Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei, an academic leader and president of Peking University, whose position on freedom of thought in universities strikes a sympathetic chord: "Regardless of what schools of academic thought there may be, if their words are reasonable and there is a cause for maintaining them, and they have not reached the fate of being eliminated by nature, then even though they disagree with each other, I would let them develop in complete freedom . . ." (p. 238). But when it came to defining the aims of education, he saw as its highest goal the cultivating of an appreciation of esthetic values.

This survey ends with the coming of Communism. It is a pioneer effort in what the authors call the "psycho-ideological approach," which "studies the ways in which modern Chinese have sought to create new systems of value and belief to replace the no longer adequate ideology of the disintegrating traditional order" (p. 275). It does not really

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cover or even concern itself with the central issue of the disintegration of Confucian culture, but it indicates some of the chief manifestations of the thought of the Chinese living in those confused years and the stages of decline which created the ideological void in which a new doctrine could prosper.

The actual story of the coming of Communism to China leads us back to Soviet Russia and Soviet policies in China. The formation of Soviet policy and its original cleavages and contradictions are the subject of a new study, *Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924*, by Allen S. Whiting.

Soviet Far Eastern policy takes its origin from Lenin's writings. His classic *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, completed just before the Russian Revolution, provided the strategy and theoretical justification for the exploitation of anti-colonialism and Eastern nationalism for the purposes of Communist world revolution. This well-known strategy did not solve the inner contradiction between the Soviet support of nationalist movements and the maintenance of a policy of Soviet self-interest and imperialism. The first indication of this contradiction came with the Karakhan Manifesto of July 25, 1919; in this statement, the Soviet government, through its Foreign Affairs Commissar, promised to return to China without compensation the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria and all economic concessions which had formerly been held by the Tsarist government. Later, when Bolshevik rule had been consolidated and Soviet power reestablished in the Far East, the Soviet government denied having made this promise and followed a policy of combining her own territorial interests with the support of nationalism in China. Mr. Whiting has traced the story of this original promise and its refutation as an illustration of the difficulties of reconciling the dual interests of Soviet policy. The author offers important quotations from Lenin's theses on the United Front and the possibility of having in Asia a short-cut in the stages prescribed for social development by Marxist doctrine, as well as Communist statements on the agrarian revolution in China. He traces the events of the Comintern Congresses in Russia and of the various Soviet missions to China that led to the agreement between Joffe and Sun Yat-sen and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1924. The book is useful for its documented description of the inner conflicts on the Soviet side. But it does not deal with the status of the Chinese Communists within the Communist organization, nor does it clarify the process of Communist development in China. The author states that, in contrast to Marx's theory of the leadership of the revolution by

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the proletariat in the most advanced industrial countries, "it was the workers and peasants of backward Russia who first achieved the Socialist state, and their success was carried further in Asia by the peasant masses of China" (p. 10). This statement is misleading, as are other statements on "turbulent, peasant-dominated China." Not even the Communists claim that "the Socialist State" has been achieved in China; and if it was peasant discontent which the Communist Party organization exploited in its strategy, the peasants themselves never assumed leadership nor were their aims the aims of the Communist revolution. The misconceptions in this and other hurried statements are all the more regrettable because the ghost of the peasant rebellion in China has not yet been laid, and it continues to mislead those with little knowledge of the facts of the Chinese political situation.

The same weakness—fundamentally a weakness of nomenclature—mars a book which otherwise is an important attempt to view the Communist moves in China within the framework of a program of revolutionary strategy and tactics developed by and derived from the Bolshevik leaders in Russia. Robert North in his *Moscow and the Chinese Communists* is trying to describe at the outset of his study "the tactical code developed by early Bolsheviks and designed to guide their actions toward other governments and peoples." Since Soviet Russia plays the double role of a state accepted by the international order and the headquarters of an international conspiracy for world revolution, Soviet leaders have to maintain an elasticity of policy that permits concessions and tactical retreats, alliances and cooperation, and sudden shifts in line, yet all these moves must be justified under a theory which supposedly maintains harmony between them and the Communist doctrine of world history and world revolution. In the parlance of Stalin, there is a "science of leadership in the class struggle of the working class." Robert North describes the main principles of this "science" of Bolshevism as it has been applied to the East. In it Lenin's ideas on the use of the "masses" of colonial and semi-colonial countries play a large role, as does his idea of a Communist alliance with the "bourgeois-liberation" movements in these countries. Within this framework of exploitation of all local political cleavages and aspirations, a code of strategy and tactics left Communist leaders the greatest leeway in using any given situation in whatever way they saw fit and in squaring whatever they did with the allegedly scientific theory they were using. In practice, success or failure was decisive in determining whether the Communist leader in charge had been a "rightist" or

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"leftist deviationist" or had correctly applied the line provided by the chiefs of the Communist Party.

North lists the three primary strategic objectives of Communist colonial policy stated in the proceedings of the Second Congress of the Comintern: to organize discontent and subversion within the capitalist countries through local Communist parties; to exploit antagonisms and foment new conflicts between "imperialist" powers; and to drive a wedge between imperialist countries and their "colonies and semi-colonies," drawing the latter into the Communist camp. All weapons of political warfare were used as means to carry out this strategy, and North quotes the three particularly stressed by Lenin: the tactical retreat; the tactical compromise; and the exploitation of existing antagonisms within the enemy's ranks. These and other techniques were applied on many levels in the Far East, where the Communists used to their advantage all cleavages and discontents on an international as well as on a Chinese social level. North finds that "while aiming to win over the working class and the peasantry, for example, *Bolshevik agents in China went first to the intellectuals and brought numbers of them into the Communist camp as leaders. . . .* With an elite corps of Bolshevik-trained intellectuals, the Communist movement could speak to Chinese professional and business men, shopkeepers, soldiers, students, and peasants, not through suspicious-looking foreigners, but through local Chinese. . . . *Bolshevik leaders put the Communist Party forward as the champion of what was most wanted by the groups they sought to influence*" (p. 28). They sought to polarize opinion, destroy middle groups, and contrast their own stand for "freedom, democracy, peace," etc., with the "camp of the enemy." They "often won support by equating—under appropriate circumstances—non-Communist principles with concepts that are strictly Communist." Infiltration, front organizations, the misuse of civil liberties—all these are employed as Communist weapons to destroy opposition and to seize power. This is the framework of Communist operation within which Communist strategy in China has to be understood. On this basis, Mr. North follows in detail the complexity of Chinese political events from the first Soviet overtures to the latest moves of the new Chinese Communist regime, and ends with an expression of his own ideas on a line of action for the West.

For this detailed story of Communist policy, Mr. North has used the rich resources of the Hoover Library, uncovering new data which were supplemented by interviews with leading former Communists, such as M. N. Roy and Chang Kuo-t'ao. The events between 1931 and 1934,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

important years of Mao's rise to power, are shown in a new light; and yet this book does not clarify the question of the relationship between Moscow and the Chinese Communists. This may be partly due to the difficulty of obtaining reliable information, since this relationship has naturally been kept secret by the parties concerned and only fragments of the picture have been revealed by former members of the Party. But it is also partly the result of the author's lack of thorough analysis of the early role of Mao Tse-tung as a Party member working within the framework of the Comintern directives; and Mao's first organization of a peasant revolt, the so-called Autumn Crop Uprising, is only briefly mentioned. Mao's own version that his venture was not sanctioned by the Party contradicts other Communist sources, and even Mao does not claim that it was contrary to the Party line. He had followed the peasant policy of the Party before, and was disciplined only because of his failure and the false hopes he had raised. North's argument that Mao's peasant policy was in contradiction to Communist doctrine or to the Party's strategy or tactics does not emerge from the author's own material.

North is entirely misleading, however, when he repeatedly speaks of Mao as the "peasant leader" and of the Communist troops as the "peasant armies." The hard core of these armies came from the group trained in Canton in the Whampoa Academy, where Chiang Kai-shek's armies originated, and, in fact, the Communist units had originally been a part of the Nationalist forces. The fact that the Communist armies were enlarged by recruiting from the peasantry does not make them any more or less peasant armies than the Nationalist troops with which they are contrasted and which drew their recruits from the same source. That the Communists had a land policy which in different forms favored the small peasants does not alter the fact that the Communists and not the peasants commanded the army. The term "peasant armies" implies an expression of the peasant will and peasant control which obviously did not exist, and the term "peasant leader" implies a man who represents the peasants rather than the Communist Party and its policies. The standing of Mao within the Communist Party organization and his own rise to power could have been analyzed more clearly if this unfortunate emphasis had not interfered. This reviewer doubts that Mao's actions contradicted "—in practice—some of the most fundamental dogmas of Marx and Lenin." If Marxian theory and Communist dogma have moved considerably apart, this is not the result of Mao's actions, which do not conflict with Lenin's theories and strategic concepts, not to mention Stalin's. There

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was no dogmatic objection to the emphasis on the exploitation of peasant discontent, nor did Mao ever give up the fiction that the Chinese Communist Party represented the vanguard of the working class rather than the peasants.

The new Communist regime in China soon faced a problem similar to that faced by the Soviet government—namely, reconciling the policy of a state government with that of Communist leadership in Asia. The foreign policy of the new Chinese regime is bound to show strains similar to those which the foreign policy of the Soviet Union has undergone; and the conflicts will be interesting to watch and may offer opportunities for exploitation by Western diplomacy. This dualism and the theoretical justification it requires are described in a study on *Modern China's Foreign Policy* by Werner Levi. This book is an attempt "to analyze and interpret Chinese foreign policy, both in the course of its development over the past century or so and in its present-day manifestations" (p. 1). The focus was meant to be on China. The great handicap of the author in his attempt is his failure to use Chinese sources, which would appear to be essential for a study of this type, even though he explains that his purpose is to give an analysis rather than a description of events. The limitation to the use of Western-language material is not so critical, however, in the discussion of the theory and practice of Communist foreign policy which forms the second part of the book. For this period, available sources are as yet limited and, of those at hand, a comparatively high percentage has been rendered into Western languages or described in them. This enables the author to give the main outlines of the Communist foreign policy in its "bid for Asian leadership"; he stresses the double character of Chinese foreign policy, which attempts to promote its own imperialism and at the same time to propagate the Communist revolution. This revival of a Great China policy has a strong attraction for some Chinese minority groups abroad and makes the Communist regime appear more acceptable to them.

This new Chinese Communist policy of expansion gives urgency to the question of the relationship of the Communist Chinese to the Soviet leadership. Max Beloff's *Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944-1951*, is a cautious and well-documented study of the period between the Yalta Conference and the Japanese peace treaty. This is a sober book which gives a carefully balanced evaluation of the Soviet moves during this decisive period in China, Inner Asia, Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia. The focus remains on China and on the question of the relationship of the Chinese Communist regime to Moscow. The author stresses

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the fact that there is "hardly any material from the Soviet side to illustrate the relations between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists in the post-war period until the formal recognition in October 1949 of the Chinese People's Government" (p. 2).

In discussing Soviet policy, Beloff finds that in spite of all the Soviet theory about political strategy, there existed no "single master plan" for expanding Soviet control in the Far East. Soviet policy had an element of opportunism and "Soviet statesmen were as likely to make mistakes in their appreciation of concrete situations as their Western competitors, and in some respects more likely to do so" (p. 2). Beloff stresses that while the lines of Soviet advance in the Far East were substantially dictated by the same geographical factors that determined Tsarist policies, the purpose and the method of Soviet policy were obviously different. Soviet coalition policy in China has to be interpreted "in the light of what has happened in coalitions elsewhere between Communist and non-Communist elements," and yet the Chinese Communists cannot be treated as the same type of "mere agents of Soviet purposes" as the Communists of European countries.

In the relationship between Moscow and the Chinese Communists, Manchuria plays a key role. Manchuria is of vital importance as a source of food for the Soviet Far East and as the most industrialized area within Chinese borders. Beloff thinks it quite likely that at the time of the Soviet invasion at the end of the war, when the Manchurian industrial equipment was taken and shipped to Soviet Russia, the Soviet government did not expect a Communist victory in China in the near future. He agrees with Fitzgerald that the Soviet policy could be explained by Russia's desire to deny to the Kuomintang as an ally of the United States the industrial equipment of Manchuria. On the other hand, if Soviet Russia aimed at aiding the Communists to a quick victory in Manchuria, or even China, Stalin made sure by looting Manchuria of its potential that "the triumphant Chinese Communists would be dependent on Russia and could not break away and stand on their own feet" (p. 247, quoted from Fitzgerald, *Revolution in China*, p. 94).

With all the potential inner rivalries in the Soviet-Chinese Communist camp, Beloff does not believe that Soviet-Chinese unity is likely to be superficial or transient. Such a view was held "mainly by students of China alone who, having made an inadequate study of Communism in its original setting, were prepared to maintain that the Chinese variety owed much less than it did to the Soviet model. More cautious students were content to note that Mao Tse-tung himself had the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unique distinction of having been allowed to introduce elements of his own into Communist theory and to be, along with Stalin, the only Communist in the world to have enjoyed such a privilege since Lenin's death" (p. 258), which gave him an enormous prestige in the Communist world. But Beloff also expects that the backwardness of Communist China's economy will guarantee her subordination to the Soviet Union for a long time to come.

Beloff's belief that Communist strategy was pieced together and made use of opportunities as they arose leads us back to the opportunity which the Communists had in China. The fall of China to the Communists was the result of the collapse of a civilization and an ensuing chaos in which the attempts at reestablishing order, interrupted by the war, were too weak to stem the Communist tide.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DEMOCRACY IN WORLD POLITICS

BY LESTER B. PEARSON

Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, former president of the UN General Assembly, here writes from years of experience as a key spokesman for the West to explore the problems which the democracies must overcome to win the peace in today's uncertain world. He points the way to solutions in considering the new scale of force in atomic warfare, international coalitions, the mediating role of the UN, open diplomacy versus secret diplomacy, and the international forces that determine the policies of Western nations.

136 pages. $2.75

THE CHALLENGE OF LAW REFORM

BY ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT

Drawing on his wide background as a leader in law reform, the well-known Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court lashes out at many of our present legal practices, which have failed to cope with crime and which encourage public apathy and delays in the administration of justice. He explains the crying need for reform, the importance of judicial administration in avoiding delays, the problem of obtaining better judges and jurors, and the necessity to streamline legal procedures. He concludes with an eloquent plea for modernizing substantive law, and shows how law schools can contribute to the major task of modern lawmaking.

204 pages. $3.50

Order from your bookstore, or

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, Princeton, New Jersey

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Swiss Review of World Affairs

A monthly publication of the Neue Zürcher Zeitung

Each month, the Swiss Review of World Affairs presents a selection, in English, of some of the basic articles published in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, leading newspaper of the Continent of Europe. Five dollars fifty cents per year. Airmailed from Zurich to all parts of the world. In the United States, address subscription orders and payments to Credit Suisse, 25 Pine Street, New York 5, N. Y.

in the Winter issue of

THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

THE BIRTH OF THE MOROCCAN NATION
Marvine Howe, since 1950 a resident of Morocco where she has been a reporter, radio broadcaster and author

THE BATTLE OF AZERBAIJAN
Robert Rossow, Jr., former U.S. Vice-Consul in Tabriz, and an eye-witness to the "opening engagement in the Cold War"

ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN AN ENCIRCLED LAND
Peter G. Franck, former economic adviser to the government of Afghanistan, the "encircled land" of the article

ADMINISTRATION AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT IN ARABIA: THE PRINCIPALITIES OF THE PERSIAN GULF
Herbert J. Liebesny, who has based his article in large part upon research carried out during a visit to the area in the summer of 1954

$1.50 PER COPY **$6.00 PER YEAR**

THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE • 1761 N ST., N.W.
WASHINGTON 6, D.C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

An American Quarterly Devoted to Russia Past and Present

TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOL. XV, NO. 1, JANUARY 1956

Articles

Soviet Nationality Policy ..... H. Seton-Watson
The Early Days of Russian Railroads ..... Valentine Tschebotarioff Bill
America's Strategic Weakness—Redefection ..... Frank R. Barnett
Reminiscences of the February Revolution (Part Four) ..... Irakli Tseretelli
Soviet Propaganda and the Rebellious Artist ..... Ludmilla B. Turkevich
Note on the Soviet Slave Labor Reform of 1954-55 ..... Bertram D. Wolfe

Book Reviews

Subscription, $5.00 a year, single copies $1.25.
Discount 25% to graduate students and college and university faculty members.

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

235 Baker Library **Hanover, N. H.**

INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE BULLETIN

UNESCO

Published Quarterly by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 19 Avenue Kléber, Paris 16e.

Just issued: Vol. VII, No. 3

EVALUATION TECHNIQUES
METHODS AND RESULTS—AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACH

Contributors to this issue: E. Barnitz, E. Beaglehole, M. Jahoda, O. Klineberg, W. Maslow, K. M. Miller, L. Moss, C. Selltiz, M. Brewster Smith, C. R. Wright.

Organization in the Social Sciences—Terminology—Reviews of Documents, Periodicals and Books—News and Announcements

Open Forum:

The Uses of the Law in the Struggle Against Bigotry, by Will Maslow

Annual subscription: $3.50; per copy: $1.00

Send subscriptions to:

U.S. Distributor:

UNESCO PUBLICATIONS SERVICE

475 Fifth Avenue, New York 17, N.Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Invaluable to everyone interested in the development and continuing problems of organized international relations.
Recent issues contain:

Board of Editors
Rupert Emerson, **Chairman**
Raymond Dennett
William Diebold, Jr.
William T. R. Fox
Edgar S. Furniss, Jr.
Leland M. Goodrich
H. Field Haviland, Jr.
Joseph E. Johnson
Grayson L. Kirk
Norman J. Padelford
Walter R. Sharp
Kenneth W. Thompson
Robert Triffin
Richard Van Wagenen
Bryce Wood

Articles on the Colombo Plan, NATO, UN Charter Review, the Soviet Union in ECOSOC, and the International Court of Justice,

Summaries of the activities of the UN and major regional and functional organizations, and a

Selected Bibliography of pertinent articles in American and foreign periodicals.

Published quarterly, with a separate annual index,

$5.00 a year
$1.50 a copy

by

$3.50 a year
student rate

WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION
40 Mt. Vernon St.
Boston 8, Mass.

THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

A Quarterly Published by
The University of Notre Dame

The Review of Politics bases its work on the Aristotelian concept of politics and is primarily interested in the philosophical and historical approach to political realities.

A selection of articles which appeared in 1955:

Hans J. Morgenthau:	Reflections on the State of Political Science.
Philip E. Mosely:	Hopes & Failures: American Policy Toward East Central Europe, 1941-1947.
Francis G. Wilson:	Public Opinion and the Middle Class.
Raymond P. Stearns:	A Plea for Political History.
Kenneth Thompson:	Beyond National Interest: A Critical Evaluation of Reinhold Niebuhr's Theory of International Politics.
John P. Armstrong:	The Enigma of Senator Taft and American Foreign Policy.
John T. Marcus:	Neutralism in France.
N. S. Timasheff:	The Anti-Religious Campaign in the Soviet Union.
Bernard Crick:	The Strange Quest for an American Conservatism.

Annual Subscription: U.S. and Pan-American, $5.00;
Foreign, $5.40. Single issues, $1.50 each.

Address: The Editors, Review of Politics,
P.O. Box 4, Notre Dame, Indiana.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED